Essays on Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Policy by Aursland, Thor Andreas Thorvalsen
Essays on Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Policy
Thor Andreas Thorvaldsen Aursland

Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I thank my supervisor Gernot Doppelhofer for encouraging my in-
terest in macroeconomics since the first semester of my Master studies. Never have I
found your door closed if I needed to discuss a research idea or technical challenges. I
have particularly appreciated our “Grøt-meetings” which always improved my research.
Without your expertise and enthusiastic pep-talks this thesis would not be possible.
During my time at NHH I have been fortunate to be part of the Macroeconomics and
Natural Resources research group at the Department of Economics. I want to thank both
the members of the group and the Department for providing a stimulating environment
for research. Particularly, I want to thank Øystein Thøgersen, Krisztina Molnar, Jesus
Crespo Cuaresma, Torfinn Harding, Lassi Ahlvik, and Ole-Petter Moe Hansen for great
discussions and feedback on my work.
I want to thank my co-authors Frode and Simen, and Birol, Ivan and Magnus. Your
insights, skills, and drive have taken our research to a level I could not have achieved
alone. Your creativity, attention to detail, and ability to see the big picture, are skills I
strive to mirror in the conduct of my own research.
I thank Andreas Fagereng for encouraging me to apply to the Research Department at
Statistics Norway. The group for macroeconomics has been a professionally stimulating
and welcoming environment. I want to thank Ådne Cappelen, Thomas von Brasch, Elin
Halvorsen, Pål Boug, Roger Hammersland, and Håkon Tretvoll for our discussions and
their valuable comments on my research.
Antonio, Ingrid, Luca, and Serhat, thank you for our friendship and your support.
Since the first day, you made the Ph.D. a great and memorable experience with your
strive for excellence and kindness. I am also grateful to Agnes, Ceren, Charlotte, Felix,
Hallgeir, Ingar, Ingvild, Jack, Johan, Kristina, Oda, Oddmund, Raffaele, Stefan, Ranveig,
Thomas, Tim, Xiaogeng, and Øivind for enriching both my professional and private life.
Finally, I want to thank my friends and family. Thank you for providing relief from
the frequently intense pursuit of academic goals. I want to thank my parents and my
sister for their never-ending support. When I have doubted, you have always supported
my ambitions. Thank you.
i

Contents
Acknowledgements i
Introduction 4
I Does size matter?
The Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, the Fiscal Rule, and the business cycle 8
II State-dependent fiscal multipliers in NORA
A DSGE model for fiscal policy analysis in Norway 54
III Unemployment shocks, cyclical prices and shopping behavior 90

Introduction
In this thesis my co-authors and I address questions related to the sources and conse-
quences of business cycles and economic policy. First, I study how the Fiscal Rule1 and
the size of the Government Pension Fund Global2 affect the propagation of domestic
business cycle shocks. Second, we study how the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates and a lower limit on nominal wage growth affect fiscal multipliers in recessions. In
the third paper we change focus and analyze how business cycles affect households’ and
grocery stores’ behavior, and the consequences for transaction prices.
The two first papers answers questions relevant to policymakers. First, does the Fiscal
Rule and the size of the sovereign wealth fund affect the Norwegian business cycle? The
Fiscal Rule ties withdrawals from sovereign wealth to its value in Norwegian Krone. The
fund has grown relative to the Norwegian economy since the Fiscal Rule was implemented
in 2001. As a result, the government budget is increasingly exposed to exchange rate
variation. Shocks that drive the business cycle might cause exchange rate fluctuations
which lead to unfavorable adjustments to the government budget. That would be an
argument in favor of adjusting the current policy framework. Second, interest rates have
exhibited a secular decline over the past decades, limiting the opportunity for central
banks to lower the policy rate in response to adverse economic shocks. The responsibility
for stabilizing the business cycle is then increasingly seen to be a co-responsibility of
the fiscal authority. One of the fiscal authority’s policy tools is to purchase goods and
services from the private sector. In the second paper we study how these purchases affect
the economy when the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and a lower bound on
nominal wage growth are binding.
To answer these research questions, we have chosen to use dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models. This allows us to focus on the contribution of the fund’s size
and the constraints on prices on the economy, by holding the remaining aspects of the
economy unchanged. The core theories we use are widely used in academia and policy
institutions to analyze similar questions. However, we make several extensions to capture
features of the Norwegian economy. In the first paper, I include the Fiscal Rule and the
sovereign wealth fund in domestic currency in a DSGE model. In the second paper, we
provide a novel model of the Norwegian labor market in a DSGE model and include a
rich tax structure capturing the Norwegian tax system. In comparison to the first paper,
we disregard the effect of exchange rate changes on the withdrawals from the fund.
In the first paper, I find that the interaction of the Fiscal Rule and the size of the
fund matters for how domestic sources of business cycles affect the economy. A domestic
shock to the economy will have an impact on both the real and the nominal exchange
rates. The fund is invested abroad and the larger it is in foreign currency, the larger is
the change in the Norwegian Krone value of the fund for a given change in the exchange
rates. The Fiscal Rule implies that withdrawals from the fund will change more when
the fund is larger, for same change in the exchange rates. I find that the effect of a larger
fund on the fluctuations in output caused by a shock depends on two elements. First,
whether the shock increases or decreases output, and second whether the exchange rate
appreciates or depreciates. A larger fund reinforces the effect of a shock on output, if the
shock increases output and depreciate the exchange rate as the government, behaving
according to the Fiscal Rule, can spend more during the boom when the fund is larger.
1Handlingsregelen in Norwegian.
2Henceforth referred to as “the sovereign wealth fund”, or simply “the fund”.
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If the shock reduces output and depreciates the exchange rate, the impact of the shock
on the economy is reduced following the same logic. I consider technology, monetary
policy, and government consumption shocks. The technology shock increases output and
depreciates the real exchange rate. Hence, a larger fund increases the impact of technology
shocks on output. The effect of a monetary policy shock is also amplified as it causes
the same co-movement in output and the exchange rate. An increase in government
consumption increases output and appreciates the exchange rate. The impact on output
is then reduced by a larger fund, while the effect is small and dependent on the expected
duration of the increase in spending. The more short-lived the increase is, the smaller is
the effect of a larger fund.
In the second paper, we study how the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates
and a lower bound on nominal wage growth affect fiscal multipliers in recessions. We
find that recessions exhibit larger fiscal multipliers compared to normal times, if at least
one constraint is binding. If one of the constraints is binding the multiplier is three
times larger, and if both are binding the multiplier is two times larger. Thus, the two
constraints interact to reduce the expansionary effects of fiscal stimulus during severe re-
cessions. The result is driven by the effect of nominal wage growth on inflation. Suppose
an adverse shock causes a recession in which the zero lower bound is binding. A govern-
ment spending increase during the recession increases nominal wage growth and inflation,
thereby reducing the real interest rate and stimulating consumption and output. If the
lower bound on nominal wage growth is binding, the government spending increase does
not affect nominal wage growth during the recession. Consequently, there is a smaller
increase in firms’ marginal cost and prices increase by less in response to the government
spending increase. Consequently, the real interest rate falls by less and the expansionary
effects on consumption and output are smaller compared to when only the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates is binding. We also show that the interaction of a zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates and a lower bound on nominal wage growth alle-
viate the paradox of thrift. The paradox states that a labor tax reduction has adverse
effects in recessions when the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is binding, as it
reduces wages and thereby inflation and increases the real interest rate. This then leads
to lower consumption and output. The lower bound on nominal wage growth reduces the
potential for lower wages and reduces the negative effects of the labor tax reduction at
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
In the third paper, we ask if households and grocery stores change their behavior over
the business cycle. If so, which aspects of their behavior change, and how large are the
effects on average prices and expenditure. A household can adjust its shopping along
several dimensions. For example, the household can reduce the quality of goods or spend
more time to purchase the same good at a lower price. As expenditures on food and
beverages represent 12 percent of expenditures in the consumer price index, and close
to 25 percent of variable consumption, these adjustments can play a significant role in
households’ responses to shocks over the business cycle. Furthermore, these adjustments
might affect the price level, and hence is of interest to policymakers.
The methodological approach in this paper differs from the approach in the two first.
We use panel data methods and rich data from Norway’s biggest grocery chain to study
how aspects of households’ and grocery stores’ behavior change with the local unemploy-
ment rate. This allows us to utilize variation in the data which would be challenging to
capture in a structural model. Our results, however, can be useful in the parameterization
of structural models as they provide evidence on the quantitative role of different sources
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of price variation at the household level.
We find that households shift their expenditures towards cheaper grocery stores and
brands when the local unemployment rate increases. They take more advantage of sales
and reduce the average price they pay for a product. Grocery stores reduce their prices
when the local unemployment rate increases. By decomposing the price households pay
for products, we find that the willingness to take advantage of sales and changes to the
grocery stores’ prices are the main drivers of product prices at the household level.
6

I Does size matter?
The Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, the Fiscal Rule,
and the business cycle

Does size matter?
The Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, the Fiscal Rule, and the
business cycle∗
Thor Andreas Aursland
Abstract
Does the size of the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund affect the propagation of business cycle shocks
in Norway? To answer this question I calibrate a DSGE model to one small and one large steady-
state value of the fund and study the impulse response functions to technology, monetary policy,
and government consumption shocks. I conclude that while the effects on output of government
consumption shocks are muted by a larger fund, the effects of technology and monetary policy shocks
are amplified. The results are driven by the Fiscal Rule which ties the government’s budget deficit
to the fund’s value measured in domestic currency. As the value of holdings in foreign currency
increases, the impact of exchange rate changes on the budget deficit is exacerbated. Furthermore, a
larger fund lead to more equal consumption outcomes for households following the shock.
1 Introduction
Does the size of the sovereign wealth fund affect the propagation of business cycle shocks in Norway?
The Fiscal Rule1 defines the behavior of withdrawals from the Government Pension Fund Global2. Over
a business cycle, the withdrawal rate should average the expected long-run real return of the fund.
From 2002 to 2018 the Norwegian Krone value of the withdrawal implied by the expected real rate of
return grew from 5 to 22 percent of non-petroleum central government revenue. Hence, the fund plays
an increasingly important role in financing the government’s yearly budget. The increasing reliance on
withdrawals exposes the budget to exchange rate variability. The spending capacity of the government
over the business cycle increasingly depends on the exchange rate movements caused by the shocks driving
the business cycle. For example, with a larger fund, an adverse shock depreciating the exchange rate will
increase the potential for countercyclical policies.
The current situation resembles historic periods in which the budget has been exposed to variable
income streams. Petroleum-related revenue has historically varied between 8 and 20 percent of non-
petroleum central government revenue. In response the government in 1990 passed the law which estab-
lished the sovereign wealth fund and started to transfer the revenue into the fund. Given the current size
of the fund, withdrawals based on a strict interpretation of the Fiscal Rule replaces petroleum-related
revenue as a source of variable income on the budget.
I study whether the size of the sovereign wealth fund and the Fiscal Rule affect the propagation of do-
mestic business cycle shocks to macroeconomic aggregates (such as output, consumption, and government
expenditure components) and consumption outcomes between different types of households. I capture
∗I am grateful to Gernot Doppelhofer for sincere discussions and supervision. I thank Svein Gjedrem for answering
questions related to the fiscal policy framework in Norway and calibration suggestions. Furthermore, I am grateful to
colleagues Pål Boug, Ådne Cappelen, and Håkon Tretvoll at Statistics Norway, and Kristina Bott, Antonio Dalla Zuanna,
Luca Picariello, Ingrid Hoem Sjursen, and Serhat Ugurlu for reading drafts of the paper and providing valuable feedback.
All remaining errors are my own.
1Fiscal Rule with capitalized letters refers to “Handlingsregelen” in Norwegian.
2Henceforth referred to as “the sovereign wealth fund”, or simply “the fund”.
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the consequences of a larger sovereign wealth fund by embedding the Fiscal Rule and the sovereign wealth
fund in a New-Keynesian small open economy model of the Norwegian economy, and study the impulse
response functions around two steady states. The two steady states correspond to the time periods 2002
- 2006 and 2014 - 2018, respectively. The initial period corresponds to the period after the Fiscal Rule
was implemented and value of the fund was 70 percent of annual GDP, on average, while the second
period reflects a period in which the value of the fund was 267 percent of annual GDP, on average.
The Fiscal Rule and sovereign wealth fund implementation allows a decomposition of fund withdrawals
into two components. First, a short-term component reflects business cycle variation in tax revenue and
automatic stabilizers. Second, a medium-term component reflects changes in the domestic-currency value
of the fund due to exchange rate variation, as well as the previous short-term component. The medium-
term component captures two objectives of the Fiscal Rule; withdrawing the long-run real return of the
fund, and smoothing withdrawals from the fund. The larger is the foreign-currency value of the fund,
the larger is the contribution of the exchange rate to the medium-term component, which consequently
is reflected in government consumption and transfers to households.
I find that the effect of a larger fund on shock propagation depends on the shock. A positive technology
shock depreciates the exchange rate and, through the Fiscal Rule, increases government consumption
and transfers to households. Hence, a larger fund implies higher spending following the shock. Higher
government consumption implies a mechanical effect on output and employment which increase relative to
the small-fund steady state. The effect on households’ consumption differs across households which save
(savers) and those who do not (non-savers). Higher government consumption crowds out consumption by
savers, but higher labor income and transfers relative to the small-fund steady state increases consumption
by non-savers. The effect on aggregate consumption is small in the short-term, but leads to lower
aggregate consumption in the medium-term. Because consumption by savers increase after the shock,
and consumption by non-savers fall, irrespective of steady state, a larger fund reduces the differences in
consumption outcomes between the two types of households following the shock.
A positive monetary policy shock increases the nominal (and real) interest rate and triggers a contrac-
tion in output and employment, and an appreciation of the exchange rate. A larger fund held in foreign
currency leads to a larger reduction in the domestic-currency value of the fund following the appreci-
ation. This amplifies the decline in government expenditures implied by the medium-term component,
and therefore amplifies the movements in output and employment following a monetary policy shock.
Consumption by non-savers declines following the shock due to lower labor income, and the reduction is
amplified by the fall in government transfers due to the larger exchange rate effect on the medium-term
component. Consumption by savers decline in response to the shock, but is relatively unaffected by the
size of the fund. Thus, a larger fund amplifies the transmission of the monetary policy shock to aggregate
consumption. Because the interest rate increase leads to a larger decline in savers’ consumption than
non-savers’, irrespective of steady state, the effects from a larger fund reduce differences in consumption
outcomes between savers and non-savers following the monetary policy shock.
A positive shock to government consumption increases output and employment, and triggers an
appreciation of the exchange rate. Because the exchange rate appreciates, a larger fund reduces the
medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund, and leads to a more rapid decline in government
consumption following the initial expansion. Hence, the impact on output and employment is muted
by a larger fund. Because the increase in output, employment, and government consumption is large
irrespective of the size of the fund, the reduction in amplification is small relative to the technology
shock. Consumption by savers declines after the shock, with the effect muted by a larger fund due
to crowding-in from lower government consumption following the real exchange rate appreciation. Non-
savers’ consumption response to the shock is muted by a smaller increase in labor income and and transfers
due to the larger exchange rate effect on the medium-term component. Because the shock, irrespecive of
the fund’s size, crowds out consumption by savers and increases consumption by non-savers, these effects
imply a smaller difference in consumption outcomes between savers and non-savers following the shock
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in the large-fund steady state than in the small-fund steady state.
The results are robust to assumptions regarding the degree of real and nominal rigidities in the
economy, as they do not change the correlation between output and the exchange rate caused by the
shocks. The same holds true with respect to the degree of persistence of the shocks. However, a more
persistent government consumption shock increases the exchange rate appreciation and therefore gives a
clearer illustration of the consequence of a larger fund.
The shocks I consider in this paper are not the only potential drivers of the business cycle. However,
the qualitative effect of a larger sovereign wealth fund might be informative of its role in the propagation
of other shocks. For example, Bergholt et al. (2019) find that, similar to a government consumption shock,
oil price shocks increase output and appreciate the real exchange rate. While the fund itself shields the
budget from a volatile petroleum-related revenue stream, the Fiscal Rule and the size of the fund provides
a second channel which reduce the impact of oil price shocks.
My results follow from the fiscal authority strictly following a fiscal rule, and do not reflect optimal
policy. The results, however, indicate that the fiscal authority can reduce variation in output and em-
ployment by deciding whether to allow exchange rate changes to affect spending, conditional on the level
of output and the real exchange rate. This can be done by taking into account exchange rate effects when
the level output and the real exchange rate, are above and below their long-term levels, respectively. The
advice is simple in theory, however, identifying the long-term level of output and the real exchange rate
is a challenging task.
I study the consequences of following a fiscal rule and a changing size of the government balance sheet,
for the propagation of the business cycle shocks studied by Cochrane (1994) and Ramey (2016). Since
Taylor (1993) policy rules have had a central role in economic policy analysis. Kumhof and Laxton (2013)
analyze the welfare consequences of different fiscal rules when a country produces natural resources. In
the terminology of Kumhof and Laxton (2013), I consider a counter-cyclical rule fiscal rule which they
find to improve welfare of non-saving households. While they show that the response of fiscal instruments
to debt matter little for welfare, I show that a large increase in government assets cause feedback effects
which matter for the positive behavior of the economy.
Beyond their use in economic policy analysis, fiscal rules are adopted by governments to alleviate
deficit biases. Wyplosz (2013) reviews historical experiences with fiscal rules. In the Norwegian context
Gjedrem and Thøgersen (2017) motivate the Fiscal Rule as the practical implementation of the nor-
mative implications that derive from the permanent income hypothesis taking into account growth and
uncertainty in petroleum income. In this paper I show that strictly following a fiscal rule might cause
the budget deficit to increase in booms, contrary to its intended effect. NOU 2015:9 (2015) argue that
the implementation of the Fiscal Rule has been flexible, which has been a key factor to its success. This
suggests that the government has made appropriate, discretionary, adjustments to fund withdrawals and
prevented the adverse effects from a strict interpretation of the Fiscal Rule.
Eichengreen et al. (2005) argue that foreign currency denominated liabilities, both in the private
and public sector, is a typical characteristic of emerging market economies and is a potential source of
economic instability. The Norwegian situation with a large sovereign wealth fund invested in a global
portfolio offers an interesting counterexample. In this paper I show that, in some cases, strict adherence
to a fiscal rule can create larger fluctuations in output with a larger fund. However, the results depends
on the type of fluctuations.
Finally, several authors focus on the role of the fiscal framework in Norway, and the fiscal rule
in the propagation of oil price shocks in Norway. Kjelsrud (2017) and Berisha and Helle (2017) are
the studies closest in scope to the current analysis. Kjelsrud (2017) finds that the response of the
structural oil-adjusted budget deficit to an oil price shock changes from 2011 to 2017, using the large-
scale macroeconometric model KVARTS. Berisha and Helle (2017) interpret a larger sovereign wealth
fund as an additional impulse to the IS-equation following oil price and risk premium shocks in the
model by Røisland and Sveen (2005), and find that a larger fund stabilizes the economy’s response to
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oil price shocks and destabilizes the economy in response to risk premium shocks. Bergholt et al. (2019)
estimate a large-scale DSGE model of Norway with a detailed oil production sector. Their results show
that the sovereign wealth fund combined with the Fiscal Rule reduce the impact of oil price shocks on
the mainland economy compared to spending the resource revenue as it accrues. Given the qualitative
similarity between on output and the real exchange rate of the government consumption shock in this
paper, and that of oil price shocks in Bergholt et al. (2019), the current analysis suggest that the size
of the fund also stabilizes variation in output in response to oil price shocks. Pieschacón (2012) finds
that the Norwegian fiscal framework reduces the impact of oil price shocks on the Norwegian economy
relative to other oil producing countries. Compared to the papers which focus on oil price shocks, I focus
on a a set of domestic shocks. As in Pieschacón (2012), Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2019) study the effect
of oil prices on fiscal policy. By separating between demand and supply factors in driving the oil price,
Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2019) conclude that fiscal policy in Norway is more sensitive to the oil price
since the introduction of the Fiscal Rule.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the current fiscal policy
framework, section 3 presents the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model used to answer the
research question, section 4 describes the calibration of the model, section 5 contains the empirical
predictions of a larger sovereign wealth fund and changed policy rule, section 6 examines the robustness
of the results to assumptions regarding rigidities and shock persistence, and section 7 concludes.
2 The fiscal framework in Norway
In this section, I review the elements of the fiscal policy framework which are captured in the model, and
are the most relevant to the research questions. A full description can be found in the annual budget
Meld. St. 1 (2019 -2020) (2019).3
The government receives a net cash flow from petroleum related activities due to the extraction of oil
and gas on the continental shelf. The cash-flow is volatile and is closely related to oil and gas prices. To
avoid large fluctuations in fiscal policy instruments in response to short-term variation in resource prices,
the cash flow is transferred to the Government Pension Fund Global. Consequently, the policy-relevant
budget balance is the oil adjusted budget deficit; the budget deficit ignoring petroleum-related revenues
accruing to the government. By law, the fund is invested in a global portfolio consisting of bonds, equities,
and real estate. Cash flows accruing to the fund are reinvested in the portfolio.
The Fiscal Rule describes the behavior of withdrawals from the sovereign wealth fund. The withdrawal
rate should average the expected long-run real return of the fund over the business cycle. The expected
long-run real return was four percent in 2002 and revised to three percent in 2017. In a given budget
year the degree of “spending” (out of the value of the fund) is measured by the structural oil-adjusted
budget deficit. The structural oil-adjusted budget deficit adjusts revenue and spending components of the
budget for business cycle variations and the effects of petroleum activities. Panel A of figure 1 displays the
development of the structural oil adjusted budget deficit as a share of mainland trend GDP, as estimated
by the Meld. St. 1 (2019 -2020) (2019). Consistent with spending the expected long-run real return
on the fund value, the structural oil-adjusted budget deficit has increased with the size of the fund. In
the first year the fiscal rule was operative in 2002 the structural oil-adjusted deficit was three percent of
mainland GDP and grew to seven percent in 2018.
The oil adjusted budget deficit corresponds to the actual withdrawal, or cash flow, from the sovereign
wealth fund to the budget. By law (Meld. St. 1 (2019 -2020), 2019, p. 44), central government budget
deficits must be financed by withdrawals from the sovereign wealth fund; i.e. debt financing is not feasible.
Hence, withdrawals from the sovereign wealth fund are equal to the primary budget deficit and contain
a component due to business cycle variation. The cyclical component of the budget deficit is plotted in
3 See in particular box 3.2.
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panel B of figure 1. On average a 1 percent output gap corresponds to a 0.5 percentage point deviation
of the oil adjusted, cyclical, budget deficit to trend GDP ratio.
In the long-run the fiscal framework should maintain the real value of the sovereign wealth fund
(Meld. St. 1 (2019 -2020), 2019, p. 44) to the benefit of future generations. The objective of, on average,
spending the (expected) long-run real return of the fund and maintaining the real value of the fund raises
a potential trade-off for the central government, as temporary shocks will have permanent effects on the
value of the fund.
Finally, large changes in the value of the fund (e.g. due to nominal exchange rate changes or portfolio
returns) should be reflected in spending over time.
3 Model
This section presents the model used to analyze the research questions. The model is closely related to
Justiniano and Preston (2010), and extended with a non-traded sector to match the low import-content of
public consumption. In order to generate realistic effects of fiscal policy the model features non-Ricardian
households as in Galí et al. (2007), henceforth referred to as non-savers as in Leeper et al. (2017). The
government collects revenues from consumption, labor and corporate taxes, and spends on government
consumption and transfers to households. The fiscal rule is implemented as a feedback rule from the
fund’s value to government spending, a mechanism similar to that in Corsetti et al. (2012).
3.1 Firms
3.1.1 Sectoral and final goods
There are three sectoral goods: the non-traded good, zN,t, the domestic traded good, zH,t, and the foreign
traded good zF,t. The sectoral goods are produced by a representative firm in a perfectly competitive
market, using a CES-production technology
zj,t =
[∫ 1
0
zj,t(i)
(εj−1)/εjdi
]εj/(εj−1)
, i ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
where i is the continuum of intermediate good producers, εj is the elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods in sector j = N,H,F . Profit maximization by firms in these industries gives rise to
well-known demand functions and price indices
zj,t(i) =
(
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t
)−εj
zj,t, ∀i, j = N,H,F (2)
Pj,t =
[∫ 1
0
Pj,t(i)
1−εjdi
]1/(1−εj)
, j = N,H,F. (3)
A representative firm, operating in a perfectly competitive market, produces the traded good, zT,t,
combining the domestic and foreign sectoral goods using a CES production function with elasticity of
substitution η and share parameter α
zT,t =
[
α1/ηz
η−1
η
H,t + (1− α)
1/η
z
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
. (4)
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Profit mazimization by the representative firm gives the following demand functions and price index
zH,t =
(
PH,t
PT,t
)−η
zT,t (5)
zF,t =
(
PF,t
PT,t
)−η
zT,t (6)
PT,t =
[
αP 1−ηH,t + (1− α)P 1−ηF,t
]1/(1−η)
(7)
The final private consumption good, zt, is produced by a representative firm operating in a perfectly
competitive market. The firm combines the non-traded and traded good according to a CES production
function with share parameter γ and elasticity of substitution θc
ct =
[
γ1/θcc
θc−1
θc
N,t + (1− γ)
1/θc c
θc−1
θc
T,t
] θc
θc−1
. (8)
Profit maximizing by the representative firm yields the following demand functions and price index
zN,t = γ
(
PN,t
Pt
)−θc
zt (9)
zH,t = (1− γ)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−θc
zt (10)
Pt =
[
γP 1−θcN,t + (1− γ)P 1−θcH,t
]1/(1−θc)
. (11)
The final public consumption good is equal to the non-traded sectoral good.
3.1.2 Intermediate good producers
Intermediate good producers operate with a decreasing returns to scale technology using labor, nj(i), as
the only input
yj,t(i) = AjZtnj,t(i)
αj ,∀i ∈ [0, 1], j = N,H (12)
where Aj is the technology level in each sector, Zt is an exogenous productivity shifter common across
sectors, and αj is the elasticity of output with respect to labor used by the firm. Given the firm’s price,
Pj,t(i), and the unit cost of labor, Wt, the surplus from production, DIVj,t(i) = Pj,t(i)yj,t −Wtnj,t(i), is
paid out as dividends to savers (who own the firms). Firms maximize the discounted value of dividends
using savers’ discount factor. Intermediate good firms have monopoly power, and every period the firm
has a probability of 1 − θj to freely set its price as in Calvo (1983). If the firm is not allowed to set
its price, the price is updated according to a geometric average of lagged and steady-state inflation with
weight χj as in Leeper et al. (2017)
Pj,t = Π
χj
t+kΠ
1−χj
ss Pj,t−1, j = N,H. (13)
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is consumer price inflation. Firms which set prices in period t maximize the ex-
pected discounted value of dividends using savers’ (nominal) discount factor, βkλ̃t+k, subject to satisfying
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demand at the chosen price
max
P#j (i)
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(βθj)
k λ̃t+k
λ̃t
[
Pj,t+kP#j,t(i)yj,t+k|t(i)−Ψ(yj,t+k|t(i))
]]
s.t. yj,t+k|t(i) =
(
Pj,t+kP#j,t(i)
Pj,t+k
)−εj
zj,t+k
Ψ(yj,t+k|t(i)) = Wt
(
yj,t+k|t(i)
AjZt
)1/αj
,
where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on information available to the firm at date t, Ψ
is the cost of production and Wt the nominal wage. The optimal price, P
#
j (i), satisfies the first order
condition
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(θjβ)
k
λ̃t+kyj,t+k|t(i)
[
Pj,t+kP#j,t(i)−
εj
εj − 1
ψj,t+k|t(i)
]]
= 0 (14)
where yj,t+k|t(i) and ψj,t+k|t are demand and nominal marginal cost of firms setting prices in period t.
Production of the final imported good follows Kollmann (2002) in which producers of the imported
good, zF,t, are located abroad and re-brand the foreign final good and to sell it in Home. Similar to
domestic intermediate good produdcers, exporters to Home have monopoly power and are subject to a
pricing friction. They solve the following maximization problem
max
P#F,t(i)
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
θkFR
∗−kE−1t+k
[
PF,t+kP#F,t(i)− Et+kP ∗F,t+k
]
yF,t+k|t(i)
]
s.t. yF,t+k|t(i) =
(
PF,t+kP#F,t(i)
PF,t+k
)−εF
zF,t+k, ∀k,
where R∗ is the foreign nominal interest rate, Et is the nominal exchange rate, θF is the probability
foreign exporters are not allowed to adjust their price, and P ∗F,t is the price of the nominal price of the
Foreign good (i.e. the price level in Foreign), P#F,t is the optimal price set by foreign exporters. Indexation
is defined similar to (13). The first order condition is similar to (14).
3.2 Labor market
3.2.1 Labor agency
A price-taking labor agency packages a continuum of differentiated labor services (professions), indexed by
m ∈ [0, 1], into a composite labor input using a CES production technology with elasticity of substitution
εW and sells it to domestic producers of intermediate goods. Cost minimization by the labor agency gives
the following demand function for each labor type and nominal wage index respectively
nt(m) =
(
Wt(m)
Wt
)−εW
(nN,t + nH,t) (15)
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(m)
1−εW dm
]1/(1−εW )
(16)
where Wt(m) and Wt are the nominal wage in profession m and the wage index, respectively, and nt(m)
is demand for labor service m given total labor demand nt. Labor demand for each labor service is
homogeneously distributed towards each household.
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3.2.2 Labor unions
Each profession is organized in a union which sets the nominal wage on behalf of its members. Every
period there is a probability 1− θW that the profession is allowed to set its wage. Unions which are not
allowed to set their wage, index wage growth in the same way as intermediate good producers, with weight
χW on lagged inflation. As in Leeper et al. (2017) and Forni et al. (2009), labor demand is assumed to
be uniformly distributed across households, and that all households receive the same wage. This implies
that all households work the same amount of hours in each profession. The per period pay-off of the
union is
∫ 1
0
[
Wt(m)nt(h,m)λ̃t − v(nt(h))
]
dh
= Wt(m)nt(m)λ̃t − v(nt) (17)
where nt(h,m) is labor supply by household h to profession m, and nt(h) =
∫ 1
0
nt(h,m)dm is labor
supply by household h, h ∈ [0, 1]. Nominal labor income is valued using savers marginal utility of
nominal wealth and disutility from working by household i is given by v(nt(h)). Professions which set
their wage in period t maximize the discounted sum of expected pay-offs with respect to the profession’s
wage subject to satisfying labor demand
max
W#t (m)
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(θWβ)
k
[
PW,t+kW#t (m)nt+k(m)λ̃t+k − v(nt+k)
]]
s.t. nt+k|t(m) =
(
PW,t+kW#t (m)
Wt+k
)−εW
(nN,t+k + nH,t+k)
nj,t+k =
∫ 1
0
nj,t+k(m)dm j = N,H
where nt+k|t(m) is labor supplied by professions setting wages in period t at date t+k,W
#
t is the optimal
wage set by professions setting wages in period t, PW,t+k is wage indexation and follows the recursion in
equation (13) with indexation parameter χW . Optimal wage-setting results in the following first order
condition
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(βθW ) λ̃t+knt+k|t
[
PW,t+kW#t −
εW
εW − 1
v′(nt+k)
λ̃t+k
]]
= 0
where the profession index is omitted as all professions setting wages choose the same wage.
3.3 Households
3.3.1 Savers
Savers in the model consume the final consumption good and save in domestic and foreign bonds. They
receive income from supplying their labor, and ownership of bonds and domestic firms. Saving in foreign
bonds is subject to a risk premium, rpt, which depends on the households’ foreign net assets, as in
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). The risk premium determines the steady-state level of net foreign
assets and ensures stationarity of net foreign assets. The households’ budget constraint is given by
(1 + τ c)Ptc
s
t (h) +B
s
H,t(h) +B
s
F,tEt(h) = Rt−1B
s
H,t−1(h) +R
∗rpt−1B
s
F,t−1(h)Et
+ (1− τw)
∫ 1
0
Wt(m)n
s
t (h,m)dm+
(
1− τK
)
DIV st (h) + Pttrnf
s
t (h) (18)
where h ∈ (γns, 1] and γns is the fraction of non-savers in the economy and superscript s denotes choice
variables, or incomes, of savers. Ptcst BsH,t and B
s
F,t are nominal purchases of the final consumption good,
17
domestic and foreign bonds, respectively. DIV st is the nominal value of dividends received from firm
ownership, trnfst is the real value of transfers received from the government, and τ j , j = c, w,K are tax
rates on consumption, labor income, and firm profits, respectively. Finally, the risk premium on foreign
investments is given by
rpt = e
−φb(EtBAggF,t /Pt−b̄F ) (19)
where φb determines the risk premium’s sensitivity to the deviation of the country’s real net foreign assets
from its steady-state value b̄F . Savers maximize the expected value of discounted utility. Utility in each
period is a function of consumption, cst , and labor effort, nst
u(cst (h), c
s
t−1, n
s
t (h)) =
σ − 1
σ (1− hc)
(cst (h)− hccst )1−1/σ −
χ
1 + ψ
nst (h)
1+ψ (20)
where σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ψ the Frisch elasticity, hc the degree of consumption
habits, and χ the disutility of working. Habits depend on the aggregate level of consumption by savers,
cst . Hence, savers solve the optimization problem
max
{cst+k(h),BsH,t+k(h),BsF,t+k(h)}∞k=0
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
u(cst+k(h), c
s
t+k−1, n
s
t+k(h))
]
s.t. (1 + τ c)Pt+kcst+k(h) +B
s
H,t(h) + Et+kB
s
F,t(h) = Rt+k−1B
s
H,t−1(h)
+R∗t+k−1rpt+k−1Et+kB
s
F,t+k−1(h)
+ (1− τw)
∫ 1
0
Wt+k(m)n
s
t+k(h,m)dm
+
(
1− τK
)
DIV st+k(h) + Pt+ktrnf
s
t+k(h), ∀k
The optimality conditions are
∂u
∂cst
= (1 + τ c)Ptλ̃t (21)
λ̃t = βRtEt
[
λ̃t+1
]
(22)
Etλ̃t = βR
∗rptEt
[
Et+1λ̃t+1
]
(23)
where λ̃ is the marginal utility of (nominal) wealth. The household index is omitted as savers work
in all professions and face the same wages and prices, and therefore choose the same consumption and
investment path.
3.3.2 Non-Savers
Non-savers consume their disposable income each period. Similarly to savers, non-savers receive labor
income, transfers from the government, and pay taxes on their consumption expenditures and labor
income. However, they do not have any source of capital income. To compensate for this, transfers
from the government contain a constant lump-sum transfer from savers to non-savers to ensure equal
steady-state consumption. Hence, γns corresponds to the share of non-savers in aggregate consumption
(and not simply the share of households in the economy). As in Leeper et al. (2017) non-savers set their
wage equal to the average wage rate of savers. Consequently, non-savers have the same wage rate and
hours worked as savers. Consumption by non-savers is given by
(1 + τ c)Ptc
ns
t (h) = (1− τw)Wtnnst (h) + Pttrnfnst (h) (24)
18
where h ∈ [0, γns].
3.4 Government
3.4.1 Monetary policy
I define output as the value of output at constant, steady-state, prices
yFP,t ≡ pH,ssyH,t + pN,ssyN,t
Monetary policy follows the Taylor rule
Rt
Rss
=
(
Rt−1
Rss
)ρR [(Πt
Π̄
)φR,Π ( yFP,t
yFP,ss
)φR,y]1−ρR
ezR,t
where φR,Π and φR,y are the long-term responses of monetary policy to the inflation gap and the output
gap, respectively. The degree of interest rate smoothing is given by ρR, and zR,t represents a monetary
policy shock and follows an AR(1) process.
3.4.2 Fiscal policy
3.4.2.1 Asset accumulation and the budget balance
The fiscal authority levies taxes on households, provides transfers to households, and purchases goods from
the non-traded sector, gt. In nominal terms, the primary oil-adjusted budget deficit of the government
is given by
PBDt = PN,tgt + Pttrnft − τ cPtct − τwWtnt − τKDIVt
where DIVt is total profits/dividends from intermediate good producers, and trnft is total transfers to
savers and non-savers. Government debt, Dt, accumulates according to
Dt = Rt−1Dt−1 + PBDt − FRt
where FRt is the value of the withdrawal from the sovereign wealth fund in domestic currency. Due to
offshore petroleum activity, the government receives a (net) cash flow from petroleum related activities in
every period. This cash flow is transferred directly into the sovereign wealth fund. The objective of the
paper is not to explain variation in the cash flow from petroleum related activities, and so it is assumed
constant and denominated in domestic currency. Hence, the value of the sovereign wealth fund in foreign
currency, Ωt, evolves according to
Ωt = RSWF,t−1Ωt−1 + (OilRev − FRt) /Et.
3.4.2.2 Fiscal rules
Closing the fiscal sector requires specifying the behavior of tax rates, government spending, transfers,
and the model of the fiscal rule withdrawal. Historically tax changes following tax reforms have not
been motivated by business cycle variation and hence marginal tax rates are assumed constant 4 and
only expenditures adjust to fluctuations in the fund’s value. In the following I refer to fluctuations in
expenditure variables due to fluctuations in the fund value as medium term. This follows the terminology
4 Since the introduction of the fiscal rule, there have been three major reforms. First, the reform in 2006 was motivated
by increased compliance to EU rules and reducing the opportunities for tax avoidance (Alstadsæter et al., 2006, p. 56
paragraph 4.2)). Second, the pension reform was motivated by sustainability of the pension system. Finally, the tax reform
in 2014 was motivated by global developments in business taxation (NOU 2014:13, 2014)).
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in Corsetti et al. (2012) in which feedback from debt to government consumption is referred to as medium-
term movements in government consumption.
Real government consumption expenditure is determined by two components reflecting the short- and
medium-term components, respectively,
gSTt = ge
zg,t (25)
gMTt = ψg,FR
FRMTt − FRMTss
PN,t
(26)
gt = g
ST
t + g
MT
t . (27)
where zg,t represents discretionary expenditure changes, and follows an AR(1) process. The parameter
ψg,FR determines the sensitivity of government consumption to variations in the withdrawals from the
fund.
The fiscal policy framework requires all deficits to be financed by withdrawals from the sovereign
wealth fund. To ensure this property of the fiscal framework, transfers to households adjust to ensure
zero debt. This implies that the primary budget deficit is financed by the transfer from the sovereign
wealth fund
PBDt = FRt (28)
and the withdrawal is equal to the budget deficit.
The fiscal rule withdrawal is specified according to the government’s objectives of spending a fraction
of the fund equal to the expected long-run real rate of return every year, avoiding large year-to-year
withdrawals, and yielding a counter-cyclical level of transfers to households.
The withdrawal from the sovereign wealth fund is separated in two components to capture these
effects; a component due to short-term concerns, FRST , and one due to medium-term concerns FRMT
FRt = FR
ST
t + FR
MT
t . (29)
The short-term component is driven by business cycle developments domestically, e.g. variation in tax
revenue, whereas the medium-term component captures the Fiscal Rule and how the withdrawal depends
on the fund value.
First, the medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund depends on the deviation of the
size of the fund from it’s steady-state value according to
FRMTt
Pt
= ρFR
FRMTt−1
Pt−1
+ (1− ρFR) fr + γFR
(
Ωt−1Et−1
Pt−1
Pt−1
Pt
− ωss
)
(30)
where fr is the steady-state level of the withdrawal from the fund in consumption units, and determines
the model-equivalent of the structural oil adjusted budget deficit, and ωss is the steady-state value of the
fund in domestic consumption units. The parameter γFR determines the pass-through of changes to the
fund value to the size of the withdrawal (the Fiscal Rule), and ρFR determines the degree of smoothing.
A higher value of ρFR implies a higher degree of smoothing of government expenditure. There are several
reasons to smooth withdrawals. First, it prevents sharp adjustments of government consumption and
transfers. Second, the political process may give rise to “sluggish” behavior; an initial increase in the fund
value is difficult to reverse in the next quarter, or year. The value of the fund at the start of the year
is the baseline for the budget year’s withdrawal. Hence, it is the value of the fund given last period’s
real exchange rate which is the determinant of the medium-term component of the withdrawal. This also
ensures that exchange rate fluctuations do not immediately affect spending.
To understand how the medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund matters for transfers
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to households (the balancing item of the debt accumulation equation), assume that the economy is at
steady state, but the medium-term component differs from its steady state value. Substitute for the
primary budget deficit, and the fund withdrawal in equation (28) to obtain
Pt (trnft − trnfss) = (1− ψg,FR)
(
FRMTt − Ptfr
)
(31)
Hence, 1− ψg,FR determines the sensitivity of transfers to changes in the fund value.
The short-term withdrawal depends on business cycle variation in tax revenue, discretionary govern-
ment consumption, and employment from their respective steady-state values in the following way
FRSTt
Pt
= −φFR,tr (trt − trss) + φFR,g
(
pN,tg
ST
t − pN,ssg
)
− φFR,nwss (nt − nss) (32)
where trt ≡ τ cct + τwwtnt + τKdivt is real tax revenue, where wt = Wt/Pt and divt = DIVt/Pt are real
wages and dividends, respectively. Depending on coefficients in the rule, this allows the model-equivalent
of the cyclical oil adjusted budget deficit in figure 1 to deviate from zero in response to domestic business
cycle developments. To interpret the consequences of this rule, it is useful to substitute for the sovereign
wealth fund withdrawal, and the primary budget deficit in equation (28). Assume that the fund is at its
steady-state value such that the medium-term component of the withdrawal is zero. Then we have that
trnft − trnfss = (1− φFR,tr) (trt − trss)− (1− φFR,g)
(
pN,tg
ST
t − pN,ssg
)
− φFR,nwss (nt − nss) (33)
This specification nests multiple potential assumptions about how transfers to households adjust to
shocks in the economy. Assume first, at odds wit with the Fiscal Rule, that φFR,tr = φFR,g = φFR,n = 0.
From equation (32), this captures a situation in which the fiscal authority does not withdraw resources
from the fund to make up for below steady-state tax revenue, and employment, or above steady-state
government consumption expenditure. To ensure that there is no debt (in line with the Fiscal Rule), the
fiscal authority reduces transfers to household. Hence, the coefficient on the tax revenue and government
consumption expenditure gaps in equation (33) are one. Second, assume φFR,tr = φFR,g = 1. In
this case, the government finances short-term fluctuations in tax revenue and government consumption
expenditures with withdrawals from the sovereign wealth fund, and thereby avoids fluctuations in transfers
to households over the business cycle. This is in line with the intentions in the Fiscal Rule, as the
government uses the fund to smooth variations in revenue. Finally, the rule generates counter-cyclical
transfer to households, when φFR,tr = φFR,g = 1 and φFR,n > 0. This corresponds to the baseline
calibration.
We can summarize the consequences of a zero-debt policy for transfers to households in a similar way
as the decomposition of government consumption
trnfSTt = (1− φFR,tr) (trt − trss)− (1− φFR,g)
(
pN,tg
ST
t − g
)
− φFR,nwss (nt − nss)
trnfMTt = trnfss + (1− ψg,FR)
(
FRMTt
Pt
− fr
)
trnft = trnf
ST
t + trnf
MT
t
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3.5 Market clearing and aggregation
Market clearing in intermediate goods and labor markets yield
ANZtn
αN
N,t = vN,t
(
cAggN,t + gt
)
(34)
AHZtn
αH
H,t = vH,t
(
cAggH,t + c
∗
H,t
)
(35)
nt = vW,t (nN,t + nH,t) (36)
where
c∗H,t =
(
PH,t/Et
P ∗t
)−η∗H
c̄∗H (37)
v
1/αj
j,t = θj (ιj,t/Πj,t)
−εj/αj v1/αjj,t−1 + (1− θj)
(
p#j,t/pj,t
)−εj/αj
, j = N,H (38)
vW,t = θW (ιW,t/ΠW,t)
−εW vW,t−1 + (1− θW )
(
w#t /wt
)−εW
(39)
ιj,t = Π
χj
j,t−1Π
1−χj
ss , j = N,H,W (40)
where c∗H,t is foreign demand for domestic export goods, vj,t are price, and wage dispersion due to
Calvo frictions, and lower-case letters refer to prices relative to the consumer price index. Aggregate
consumption demand and transfers are given by xAggt = γnsxnst + (1− γns)xst , x = cN , cH , cF , c, trnf .
Labor effort is identical across households implying nAggt = nnst = nst . Only savers have assets and receive
dividends, implying xt = (1− γns)xst , x = DIVN , DIVH , BF . Domestic bonds are in zero net supply
BH,t = 0 (41)
3.5.1 Exogenous AR(1) processes
The exogenous AR(1) processes driving the productivity shifter, the monetary policy shock, and the
government consumption shock are given by
log (Zt) = ρZ log (Zt−1) + uZ,t (42)
zR,t = ρz,RzR,t−1 + uR,t (43)
zg,t = ρz,gzg,t−1 + ug,t, (44)
respectively, where the ρ’s are the persistence of the shocks.
4 Model calibration
This section describes the calibration of the model. I first describe the parameters which determine
the steady state, and next the remaining parameters of the model. The steady state of the baseline
calibration is calibrated to match shares in consumer price index, the size of the non-petroleum trade
balance and the size of government variables relative to mainland GDP, and effective marginal tax rates
in the period from 2014Q1 to 2018Q4. This reflects a period with a large sovereign wealth fund relative
to GDP. Dynamic parameters are chosen to match parameter estimates in estimated DSGE models of
Norway, and microeconomic estimates where feasible.
National accounts and consumer price index data are collected from Statistics Norway, the market
value of the fund is taken from Macrobond, and data used to calculate effective marginal tax rates are
collected from the OECD.
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Parameter Description Value
Households
γns Share of non-savers in the economy 0.3
φb Risk premium sensitivity to NFA 0.0001
σ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1
hc Habit persistence 0.85
ψ Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 3
β Utility discount factor 0.9975
γ Expenditure share of non-traded goods 0.489
α Share of exports in traded basket 0.393
θc Elasticity of subst. T-NT goods 0.5
η Elasticity of subst. H-F goods 0.5
εj Intermediate goods substitution, k = N,H,F 6
Firms
αN Labor-intensity in N-sector 0.754
αH Labor-intensity in H-sector 0.718
θN Calvo parameter in N-sector 0.87
θH , θF Calvo parameter in H,F-sector 0.75
χj Degree of indexation to lagged CPI inflation, k = N,H,F 1
Foreign sector
η∗H Export demand elasticity 0.5
Labor market
εW Elasticity of substitution between professions 2.5
θW Calvo parameter in wage setting 0.82
χW Degree of indexation to lagged wage inflation 1
Monetary policy rule
ρR Monetary policy smoothing 0.85
φR,Π Monetary policy long-run inflation response 2
φR,y Monetary policy long-run output response 0.125
log
(
Π̄
)
Steady-state inflation rate 0.5%
Exogenous processes AR(1), shock persistence
ρZ Technology shock 0.7
ρz,R Monetary policy 0
ρz,g Government consumption 0.7
Fiscal policy rules
Medium-term component
ρFR Medium-term withdrawal smoothing 0.9
γFR Withdrawal rate (quarterly) 1%
Short-term component
φFR,tr Tax revenue replacement 1
φFR,g Government consumption replacement 1
φFR,n Transfer response to employment 0.6
Government consumption
ψg,FR Sensitivity to medium-term component 0.45
Tax rates
τ c Effective tax rate on consumption 0.263
τw Effective tax rate on labor income 0.419
τK Effective tax rate on capital income 0.193
Table 1: Overview of calibrated parameters. See text for details.
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Variables relative to GDP Value
Household consumption 0.82
Exports 0.16
Imports 0.25
Government consumption 0.28
Government transfers to households 0.34
Tax revenue 0.55
Fiscal rule transfer 0.07
NFA of households 2.55
Sovereign wealth fund 2.67
Government debt 0.00
Employment, sectoral ratios and prices
Labor income share 0.62
Employment rate 0.96
Relative employment (NT-T) 2.23
Relative production value (NT-T) 2.12
Annual real interest rate 1.0%
Annual inflation rate 2.2%
Annual, nominal, SWF return 6.2%
Table 2: Calibration targets and steady-state values in the model.
4.1 Steady-state parameters
The share of wage costs in value added in the two intermediate goods producing sectors is given by
αj/µj , j = H,N . Following (Kravik and Mimir, 2019) and Aursland et al. (2020), the markup in all
sectors is set to 1.2. This implies an elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods in the three
sectors of 6. The elasticity of value added with respect to labor, αj , is set to match the share of wage
costs in value added in the two sectors. The wage share in the traded sector is 59.9 percent and 62.9
in the non-traded sector. This gives an αH of 0.718 and an αN of 0.754. Following Kravik and Mimir
(2019) the elasticity of substitution among labor services, εW , is set to 2.5.
The share parameters of the consumption aggregates are chosen to match the import share in the
consumer price index, and the share of service expenditure in household expenditures.5 Over the sample
period, the average share of imports in the CPI is 31.0 percent and the expenditure share of services in
household consumption is 48.9 percent, yielding a γ of 0.489 and α of 0.393. The steady-state level of
households’ net foreign assets, b̄F , is set to match the sample non-petroleum trade balance to mainland
GDP ratio of minus 9.8 percent.
The utility discount factor is set to obtain a steady-state real interest rate of one percent annually,
yielding a β of 0.9975.6 Steady-state inflation, Π̄, is set to 1.005 to match an average inflation rate of the
calibration period of 2.2 percent annually. The steady-state real rate of return of the fund is calibrated
to four percent annually to match the expected real return in the early part of the calibration period.
Hence, the steady-state nominal return is 6.2 percent given the assumption of no steady-state nominal
exchange rate changes, and equal real interest rates domestically and abroad.
The steady-state level of government consumption, and the sovereign wealth fund are set to match
the average value of government consumption, and the sovereign wealth fund to mainland GDP ratio
5 Service and goods consumption expenditures are used as proxies for the consumption of non-tradable and tradable
goods.
6 The average real interest rate of the sample is negative, and a real interest rate of one is chosen to achieve a discount
factor lower than one.
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of 27.9 percent, and 10.7 percent, respectively. Finally, the steady-state level of fiscal transfers is set
to match the average size of the oil adjusted budget deficit to GDP ratio of 7.3 percent. Because the
consequences of oil extraction and oil price variation is not the focus of analysis in this paper, the ratio of
oil revenue to mainland GDP is determined residually to allow the model to match the budget surplus,
and the sovereign wealth to GDP ratio.
The effective marginal tax rates are determined following the method outlined in Mendoza et al.
(1994). For the calibration period this gives τ c = 0.263, τw = 0.419, and τK = 0.193.
4.2 Dynamic parameters
As in Kravik and Mimir (2019) and Aursland et al. (2020), the inverse of the Frisch elasticity, ψ, is
set to 3 and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, is set to 1. These are common values in
the literature. The labor disutility parameter is set to match the employment rate of 0.96. The habit
persistence parameter, hc, is set to 0.85 which is a typical value in the literature, and in line with the
results in Bergholt et al. (2019).
The elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods, θc, is set to 0.5. Akinci (2011)
summarizes empirical estimates and find ranges below one for this parameter. Estimated DSGE models
tend to find low elasticities of substitution between tradable goods, see Bodenstein (2010). DSGE-models
of Norway such as Kravik and Mimir (2019) and Bergholt et al. (2019) use a value of one half, and one
respectively. Due to the nested CES structure of the current model, a similar value could (ceteris paribus)
result in a lower elasticity of the share of foreign traded goods in the consumption basket. In order to
obtain a similar level of substitutability as in Kravik and Mimir (2019), η is set to 0.57. Preferences in
Home and Foreign are similar with η∗ equal to 0.5.
Wulfsberg (2016) finds that the average duration of a price spell for services is approximately eight
quarters, while two to three quarters for goods. Bergholt et al. (2019) find the same qualitative difference
in pricing behavior between the two sectors, but a higher level of price rigidity in the manufacturing
sector. In line with these studies, θN and θH are set to 0.87 and 0.75 respectively. Bergholt et al.
(2019) find that nominal wages are more sticky than the price of manufacturing goods, but adjusted
more frequently than prices in the service sector. Based on their results, I set θW to 0.82.
The degree of price indexation varies considerably across DSGE-models of the Norwegian economy.
Kravik and Mimir (2019) assume full indexation to lagged inflation. Bergholt et al. (2019) estimate a low
weight to lagged inflation and a high weight on steady-state inflation for prices, and an approximately
equal weight for nominal wages. As in Kravik and Mimir (2019), all prices and wages are assumed to be
fully indexed to lagged inflation. Hence, χj , j = N,H,F,W is set to 1.
There is significant smoothing in the key policy rate with a coefficient on the lagged interest rate, ρR,
of 0.85, and a long-run response to inflation of 2. The output response, φR,y, is set to 0.125. Under the
baseline calibration, this is the highest value which avoids deflation in response to a persistent government
consumption shock.
The withdrawal rate, γFR, from the sovereign wealth fund is set to 0.01, which corresponds to a four
percent annual withdrawal rate. This is line with the long-term concerns of the fiscal rule (the Fiscal
Rule) to spend the expected real return on the fund. Furthermore, the medium-term component of
the withdrawal from the sovereign wealth fund is smooth with a ρFR of 0.9. A smooth medium-term
component is consistent with the government’s concern of smoothing large fluctuations in the fund value,
as described in section 2. Real government consumption and transfers to households adjust to the medium-
term component of withdrawals with rates ψg,FR and 1 − ψg,FR, respectively. The parameter ψg,FR is
set to 0.45 reflecting the steady-state share of government consumption expenditures in government
spending8.
7 If the price of foreign goods increases by one percent in the current model, demand falls by (1− α) θ+αη. η is chosen
such that this expression is 0.5 as in Kravik and Mimir (2019). Because θ is 0.5, the solution is η = 0.5.
8I am indebted to Svein Gjedrem for suggesting this calibration.
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Fluctuations in tax revenue are fully smoothed by withdrawals from the sovereign wealth fund, as
described in section 2. Hence, φfr,tr = 1. Furthermore, changes in nominal government consumption
spending, are financed by withdrawals from the fund in the short-term, i.e. φfr,g = 1. In models
with government debt, these assumptions are akin to assuming debt-financing of the government deficit.
Finally, transfers to households depend on employment status (e.g. unemployment insurance). Hence,
the short-term component of the budget surplus depends on the use of labor with φfr,n = 0.6. This value
is close to the replacement rate of unemployment benefits 9. Furthermore, the model does not separate
between the extensive and intensive margin of labor supply. However, the deviation of total hours from
trend can be decomposed into a gap reflecting the number of employed persons and a gap reflecting hours
per person. Panel B of figure 2 shows that the gap is mostly driven by the number of persons working.
Hence, φfr,n is set to capture how transfers depend on the employment in the economy.
5 Results
5.1 Impulse response functions
In this section, I consider a shock to the level of technology, monetary policy, and government consump-
tion. The shock size is set to yield a peak effect on output of one percent. The sign of the shock is chosen
to increase the budget deficit. The impulse response functions are generated by linearizing the model
around the steady state using the DYNARE software (Adjemian et al., 2011).
5.1.1 Technology
Figure 3 displays the economy’s response to the technology shock. Increased productivity reduces in-
termediate goods firms’ marginal cost and firms reduce price growth. At lower prices output expands
in both sectors. The expansion in output is smaller than the increase in productivity, due to rigidities
in price setting. Hence, demand for labor falls in both sectors. Falling inflation dominates the effect
of lower output, inducing the central bank to reduce the nominal interest rate. The real interest rate
increases in the short-run but falls below its steady state value as the policy rate fully incorporates the
fall in inflation. Savers expecting higher real interest rates increase consumption growth. Savers in the
economy are wealthier following the productivity shock; at unchanged prices the quantity of production
increases. Hence, savers increase consumption on impact and thereafter. Wealthier savers desire to work
less and would increase the real wage. However, lower labor demand outweighs the wealth effect, and the
real wage falls. Lower employment and real wages reduce consumption by non-savers, ceteris paribus.
Transfers from the government mute the decline in labor income, and also the reduction in consumption
by non-savers relative to labor income. The real exchange rate depreciates on impact for two reasons.
First, the technology shock, ceteris paribus, increases the relative supply of domestic goods. To clear
the market for domestic tradable and non-tradable goods the relative price of domestic goods in units
of foreign goods (the inverse of the real exchange rate) falls. Second, temporarily higher productivity,
ceteris paribus, raises the supply of domestic consumption goods today relative to the future and triggers
a decline in the (expected) real interest rate to induce current consumption. A low expected return on
domestic assets require an expected appreciation of the nominal exchange rate due to uncovered interest
rate parity. To generate an expected appreciation, the real and nominal exchange rates depreciate on
impact. Falling inflation after the shock lead to a hump-shape in the response of the real exchange rate.
Furthermore, as the nominal interest rate is slow to adjust, the real interest rate increases in the first
periods after the shock.
The exchange rate depreciation increases the value of the fund in domestic currency and thereby
the medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund. Hence, the technology shock leads to
9 https://www.nav.no/arbeid/no/arbeidsledig/
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increased government expenditure in the future through the medium-term component. While output
increases, tax revenue raised by the government declines following the technology shock. The increase in
output and decline of labor income implies a lower labor income share in the economy, and thereby a lower
average tax rate. In response to lower tax revenue and higher transfers to households, the government
draws on the resources in the sovereign wealth fund to finance the budget deficit. Over time the deficits
reduce the fund value, exacerbated by the exchange rate depreciation. Hence, the fund value in domestic
currency falls below its steady-state level, and the government reduces withdrawals to return the fund to
its long-run level.
5.1.2 Monetary policy
Figure 4 displays the economy’s response to the monetary policy shock. The monetary policy contraction
increases the (expected) real interest rate and induces savers to reduce consumption. Consequently, firms
reduce price growth and demand less labor, and unions set a lower real wage. Non-savers consume less
due to the decline in labor income. The real exchange rate appreciates on impact to satisfy the uncovered
interest rate parity condition.
The exchange rate appreciation reduces the value of the fund in domestic currency and thereby
the medium-term component of the withdrawal, and hence the monetary policy shock leads to lower
government expenditure in the future. Hence, government consumption expenditures fall following the
initial increase due to a higher price of non-traded goods. The falling medium-term component of the
withdrawal also implies that transfers will be lower and have a negative effect on consumption by non-
savers. The short-term component of withdrawals increases to cover the increased budget deficit from
lower tax revenues and higher transfers to households.
5.1.3 Government consumption
Figure 5 displays the economy’s response to a government consumption shock. The government finances
the increase in government consumption with withdrawals from the sovereign wealth fund in the short
run.
The government consumption increase is a positive demand impulse to firms in the non-traded sector,
which respond by higher price growth and a higher demand for labor. Both effects induce the central bank
to raise the nominal interest rate, resulting in a higher real interest rate and an appreciated real exchange
rate. Facing higher real interest rates and lower future transfers savers reduce consumption. Consuming
less, savers desire to work more which puts downward pressure on the real wage. However, increased
labor demand outweighs this effect and lead to a higher real wage. Non-savers increase consumption on
impact as labor income increases, before falling below steady state as the employment effect fades and
the wealth effect on real wages dominates.
The exchange rate appreciation reduces the value of the fund in domestic currency and thereby
the medium-term component of the withdrawal. Hence, the government consumption shock leads to
lower future government expenditure through the medium-term component. However, for consumption
expenditures the effect is small compared to the initial shock. Furthermore, the effect on real government
consumption expenditure is muted by a higher price of non-traded goods. The expansionary effects on
output and labor income of the government consumption shock are important drivers of the withdrawal
from the sovereign wealth fund. Three effects contribute. First, the level of output increases, increasing
tax revenue. Second, labor’s share of income increases, thereby increasing the average tax rate in the
economy. Third, the employment increase reduces the need for transfers to households. In total these
effects result in a high degree of self-financing of the government consumption shock in the short run, and
a small response of the short-term component of the withdrawal from the fund. There is a second peak
in the short-term component of the withdrawal due to production and labor utilization undershooting
during the transition back to steady state. Hence, transfers to households increase.
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The present value multiplier of output answers the question: by how much does the present value of
output increase over the next k quarters relative to the present value of government consumption over
the same period? The present value multiplier is defined as Leeper et al. (2017)
PVM (k) =
Et
∑k
j=0
(
Πki=0
(
1 + rct+i
))
ŷct+j
Et
∑k
j=0
(
Πki=0
(
1 + rct+i
))
ĝct+j
where rct is the consumption real interest rate, ŷct is the deviation of the value of output in consumption
units from its steady state value, and ĝct is the corresponding deviation of government consumption
expenditure from its steady-state value.10
The red line in figure 6 displays the present value multiplier when measuring the value of output and
government consumption expenditure in current prices. The impact multiplier is 0.98 in the baseline
calibration, which is high for open-economy models. The positive effect on output of higher real gov-
ernment consumption declines at a faster rate than the effect on government consumption expenditure.
Hence, the present value multiplier is lower at longer horizons. The present value converges to 0.74 in
the long-term.
The unit of measurement of output and government consumption expenditure is rarely discussed
in empirical studies of government spending multipliers. Hall (2009) argues for using data in chained
prices for both GDP and government consumption, while studies often deflate nominal series with a
common price index (Ramey and Zubairy, 2018). Depending on the choice of deflator, the researcher
might capture effects coming from relative prices in their estimate of the multiplier. The dashed and
dotted, blue, line in figure 6 represents the present value multiplier calculated by holding prices and the
interest rate constant, in line with the approach taken by Hall (2009). The government consumption
shock increases the relative price of domestically produced goods and thereby increases the relative price
of output. Hence, multipliers calculated using data in current prices with a common deflator, runs the
risk of exaggerating the multiplier. The discrepancy between the two present value multipliers falls as
the horizon increases, and both converge to a value 0.74.
5.2 Transmission of shocks and the size of the sovereign wealth fund
In this section, I analyze the consequences of the sovereign wealth fund’s size for the propagation of
domestic business cycle shocks. To assess the role of the fund’s size in the propagation of shocks, I
recalibrate the budget deficit to GDP ratio and the size of the fund relative to GDP to their average
values in the 2002 to 2006 period. Henceforth I refer to this calibration as the small-fund steady state,
and the previous calibration (based on the 2014 to 2018 period) as the baseline calibration.
How does the size of the sovereign wealth fund affect the propagation of the shocks? First, mechani-
cally, the larger is the fund the more its value moves relative to steady-state GDP in response to a shock.
Second, the effect on the budget deficit (i.e. the total withdrawal) depends on the conditional correla-
tion between the exchange rate and the short-term component of the withdrawal caused by the shock.
A positive correlation increases the budget deficit and thereby increases government expenditure with
a larger fund. Hence, with a larger fund government expenditure increases, relative to the small-fund
period, following the shock. Finally, whether a larger fund amplifies or mitigates the propagation of a
shock to a variable depends on how the components of government expenditure affects the variable.
Figure 7 shows that following a technology shock, the exchange rate effect dominates the fall in fund
value due to lower tax revenue and higher transfers to households. Thus, the fund increases, rather
than declines, in value in the latter calibration period. Hence, with a larger fund the medium-term
component of the withdrawal, and thereby government expenditures, increase following a technology
10 Ramey (2019) discusses the use of alternative definitions of the government spending multiplier and concludes that
definitions which capture the cumulative effects on output and spending are preferable relative to definitions using period-
by-period deviations of output and spending from steady state.
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shock. Consequently, transfers to households increase and consumption by non-savers is more procyclical
than with a small fund. In contrast, government consumption crowds out household consumption relative
to the small-fund steady state and reduces consumption by savers. Thus, the fund’s size reduces differences
in consumption outcomes, but does not affect aggregate consumption. Furthermore, the real exchange
rate depreciates by less to induce households to consume less non-traded goods. Finally, with a larger
fund government consumption is positively correlated with output and amplifies movements in output,
hours, and real wages. The amplification of hours and real wages also contribute to make consumption
by non-savers procyclical.
The mechanical exchange rate effect in response to a monetary policy shock triples as the fund increases
in size, as can be seen in figure 8. Consequently, a larger fund increases future reductions in government
expenditures. Larger reductions in real government consumption and transfers to households, amplify
the propagation of the shock to output, hours, real wages, and consumption by non-savers. The decline in
real government consumption and corresponding crowding in of consumption by savers, is not enough to
cancel out the exaggerated decline in consumption by non-savers. Hence, household consumption is also
more procyclical, and closer to the consumption response by savers. Hence, the difference in consumption
outcomes declines relative to the small-fund steady state.
A larger fund has relatively small effects for the propagation of the government consumption shock,
as can be seen in figure 9. The larger fund implies that real exchange rate effect forces the deficit and
government consumption back to steady state at a quicker rate. This in turn implies less crowding
out of savers’ consumption and a larger decline (and smaller initial increase) in consumption by non-
savers. Thus, a larger fund reduces the difference in consumption outcomes between savers and non-savers
following the shock. Overall the size of the fund has small consequences for the output response to the
shock.
6 Robustness
In this section, I analyze whether the results regarding the size of the fund are sensitive to model as-
sumptions. The shock size is kept constant across the simulations, and hence the peak impact of output
might differ from one. First, I consider a case without nominal and real rigidities. Next, I consider the
role of shock persistence.
6.1 The role of nominal rigidities
In these simulation, I set the Calvo-parameters, indexation, and habit persistence parameters to zero. The
real exchange rate exhibits larger movements on impact and is less persistent in the friction-free economy.
Hence, nominal rigidities reduce the impact of the size of the fund on the medium-term component of
the fund withdrawal.
For a technology shock, the absence of rigidities implies that output, consumption, and real wages
increase on impact. Furthermore, the decline in hours worked is much smaller (not shown), and the price
of non-traded goods declines on impact. Consequently, the short-term component of the withdrawal and
the total withdrawal decline. The increase in the medium-term component of withdrawals, due to a larger
fund, increases real government consumption (the plot shows government consumption expenditure), and
therefore also output and employment relative to the small-fund steady-state. Furthermore, the transfers
to households increase, and a larger fund increases the volatility of consumption by non-savers. However,
consumption by savers is crowded out and a larger fund reduces differences in consumption outcomes
following the shock. Overall, consumption is less volatile with a larger fund in the absence of rigidities.
While, the qualitative effects remain when there are no rigidities, the relative effect is smaller.
A shock to government consumption reduces output by less in the absence rigidities of due to more
crowding out of consumption by savers. Hence, the spending reversal triggered by the medium-term com-
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ponent plays a relatively larger role in output. As movements in consumption are larger, the quantitative
role of the size of the fund is relatively smaller in consumption by the two household types. However, a
larger fund contributes to more equal consumption outcomes.
6.2 The role of shock persistence
In this section, I consider the effect of increasing the persistence of the technology and government
consumption shocks, ρZ and ρz,G respectively, from 0.7 to 0.9. I do not consider the monetary policy
shock, as there is endogenous persistence in the policy rule. Increased shock persistence increases the
real exchange rate response on impact and its longevity, thus reinforcing the consequences of a larger
fund. Consequently the real exchange rate effect plays a larger role in the expenditure components and
the budget deficit. The qualitative responses are similar as in the baseline calibration. However, there
is more crowding out of consumption by savers which reduces the difference in the maximum impact on
consumption between the two steady states.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have studied the consequences of a larger sovereign wealth fund for the propagation
of business cycle shocks within the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the
Norwegian economy. I found that a larger fund amplifies the effect of technology and monetary policy
shocks on output, while the effect on output from a government consumption shock is muted (in particular
for more persistent shocks). A larger fund reduces the effect of technology and government consumption
shocks on aggregate consumption, while increases the effect of a monetary policy shock. A larger fund
lead to more equal consumption outcomes following the shocks I consider.
The current paper is an analysis of the positive consequences of a fiscal rule which ties withdrawals to
the domestic-currency value of an increasingly large fund, but suggest alternatives for the fiscal authority
on how to treat exchange rate effects to smooth variations in output. For example, supply shocks, like
the technology shock, cause a positive correlation of output and the real exchange rate on impact. Hence,
conditional on observing a simultaneous depreciation (apprecation) of the real exchange rate and positive
(negative) output growth, the government could choose to ignore the change in the fund’s value when
deciding on the level of withdrawals, and thereby reduce the increase (decrease) in output coming from
having a larger fund. However, this would come at the cost of increasing the decline in employment.
Alternatively, the fiscal authority can adjust the degree of pass-through from the exchange rate to fund
withdrawals based on whether the real exchange rate and output are above or below their long-term
levels. The advice is simple in theory, however, identifying the long-term level of output and the real
exchange rate is a challenging task. Even if there is a reliable method to identify these components in
real-time, further analysis is required whether it would be optimal.
The analysis might benefit from several extensions. First, in the analysis, I do not allow for discretion
on the part of the fiscal authority. This implies a naive reaction to changes in the fund’s value. Such
behavior contrasts to the conclusion in NOU 2015:9 (2015), which concludes that flexibility in the im-
plementation of the rule was a key component of its success. Hence, a more complete analysis should
assess how discretionary deviations from the rule matters for the propagation of business cycle shocks.
Treating withdrawals from the fund as the outcome of a maximization problem might resolve the issue.
Temporary exchange rate changes, as in the current analysis, represent temporary income variations and
should according the permanent income hypothesis lead to small changes in spending. However, adopting
a maximization-perspective would not, necessarily, resolve concerns of how to implement discretion on
the part of policy makers. Second, temporary shocks may have permanent effects on the level of sovereign
wealth fund. This might be the case for the shocks studied in this paper, but is even more likely for
shocks originating in the foreign sector. For example, the fiscal authority might not reduce future with-
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drawals to counteract large negative returns on the investment portfolio, or in response to lower oil prices.
Furthermore, shocks originating in the foreign sector which lead to large changes in the fund value might
be correlated, aggravating the decline in the fund value. I leave these concerns for future research.
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A Data plots
A.1 The budget deficit
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Figure 1: The development of different measures of the budget balance in Norway as a share of trend GDP since
2002. Panel A compares the the structural budget balance with the actual budget balance, both as a share of
trend mainland GDP. Panel B plots the cyclical budget balance as a share of GDP, and the output gap. The
trend value of mainland GDP is calculated using a two-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter
of 400. Source: Meld. St. 1 (2019 -2020) (2019).
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A.2 Hours decomposition
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Figure 2: Panel A: the output gap for the mainland economy and the gap in total hours worked by employees in
the mainland economy. Panel B: the contributions of hours worked per employee and the number of employees to
the gap in total hours worked in the mainland economy. Gaps constructed using the two-sided Hodrick-Prescott
filter with smoothing parameter of 400. Sources: Meld. St. 1 (2019 -2020) (2019) and SSB.
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B Results
B.1 Impulse responses functions - baseline calibration
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions for a technology shock in both sectors, uZ,t, in equation (42). Real variables
and relative prices are in percent deviation from steady state, nominal variables and the expected real interest
rate are annualized and in percentage point deviations from steady state, fiscal variables are ratios to steady-state
quarterly GDP and represented as percentage point deviations from steady state. S-T and M-T refer to the
short-term and medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund respectively.
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Monetary policy shock
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions for a monetary policy shock, uR,t, in equation (43). Real variables and
relative prices are in percent deviation from steady state, nominal variables and the expected real interest rate
are annualized and in percentage point deviations from steady state, fiscal variables are ratios to steady-state
quarterly GDP and represented as percentage point deviations from steady state. S-T and M-T refer to the
short-term and medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund respectively.
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Government consumption shock
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions for a government consumption shock, ug,t, in equation (44). Real variables
and relative prices are in percent deviation from steady state, nominal variables and the expected real interest
rate are annualized and in percentage point deviations from steady state, fiscal variables are ratios to steady-state
quarterly GDP and represented as percentage point deviations from steady state. S-T and M-T refer to the
short-term and medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund respectively.
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Figure 6: Present value government spending multiplier
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B.2 The effect of fund size
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions for a technology shock in both sectors, uZ,t, in equation (42). Real variables
and relative prices are in percent deviation from steady state, nominal variables and the expected real interest
rate are annualized and in percentage point deviations from steady state, fiscal variables are ratios to steady-state
quarterly GDP and represented as percentage point deviations from steady state. S-T and M-T comp. withdrawal
refer to the short-term and medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund, respectively.
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions for a monetary policy shock, uR,t, in equation (43). Real variables and
relative prices are in percent deviation from steady state, nominal variables and the expected real interest rate are
annualized and in percentage point deviations from steady state, fiscal variables are ratios to steady-state quarterly
GDP and represented as percentage point deviations from steady state. S-T and M-T comp. withdrawal refer to
the short-term and medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund, respectively.
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Figure 9: Impulse response functions for a government consumption shock, ug,t, in equation (44). Real variables
and relative prices are in percent deviation from steady state, nominal variables and the expected real interest
rate are annualized and in percentage point deviations from steady state, fiscal variables are ratios to steady-state
quarterly GDP and represented as percentage point deviations from steady state. S-T and M-T comp. withdrawal
refer to the short-term and medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund, respectively.
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C Robustness
In this section, I recompute the results with respect to the fund size under different assumptions regarding
real and nominal rigidities, and the persistence of the shocks.
C.0.1 No rigidities
The following computations assume that there are no real or nominal rigidities. That is θj = χj = 0, j =
N,H,F,W . Furthermore, hc = 0 and ρR = 0.
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Figure 10: Impulse response functions for a technology shock in both sectors, uZ,t, in equation (42). Real variables
and relative prices are in percent deviation from steady state, nominal variables and the expected real interest
rate are annualized and in percentage point deviations from steady state, fiscal variables are ratios to steady-state
quarterly GDP and represented as percentage point deviations from steady state. S-T and M-T comp. withdrawal
refer to the short-term and medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund, respectively.48
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Figure 11: Impulse response functions for a government consumption shock, ug,t, in equation (44). Real variables
and relative prices are in percent deviation from steady state, nominal variables and the expected real interest
rate are annualized and in percentage point deviations from steady state, fiscal variables are ratios to steady-state
quarterly GDP and represented as percentage point deviations from steady state. S-T and M-T comp. withdrawal
refer to the short-term and medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund, respectively.
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C.0.2 Shock persistence
This section repeats the analysis under the assumption that ρZ = ρz,g = 0.
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Figure 12: Impulse response functions for a technology shock in both sectors, uZ,t, in equation (42). Real variables
and relative prices are in percent deviation from steady state, nominal variables and the expected real interest
rate are annualized and in percentage point deviations from steady state, fiscal variables are ratios to steady-state
quarterly GDP and represented as percentage point deviations from steady state. S-T and M-T comp. withdrawal
refer to the short-term and medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund, respectively.51
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Figure 13: Impulse response functions for a government consumption shock, ug,t, in equation (44). Real variables
and relative prices are in percent deviation from steady state, nominal variables and the expected real interest
rate are annualized and in percentage point deviations from steady state, fiscal variables are ratios to steady-state
quarterly GDP and represented as percentage point deviations from steady state. S-T and M-T comp. withdrawal
refer to the short-term and medium-term component of the withdrawal from the fund, respectively.
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We develop a novel medium-scale DSGE model, called NORA, for fiscal policy analysis in Norway. NORA con-
tains a sheltered and exposed sector allowing us to model wage bargaining between a labor union and the
exposed sector, reflecting Scandinavian wage formation institutions. Wages are subject to a downward nominal
wage rigidity (DNWR). Inspired by many countries’ fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession and the coron-
avirus pandemic, we investigate the model’s ability to generate state-dependent fiscal multipliers. We find, that
both the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and DNWR individually can account for higher fiscal mul-
tipliers during recessions. In joint presence, however, the existence of DNWR reduces the multiplier at the ZLB.
Moreover, the DNWR significantly relaxes the paradox of toil at the ZLB. We show that the state-dependency
is robust to alternative assumptions about the origin of the recession, the nature of the fiscal stimulus and its
financing source.
1. Introduction
The Great Recession and more recently the coronavirus pandemic
has prompted many governments around the world to use fiscal pol-
icy to provide stimulus and alleviate the effects of economic recession.
Underlying such action is the belief that fiscal stimulus is particularly
effective and worthwhile in adverse economic conditions. Blanchard
(2019), Eichenbaum (2019) as well as Rachel and Summers (2019) have
☆ We are grateful to SeHyoun Ahn, Jaromir Benes, Roger Bjørnstad, Olivier Blanchard, Thomas von Brasch, Leif Brubakk, Brita Bye, Hilde Bjørnland, Ådne
Cappelen, Benjamin Carton, Chris Carrol, Günter Coenen, Vesna Corbo, Erika Färnstrand Damsgaard, Bjorn Dapi, Yngvar Dyvi, Håkon Frede Foss, Steinar Holden,
Martin Holm, Amund Holmsen, Kristine Høegh-Omdal, Brynjar Indahl, Jens Iversen, Arnaldur Sølvi Kristjansson, Jesper Lindé, José R. Maria, Yasin Mimir, Benjamin
Moll, Ragnar Nymoen, Jørgen Ouren, Kenneth Sæterhagen Paulsen, Johannes Pfeiffer, Arent Skjæveland, Victoria Sparrman, Nikolai Stähler, Birger Strøm, Håkon
Tretvoll, Ragnar Torvik, Ida Wolden-Bache and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The paper also benefited greatly from discussions at the Norwegian
Ministry of Finance, Statistics Norway, Norges Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, the Swedish National Institute of Economic Research, the University of Cologne, the
Bundesbank, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Congressional Budget Office. The responsibility for any errors lies entirely
with us. The views presented in this paper are those of the authors, and should not be attributed to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Statistics Norway, or
Konjunkturinstitutet. This article was submitted to the Journal when Birol Kanik was employed at the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. Declaration of interest: none.
∗ Corresponding author. Akersveien 26, 0177, Oslo, Norway.
E-mail addresses: thor.aursland@ssb.no (T.A. Aursland), ivan.frankovic@ssb.no (I. Frankovic), birol.kanik@konj.se (B. Kanik), frankovici@gmail.com
(B. Kanik), Msaxegaard@imf.org (M. Saxegaard).
1 National Institute of Economic Research, Forecasting Department, Research and Macroeconomic Scenarios Unit, Stockholm, Sweden. (present affiliation)
2 International Monetary Fund, European Department, Washington DC, USA. (present affiliation)
3 See, for example, results and literature review in Fazzari et al. (2014) or Ramey and Zubairy (2018).
recently argued for a more prominent role of fiscal policy in stabilizing
the economy during recessions. While there is ample empirical evidence
for state-dependency of fiscal policy,3 there are relatively few structural
models that can shed light on the different transmission channels of fis-
cal policy both in “normal” times and times of economic hardship. In
this paper, we present NORA, a DSGE model developed for analysis of
fiscal policy in Norway. The model features a rich description of public
spending and taxation and is suited to analyze fiscal policy in a real-
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Received 25 March 2020; Received in revised form 23 June 2020; Accepted 27 July 2020
Available online 11 August 2020
0264-9993/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
56
T.A. Aursland et al. Economic Modelling 93 (2020) 321–353
istic setting. It has been developed in order to, among other things,
investigate fiscal multipliers in Norway under varying economic cir-
cumstances. NORA is the outcome of a two-year long modeling project
at the Ministry of Finance, and has been developed in collaboration
with Statistics Norway and Norges Bank.
In this paper, we analyze the ability of two non-linearities to gen-
erate state-dependent fiscal multipliers in our model, namely the zero
lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate and a downward nom-
inal wage rigidity (DNWR).4 Both frictions are likely to play a role in
recessions. Compared to many other developed countries, the finan-
cial crises affected the Norwegian economy to a modest extent and the
central bank policy rate never reached zero. However, the recent coro-
navirus outbreak and the related economic turbulences have prompted
the Norwegian central bank, similarly to numerous other monetary
authorities around the world, to lower its main policy rate and effec-
tively reaching the zero lower bound. There is also clear evidence of
downward nominal rigidities of wages in Norway. Holden (2004) shows
that institutionalized collective wage setting systems, as present in Nor-
way, imply that workers or unions have a strategic advantage in avoid-
ing cuts to nominal wages. Empirical evidence on downward nominal
wage rigidities in Norway have been presented in Holden and Wulfs-
berg (2008) and more recently by Ku et al. (2020). As we will show in
this paper, the presence of ZLB and DNWR can significantly alter the
transmission channels of fiscal stimulus during recessions and give rise
to state-dependent multipliers.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we contribute to
the literature on medium-scale DSGE models used for fiscal policy anal-
ysis by including several novel extensions. The model possesses a high
degree of disaggregation on both the spending and the revenue side. In
particular, NORA features a realistic distinction between capital income
taxation of households and corporate profit taxation. The model also
captures the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), the Norwe-
gian sovereign wealth fund, used to finance public expenditures. More-
over, NORA contains two domestic intermediate good sectors capturing
a sheltered service sector and an exposed manufacturing sector. This
allows us to model wage bargaining between a labor union and firms in
the exposed sector, reflecting the institutional wage formation system in
Norway. As wage formation systems in many countries, particularly the
Nordic countries, deviate significantly from the modeling approaches in
the current DSGE literature, we provide a novel way to implement this
institutional setting.
Second and inspired by the fiscal responses of many governments
to recessions, we investigate the state-dependency of the fiscal multipli-
ers. Specifically, we analyze the transmission channels of fiscal stimulus
when the economy is in a recession in which the ZLB and DNWR con-
strain the economy as opposed to in the steady state. Our approach
departs from the existing studies in a key aspect: we provide a unified
framework in which both the ZLB and DNWR hold. This allows us to
study the frictions’ relative contribution to the state-dependency of the
fiscal multipliers. As we will argue, the presence of both rigidities gives
rise to important interaction effects that, to our knowledge, have not
received attention yet. Moreover, our relatively rich fiscal sector allows
us to study the robustness of state-dependency of the multiplier for a
wide array of assumptions about the nature of the fiscal stimulus.
In our analysis we find that both the ZLB as well as the DNWR can
individually account for counter-cyclical state-dependency of govern-
ment spending and tax multipliers. At the ZLB, fiscal stimulus induces
inflation through higher aggregate demand, resulting in a falling real
interest rate and stimulating investment as well as consumption. Reces-
sions during which the DNWR becomes binding, fiscal expansions do
not lead to an increase in nominal wages. Marginal costs of firms and
thus inflation increase only modestly. Constant nominal wages then
lead to falling real wages, stimulating rather than crowding-out private
4 Specifically, we consider a zero lower bound on nominal wage growth.
sector activity. Our central finding, however, relates to a situation in
which both rigidities are present in the model. We show, that the DNWR
tends to dampen the extent to which fiscal multipliers are higher at the
ZLB relative to the steady state. This is because the DNWR limits the
increase in inflation, leading to a smaller fall in the real interest rate for
a binding ZLB and by extension in smaller fiscal multipliers relative to
when the DNWR is not present. The effect is quantitatively important: In
a model with only the ZLB present, the multiplier in a recession is three
times larger relative to steady state, while in a model with both the
ZLB and the DNWR the multiplier only doubles in the same recession.
Furthermore, contrary to the literature on the paradox of toil initiated
by Eggertsson (2010), we find that supply-side fiscal stimulus through
tax cuts is not strongly or not at all pro-cyclical if the DNWR is taken
into account. The paradox of toil arises when labor tax cuts lower infla-
tion during a ZLB episode and thus increase the real interest rate. The
existence of DNWR, however, dampens the fall in wages and thus prices
in such a way, that the paradox is strongly relaxed. We establish these
results not only through simulation experiments using the calibrated,
full model, but also through a theoretical analysis in a simplified version
of the model. We perform several robustness checks with respect to the
model’s ability to generate state-dependent multipliers and to give rise
to interaction effects between the ZLB and DNWR. Exploiting the rich
fiscal heterogeneity of the model we show, that the state-dependency
of the multiplier is robust to alternative assumptions about the spend-
ing component which is increased for stimulus purposes, the time of
implementation and financing. Furthermore, we demonstrate, that the
state-dependency is stronger in a model calibration reflecting less open
economies. This is due to the negative effect on exports from an appre-
ciated real exchange rate following the fiscal spending increase, a chan-
nel also present during recessions. Finally, we show that the interaction
effects between ZLB and DNWR are independent of the particular Nor-
wegian setting considered in our model but a fundamental feature of
New Keynesian DSGE models.
Our model stands in the tradition of medium-scale DSGE models
recently developed at policy institutions to assess the impact of a rich
set of policy measures fiscal authorities can undertake. For example,
such models are used to evaluate the temporary and permanent effects
of fiscal spending and tax reforms, as in the extended version of the
ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (Coenen et al., 2008) and the FiMOD
model developed at the Bundesbank (Stähler and Thomas, 2012), or to
estimate the contribution of fiscal policy to business cycle fluctuations,
as in the GEAR model developed at the Bundesbank (Gadatsch et al.,
2016) and the Global Multi-Country Model developed at the European
Commission (Albonico et al., 2019). NORA resembles these models in
many respects but also differs along several dimensions where tradi-
tional models do not fit the Norwegian context. In particular, wage
formation in existing models, which is typically built around the frame-
work proposed by Erceg et al. (2000), does not fit the institutional
framework in Norway where wage negotiations between a labor union
and firms in the exposed sector seek to preserve the competitiveness of
the exposed sector and maintain a high level of employment. This wage
bargaining process alongside with the distinction between sheltered
and exposed sector is explicitly modeled in NORA. Moreover, unlike
existing fiscal policy models that assume public spending is financed
using a combination of higher taxes and government borrowing, NORA
includes a model of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), the
Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, which is the main public financing
vehicle in Norway. Finally, none of these fiscal policy models provide a
convincing modeling approach to the particularities of Norwegian cor-
porate profit and shareholder income taxation.
Our paper is also related to the literature using DSGE models to
investigate the state-dependency of fiscal multipliers, see for example
Cogan et al. (2010), Christiano et al. (2011), Coenen et al. (2012),
Leeper et al. (2017). These papers analyze fiscal multipliers at the zero
lower bound (while ignoring downward nominal wage rigidities) and
find that fiscal spending is more effective in raising output when the
322
57
T.A. Aursland et al. Economic Modelling 93 (2020) 321–353
nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound. More recently, Shen
and Yang (2018) as well as Dupor et al. (2019) have argued, using a rel-
atively standard NK-DSGE model, that the existence of a DNWR (while
not studying a binding ZLB) can also rationalize higher fiscal multipliers
during recessions.5 None of these papers, however, have examined the
joint presence of both rigidities.6 Our main contribution to this litera-
ture lies therefore in showing that interaction effects of the ZLB and the
DNWR have important implications for the state dependency of spend-
ing and tax multipliers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the full model while section 3 illustrates the main state-
dependency effect in a simplified version of the model. Section 4
describes the calibration of the model and illustrates its fit with empir-
ical results on the Norwegian economy. Section 5 analyzes the trans-
mission channels of a fiscal spending stimulus from an economy in
steady state as well in a recession and determines the fiscal multipliers
in both states. We furthermore investigate the role played by the ZLB
and DNWR in generating the observed state-dependency and analyze
various tax multipliers. In section 6 we perform a number of robustness
checks. Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
NORA belongs to the class of small open economy DSGE models and
shares many elements with prominent examples such as Justiniano and
Preston (2010) or Adolfson et al. (2007). The economy described by this
model is assumed to have strong trade and financial linkages with the
rest of the world, but is sufficiently small to not affect the world econ-
omy itself. Shocks to foreign variables are transmitted to the domestic
economy through movements in the real exchange rate, the return on
foreign bonds and the demand for exports. Consistent with most anal-
ysis of the Norwegian economy NORA focuses on developments in the
mainland economy, i.e. excluding the off-shore oil sector. The produc-
tion and taxation of the off-shore oil sector is not modeled. However,
we include interlinkages between the off-shore oil sector and the main-
land economy in the form of the oil sector’s demand for domestically-
produced investment goods.7
There are two types of households in the economy. First, an
infinitely-lived utility-maximizing (Ricardian) household chooses how
much to spend on consumption each period. The Ricardian house-
hold earns labor income from employment in domestic firms and the
government, interest on bank deposits, dividend payments and capi-
tal gains resulting from firm stocks, and receives unemployment ben-
efits and other public transfers. Unlike the Ricardian household, the
liquidity-constrained household does not smooth consumption across
periods, and instead consumes its entire income net of taxes, consisting
of labor income, unemployment benefits, and other public transfers,
each period. The inclusion of the liquidity-constrained household can
be justified by arguing that a share of households do not have access to
5 Other transmission channels for the state-dependency of fiscal multipliers
have been proposed. Ghassibe and Zanetti (2019) and Ziegenbein (2019) use
a search-matching framework to show that spending multipliers are counter-
cyclical while tax multipliers are pro-cyclical. Similarly, Michaillat (2014)
demonstrates that the public employment multiplier is counter-cyclical. At the
core of these three papers search-matching frictions, either in the labor or goods
market, cause fiscal policy to be state-dependent. Another recent approach has
been developed by Canzoneri et al. (2016) using counter-cyclical financial fric-
tions to generate state-dependency of fiscal spending.
6 A partial exception is Burgert et al. (2019) who consider the interaction of
a DNWR and the ZLB in a robustness analysis. However, they do not provide
a full decomposition of interaction results and consider the special case of an
economy within a monetary union.
7 Government revenues from petroleum activities in Norway are assumed to
be transferred in their entirety to the wealth fund and do therefore not have a
direct impact on the mainland economy.
financial markets, choose their consumption path on the basis of simple
rules of thumb rather than rational expectations about the future, or are
myopic/impatient. The liquidity-constrained household is included to
add realism to the aggregate effects of changes to fiscal policy (notably
the sensitivity of consumption to current income), and to overcome the
Ricardian equivalence that typically characterizes this class of models,
see Galí et al. (2007).
A novel feature in NORA is the way we model wage formation
and unemployment. Consistent with the institutional framework for
wage bargaining in Norway (the so-called “frontfag” model), we assume
that wage negotiations in the exposed sector of the economy sets the
norm for wage growth in the rest of the economy. An important pur-
pose of this setup, which builds on the so-called main-course theory
developed by Aukrust (1977), is to preserve the competitiveness of the
exposed sector and to ensure a high level of employment. Specifically,
we assume that wages are set by Nash bargaining between a labor union
aiming for a high level of wages and an employer organization aiming
for high profits in the exposed sector. Wage growth is subject to a down-
ward nominal wage rigidity. High unemployment, ceteris paribus, is
assumed to weaken the bargaining position of unions and lead to lower
wage claims. The result is a negative relationship between the level of
real wages and unemployment which is often referred to as the “wage
curve”, see Blanchflower and Oswald (2005). Labor force participation
is modeled in reduced-form, and responds to the after-tax wage and
the unemployment rate. The discrepancy between labor demand and
labor force participation gives rise to unemployment in NORA. Hence,
household members in NORA can either be employed, unemployed, or
outside the labor force.
The production side of the economy differentiates between firms in
the manufacturing and service sector of the economy. Manufacturing
sector firms are more exposed to competition from abroad, both from
imported goods and from their reliance on exports. Firms in both sectors
use labor and capital to produce an intermediate good that is bundled
with imported goods to make different types of final goods. The firms
face a choice between paying out dividends to Ricardian households or
investing in fixed capital that is used in production.8 Investment can
either be financed through retained profits (equity) or borrowing from
banks (debt).
Firms that produce the intermediate good have pricing power
because they produce differentiated goods that are imperfect substi-
tutes. Importers reprocess a homogeneous foreign good into a differen-
tiated imported intermediate good and set a price on it. The output of
domestic intermediate good firms and imported goods are bought by
firms in a perfectly-competitive final good sector that bundle them into
government consumption and investment goods that differ in their com-
position and degree of substitutability across inputs. Monopolistically-
competitive exporters combine intermediate domestic and imported
goods to produce a differentiated export good that is sold on the world
market at a price set in foreign currency as a markup over marginal
cost. Final good consumption firms also possess market power and
are subject to consumption taxes which are passed over to households
through the retail price. We assume that domestic intermediate goods
firms, importers, final consumption sector firms and exporters face price
adjustment costs. Domestic intermediate goods firms additionally incur
adjustment costs when varying the level of investment.
NORA includes a relatively disaggregated description of government
spending and taxation in Norway. In particular, households pay a flat
tax on their total (ordinary) income, a shareholder tax on dividends, a
surtax on labor income and transfers as well as social security contri-
butions. Firms pay taxes on their profits net of deductions as well as
8 DSGE models often assume, for simplicity, that households invest in fixed
capital that they subsequently rent out to firms. Our more realistic depiction of
the investment process allows us to more accurately describe the effect of tax
changes on investment.
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social security contributions. The government in NORA also receives an
exogenous stream of funding from an offshore sovereign wealth fund,
the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) to capture the fact that
a significant portion of government spending in Norway is financed
by such transfers. Taxes and withdrawals from the GPFG are used to
finance government expenditures, consisting of unemployment benefits,
purchases of goods and services from the private sector, government
employment, and public investment. NORA allows for the possibility
that public capital increases private sector productivity. The central
bank is assumed to follow a rule mimicking optimal monetary policy,
subject to a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
The remainder of this section provides an in-depth technical presen-
tation of the main model elements. Further details of the mathematical
derivations can be found in the online appendix.
2.1. Households
Following Mankiw (2000) and Galí et al. (2007), we assume that
the economy is populated by a share (1 − 𝜔) of Ricardian households,
denoted by superscript R, and a share 𝜔 ∈ [0,1) of liquidity-constrained
households, denoted by superscript L. The Ricardian household chooses
current consumption with a view to maximize its lifetime utility, while
liquidity-constrained households simply consume all available income
net of taxes. Anderson et al. (2016) argue that a modeling approach
using these two types of households captures well the empirical aggre-
gate consumption response to a government spending shock.9
2.1.1. Ricardian household
Expected lifetime utility of the Ricardian household at time 0 is
given by
U0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
𝛽 t
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
exp(ZUt )
(
CRt − hCRt−1
)1−𝜎
(1 − 𝜎)(1 − h)−𝜎
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (1)
where CRt captures the consumption level, the parameter h the degree
of consumption habits and the parameter 𝜎 the inverse of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution.10 The term ZUt is a shock that increases
households preference for consumption.11 In line with the literature on
state-dependent multipliers, we will use this shock to drive the econ-
omy into a recession by decreasing ZU for some time and thus induc-
ing a slump in consumption and therefore a recession. The Ricardian
household earns income from supplying labor, transfer payments by
the government, dividends and capital gains resulting from ownership
of domestic firms, and interest income on bank deposits. The sum of all
these sources of income is referred to as household ordinary income,
OIRt , and given by
OIRt = LI
R
t + UBt(Lt − Et) + TR
R
t +
Pt−1
Pt
DPRt−1(Rt−1 − 1) +
(DIVMt + AV
M
t )S
R,M
t−1 + (DIV
S
t + AV
S
t )S
R,S
t−1. (2)
Labor income is given by LIRt = WtNPt + WGt NGt where Wt is the real
wage rate and NPt the number of hours worked in the private sec-
tor. Given the importance of the public sector as an employer in Nor-
9 Using US consumption expenditure panel data they show that rich house-
holds tend to lower consumption expenditures following a government spend-
ing expansion while poorer households tend to increase consumption. The
behavior of the former group is proxied by Ricardians in NORA, while the later
is captured by liquidity-constrained households.
10 We do not include disutility of labor in the utility function as households are
not assumed to set wages. Instead our wage formation model is based on Nash
bargaining between a labor union and exposed sector firms to be introduced in
section 2.3.
11 All shock processes in NORA are collectively discussed in section A.9.
way we follow Stähler and Thomas (2012) and assume that the Ricar-
dian household can be employed also in the public sector, with WGt N
G
t
denoting the Ricardian household’s income from such employment.
The government wage is given by WGt and hours worked by N
G
t . We
assume that government wages are proportional to private wages, i.e.
WGt = MARKUPGWWt , where MARKUPGW is a fixed parameter. The
variable UBt captures unemployment benefits paid to the share of the
household that is within the labor force Lt but is not employed Et . The
term TRRt denotes lump-sum transfers to the Ricardian household.
We define the price level in the economy as Pt , which reflects the
nominal price of one consumption good before tax and is equal to the
marginal cost of the final consumption good producer, introduced in
section 2.5.2. Hence, real variables, if not otherwise stated are to be
understood as given in units of the final consumption good. We define
pre-tax inflation as 𝜋ATEt =
Pt
Pt−1
. And after-tax inflation as 𝜋t =
PNom,Ct
PNom,Ct−1
,
where PNom,Ct the nominal price of the consumption good faced by
the household, i.e. including tax.12 Generally, we will express prices
throughout the model as prices relative to Pt . For example, the rela-
tive price of the consumption good paid by the household is given by
PCt =
PNom,Ct
Pt
.
The term DPRt−1(Rt−1 − 1) captures net nominal interest income on
bank deposits held at the end of the last period, where the first term
captures the amount of bank bonds and Rt−1 the nominal interest rate.
We convert this interest income into this period’s value by dividing
through by the inflation rate. Dividends per share DIVMt and DIV
S
t are
paid to the household that holds shares in firms in the manufacturing
(denoted by superscript M) and services (denoted by superscript S) sec-
tors. The total amount of dividend income is determined by the product
of dividends with the corresponding number of shares held at the end
of the last period, SR,Mt−1 and S
R,S
t−1. Real capital gains (per stock) in the
manufacturing sector (and equivalently in the service sector) are given
by AVMt =
PNom,E,Mt −P
Nom,E,M
t−1
Pt
, where PNom,E,Mt denotes the nominal price of
a share in the manufacturing sector (price of equity), with PE,Mt being
the real price (relative to Pt).
In line with the Norwegian tax code, the tax base for the household
ordinary income tax is defined as follows
TBOIH,Rt = OI
R
t − TD
OIH
−RRAt
(
PNom,E,Mt−1
Pt
SR,Mt−1 +
PNom,E,St−1
Pt
SR,St−1
)
𝛼OIHt . (3)
Hence there are two deductions to the ordinary income tax base. The
first deduction TDOIH represents an allowance on personal income. It is
calibrated to match the empirical value for the ordinary income tax base
in steady state. A second deduction present in the Norwegian tax code
applies to shareholder income in the form of a rate-of-return allowance
on stocks RRAt . This deduction has the effect that the return up to
the rate-of-return allowance is exempt from taxation while only the
remaining equity premium on stocks is taxed at the household level.13
The adjustment factor 𝛼OIHt > 1 increases the effective tax rate on the
equity premium.14 This detailed modeling of the shareholder allowance
12 So called ATE-inflation is a measure of inflation adjusted for tax changes
and excluding energy products compiled by Statistics Norway. NORA does not
model energy prices separately such that we simple differentiate between infla-
tion after taxes (𝜋t) and before (𝜋ATEt ).
13 Absent the rate-of-return allowance the overall return on equity would be
taxed twice, both at the corporate and household level, thus introducing a tax-
induced bias in favor of debt financing which is only taxed at the household
level, see a general discussion in Sørensen (2005).
14 The real-world motivation behind this adjustment factor is to equalize the
tax rate on the equity premium and the top marginal tax rate on labor income
in order to remove any incentives for firm owners to shift their income from
labor to equity income.
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allows us to derive more realistic insights on the ordinary income tax
multiplier, which we analyze later.
Total direct taxes TRt paid by the Ricardian household are given by
TRt = 𝜏
OIH
t TB
OIH,R
t + (𝜏
LS
t + 𝜏
SSH
t )
(LIRt + UBt(Lt − Et) + TR
R
t − TD
LS) + TL,Rt ,
where 𝜏OIHt is the household ordinary income tax rate, 𝜏
LS
t is a labor sur-
tax on labor income and transfers and 𝜏SSHt is the rate of social security
contributions.15 The term TDLS captures a deduction to the tax base
of the labor surtax and social security contributions and TL,Rt repre-
sents lump-sum taxes. For ease of later exposition it is useful to define
𝜏Wt = 𝜏OIHt + 𝜏LSt + 𝜏SSHt as the overall effective tax rate on labor income
and 𝜏Dt = 𝛼OIHt 𝜏OIHt as the overall tax rate on dividend and capital gains
income.
The household’s budget constraint is then given by
DPRt + (P
E,M
t S
R,M
t + P
E,S
t S
R,S
t )(1 + F
S
t )
= 1
𝜋ATEt
DPRt−1 + P
E,M
t−1 S
R,M
t−1 + P
E,S
t−1S
R,S
t−1
+OIRt − T
R
t − P
C
t C
R
t − P
I
t Inv
H,R
t + AVT
R
t
+ΠX,Rt +Π
C,R
t +Π
F,R
t +Π
B,R
t . (4)
Following the approach in Graeve and Iversen (2017) we introduce
financial fees FSt charged when trading in firm stocks resulting in a
gap between the required return on equity and the required return on
bank deposits, which we interpret as an equity premium.16 The retail
price of the consumption good (including taxes and fees) is given by
PCt and set by the final consumption good sector. Housing investments
InvH,Rt are purchased at price P
I
t and follow a reduced-form process to
be introduced in section 2.8. Other income and costs consist of an asset
valuation tax refund AVTt , and lump-sum redistribution of profits from
exporting firms (ΠX,Rt ), from consumption retailers (Π
C,R
t ), from finan-
cial intermediaries (ΠF,Rt ) as well as from the banking sector (Π
B,R
t ).
17
The Ricardian households maximize the present value of the
expected stream of future utility subject to the budget constraint. The
maximization problem yields a first-order condition for deposits, which
is given by
𝜆t = 𝛽Et
[
𝜆t+1
𝜋ATEt+1
(1 + (Rt − 1)(1 − 𝜏OIHt+1 ))
]
. (5)
15 In reality, the labor surtax is a progressive tax, dividing total labor income
and transfers into four brackets on which progressively higher tax rates are
applied. NORA does not differentiate between different income groups and we
are therefore not able to capture the progressive nature of the labor surtax.
Instead, we set the labor surtax rate to the effective rate paid by all workers in
the economy.
16 In Graeve and Iversen (2017) financial fees are used to generate a gap
between central bank and market forward rates. Similarly, Andrés et al. (2004)
and Chen et al. (2012) use financial fees to generate term premia.
17 The asset valuation tax refund is a pragmatic solution to the fact that capi-
tal gains in NORA are (unlike in the real world) realized every period. Because
the firm share price is forward looking it reacts strongly to shocks that hit
the economy, implying that capital gains tax revenue can be very volatile.
To avoid this we redistribute capital gains tax revenue back to the Ricar-
dian household in a lump-sum fashion in each period. Because the Ricardian
household maximizes expected lifetime utility and is assumed to have com-
plete access to financial markets, temporary income movements caused by
the asset valuation tax refund will then not affect their decision-making pro-
cess strongly. Profits from monopolistically-competitive exporting, consump-
tion firms and banks are included to close the model. The financial fees imposed
on stock holdings are paid to an unmodelled financial intermediary whose prof-
its ΠF,Rt = P
E,M
t FSt S
R,M
t + P
E,S
t FSt S
R,S
t are redistributed lump-sum to the Ricardian
household. The definitions of the other profit terms will follow in section 2.4
and 2.5.2.
where 𝜆t is the real shadow value of one unit of savings. For later
convenience, we define the compounded stochastic discount factor as
Δt,t+j ≔ 𝛽 j 𝜆t+j𝜆t and the one-period discount factor at time t as Δt+1 ≔
Δt,t+1 = 𝛽
𝜆t+1
𝜆t
.
The first-order condition for consumption is given by
𝜆t =
exp(ZUt )(CRt − Ht)−𝜎
PCt (1 − h)−𝜎
, (6)
where Ht = hCR{t−1} is the habit stock of consumption.
Combining equations (6) and (5) yields the well-known Euler
equation.
The first-order condition for stocks is given by
PE,Mt =
∞∑
j=1
1
Ret+j
DIVMt+j, (7)
where Ret+j =
∏j
l=1
1−Δt+l∕𝜋ATEt+l 𝜏
D
t+l(1+RRAt+l)
Δt+l(1−𝜏Dt+l)
. Hence, the price of a stock
is equal to the present discounted value of the stream of future divi-
dends from that stock, where the discount factor is a function of the
household’s discount factor, the effective tax rate on dividends, and the
rate-of-return allowance.18
2.1.2. Liquidity-constrained households
The liquidity-constrained household, following Galí et al. (2007),
consumes all of its disposable income net of taxes. Disposable income
consists of income from public and private employment, unemployment
benefits and transfers:
OILt = WtN
P
t + W
G
t N
G
t + UBt(Lt − Et) + TR
L
t . (8)
Note, that the we assume that hours worked as well as the participation
and employment rate do not differ across the Ricardian and liquidity-
constrained household. Consumption expenditures are then given by
PCt C
L
t = OI
L
t − (OI
L
t − TD
OIH)𝜏OIHt − (OI
L
t − TD
LS)(𝜏LSt + 𝜏
SSH
t ). (9)
The income is taxed applying the identical deductions and tax rates as
in the case of labor (and transfer) income of Ricardians.
2.1.3. Household aggregation
Without loss of generality, we normalize the population size to
1. The parameter 𝜔 ∈ [0,1) denotes the share of liquidity-constrained
households in the economy. The aggregate consumption and transfers
are then given as
Ct = 𝜔CLt + (1 −𝜔)C
R
t ,
TRt = 𝜔TRLt + (1 − 𝜔)TR
R
t . (10)
We implicitly assume that the total amount of hours worked in the
private and public sector is proportional to the size of the household.19
For those variables specific to the Ricardian household we rescale by
the share of the Ricardian household in the overall population to arrive
at an aggregate measure.
Xt = (1 − 𝜔)XRt for
Xt ∈ {DPt ,TLt , S
M
t , S
S
t , Inv
H
t ,AVTt ,Π
X
t ,Π
C
t ,Π
F
t ,Π
B
t }.
18 Following Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2017) we have, without loss of gener-
ality, normalized the number or stocks in the model to 1.
19 Hence, total hours worked in the private sector by the Ricardian household
amount to (1 −𝜔)NPt and by the liquidity-constrained household to 𝜔NPt , yield-
ing overall hours worked in the private sector of NPt . The same logic applies to
the public sector hours worked.
325
60
T.A. Aursland et al. Economic Modelling 93 (2020) 321–353
2.2. Labor market
Labor supply, employment and unemployment For simplicity we
assume that the Ricardian and liquidity-constrained household have the
same labor supply Lt , employment rate Et and unemployment rate Ut .
Labor supply, which we interchangeably refer to as labor force partici-
pation, follows directly the model of labor supply in Statistics Norway’s
large-scale macroeconometric model MODAG/KVARTS, see Gjelsvik et
al. (2013), which includes reduced-form processes for the participation
rate of seven distinct population groups.20 Participation rates in each
population group j are a function of lags of the participation rate, a pos-
itive function of lags of the real after-tax wage and a negative function
of lags of the unemployment rates.21 The latter captures the commonly-
observed discouraged worker effect whereby workers who believe that
their chances of finding a job are low in a recession (when unemploy-
ment is high) leave the labor force rather than incur the monetary and
psychological costs of searching for a job, see Dagsvik et al. (2013). The
reduced-form processes for participation rates take the form
Ljt = f
j
(
Ut−1,…,t−n , (1 − 𝜏Wt−1,…,t−n)Wt−1,…,t−n, L
j
t−1,…,t−n
)
. (11)
Total labor supply is then given by the sum of group-specific participa-
tion rates weighted by the relative size of the population groups
Lt =
7∑
j=1
wjL
j
t + Z
L
t , (12)
where wj capture the population weights for each subgroup. The vari-
able ZLt denotes a shock to the overall labor force participation rate.
With hours worked in the total economy being determined through a
microfounded decision problem on the firm side, we resort to a reduced-
form model of the employment rate along the lines of Uhlig (2004). For
this purpose, we first define the number of hours worked per employee
in the economy NEt as the total number of hours worked in the private
and the public sectors Nt = NPt + NGt divided by the overall employ-
ment rate Et : NEt =
Nt
Et
. Following Uhlig (2004) we then impose that
the employment rate is a sluggish process that responds more slowly to
economic shocks than hours worked per worker (i.e. the intensive mar-
gin of labor supply).22 In particular, we rely on the following reduced-
form relationship between the employment rate and the total number
of hours worked in the economy
Et = 𝜌EEt−1 + (1 − 𝜌E)Nt∕NEss,
where 𝜌E captures the degree of persistence in the employment rate and
NEss is the steady-state number of hours per employee. Hence, today’s
employment rate is a function of last period’s employment rate, imply-
ing sluggishness in the creation of new or destruction of old jobs, and
a function of this period’s labor demand, which captures the number of
workers that would be needed to satisfy the aggregate demand for hours
if all employees worked the steady-state number of hours per employee
NEss. A shock that increases demand for hours Nt will therefore result in
an immediate increase in hours worked per employee that will dissipate
as the employment rate gradually adjusts.
The number of household members that are unemployed is given by
Lt − Et (as the population size is normalized to 1). The unemployment
20 Note, since the population size is normalized to one, Lt can be both con-
sidered the absolute number of people providing labor as well as the share of
people in the economy providing labor, i.e. the participation rate.
21 The seven population groups consist of 15–19 year olds, 20–24 year olds,
female as well as male 25–61 year olds, female as well as male 62–66 year olds
and 67–74 year olds.
22 Uhlig (2004) assumes contract hours (rather than the employment rate)
responds more sluggishly than actual hours worked. In that case it is productiv-
ity per contract hour that adjusts in the short-run rather than hours worked per
employee as in NORA. The modeling approaches are otherwise similar.
rate relates the number of unemployed to the number of people in the
labor force: Ut =
Lt−Et
Lt
. Due to the reduced-form nature of unemploy-
ment, our model is silent on whether unemployment is voluntary or
involuntary.
2.3. Wage formation
The institutional framework for wage bargaining in Norway is based
on the so-called “frontfag” model whereby wage negotiations in the
exposed sector of the economy sets the norm for wage growth in the
rest of the economy. An important purpose of this institutional setup
is to preserve the competitiveness of the exposed sector and ensure
a high level of employment by avoiding excessive wage claims rela-
tive to productivity, see NOU (2013:13) (Holden III Committee). There
is ample empirical evidence documenting the successful implementa-
tion of the model. For example, Bjørnstad and Nymoen (1999) show
that high wage rarely occur during periods of low profitability in the
exposed sector, while periods of high profitability result in higher wage
claims. Gjelsvik et al. (2015) find empirical support for the fact that the
sheltered sector follows wage settlements in the exposed sector, thereby
preventing circumvention of profitability concerns of the exposed sec-
tor.23
Hoel and Nymoen (1988), Nymoen and Rødseth (2003) and
Forslund et al. (2008) have developed partial equilibrium models of
the frontfag model in which wages are set through bargaining between
workers, that are represented by a union that acts in their interest by
aiming for a high level of wages, and exposed-sector firms, that are
represented by an employer organization aiming for high profits. The
current economic environment is assumed to affect wage formation
by changing the bargaining position of the parties. In particular, high
unemployment will weaken the union’s bargaining position and lead to
lower wage claims, while a tighter labor market (low unemployment)
makes it necessary for firms to pay higher wages in order to recruit
workers. The resulting negative relationship between unemployment
and the level of real wages, which is often referred to as the “wage
curve”, has been shown to be a robust feature of labor markets across a
wide range of countries, see Blanchflower and Oswald (1989, 2005).
We build on this literature and model wage formation in Norway as
Nash bargaining over wages between a union representing all workers
in the economy and an employer organization representing firms in
the exposed sector, which in NORA is proxied by the manufacturing
sector.24 In contrast to the existing literature, the wage bargaining in
NORA occurs in a general equilibrium setting and is subject to wage
stickiness as well as downward nominal wage rigidity, which will be
crucial for our results in section 5.
We assume that the payoff function of the union is a utility function
that increases with worker’s pre-tax real wages.25 The union’s reference
23 The role of the exposed sector in setting the norm for wage growth in small
open economies was analyzed by Aukrust (1977) in the so called main-course
theory (“hovedkursteorien”), which lays the foundation for the frontfag model.
Aukrust demonstrated that the sustainable level of nominal wage growth in
small open economies is determined by productivity growth in the exposed sec-
tor and the growth in the world market price of exported goods. Wage growth
exceeding this level will weaken the competitiveness of exposed sector firms,
reduce activity and labor demand, and eventually lead to a moderation of wage
growth. Since the sheltered sector of the economy competes for workers from
the same pool as the exposed sector, wage growth in the sheltered sector will,
over time, follow the norm set in the exposed sector.
24 We calibrate the export content of the manufacturing sector reflecting the
industries classified as exposed sector in the official wage negotiations.
25 As noted by Bjørnstad and Nymoen (2015), a higher degree of coordination
in wage bargaining reduces the positive association between taxes and real
wages. This is because centralized or coordinated labor unions associate higher
taxes with higher welfare. As a result, workers do not need to be compensated
for the loss in purchasing power from higher taxes. Empirical studies on wage
formation in Norway in fact find little effect of labor taxes on bargained wages.
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utility, which can be thought of as their outside option in the event an
agreement is not reached, is assumed to fall with the unemployment
rate. The payoff function of the employer organization representing
firms in the exposed sector is assumed to be given by the monetary
value of profits in the manufacturing sector, which ceteris paribus is
falling with the level of wages. Following the literature, the reference
utility of firms is set to zero on the assumption that failure to reach an
agreement implies no production and zero profits. Hence, the real wage
WNBt that corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution can be found by
maximizing the following Nash product
WNBt = arg maxWNB
[V(W) − V0(Ut)]𝛾 [ΠMt (W)]
1−𝛾 , (13)
where V(W) captures the payoff function of the union given a real wage
W, V0t denotes the union’s reference utility, and the payoff function
of firms equals profits in the manufacturing sector ΠMt . The parameter
𝛾 governs the relative bargaining power of the parties involved. The
payoff function of unions is given by
V(W) = cN + log(W), (14)
where cN is a constant that ensures a positive value of V at relevant
wage levels.26 The payoff function in equation (14) increases with the
wage level Vw > 0 while gains at higher level of wages are valued less
in utility terms Vww < 0. Manufacturing sector profits will be defined in
section 2.5.3. The union’s reference utility is given by
V0t = −𝜈U log(Ut) + Z
V
t ,
where 𝜈U > 0 is a parameter that determines the importance of unem-
ployment for the reference utility and hence the negotiated wage. We
take the logarithm of unemployment given evidence by Blanchflower
and Oswald (2005) that the wage curve becomes flat at relatively high
levels of unemployment. The term ZVt captures a shock to the reference
utility of the union (corresponding to a vertical shift in the wage curve).
Solution and characterization The Nash bargaining solution can
be found by taking the derivative of the Nash product in equation (13)
with respect to the real wage and setting the resulting term to zero. The
resulting first-order condition is given by
(WNBt )−1
V(WNBt ) − V0(Ut)
= 1 − 𝛾𝛾
(1 + 𝜏SSFt )NMt
ΠMt (WNBt )
, (15)
where 𝜏SSFt is the social security tax paid by firms and N
M
t is the amount
of hours worked in the manufacturing sector. As can be shown (see
Appendix A.2), the Nash bargaining wage increases with the value of
V0t and hence falls with the level of unemployment. In addition, the
Nash bargaining wage increases with higher profitability in the manu-
facturing sector, caused for example by reduction in the social security
tax paid by firms or by increased demand for manufacturing goods.
Conversely changes detrimental to the profitability of manufacturing-
sector firms will depress the Nash bargaining wage.
The wage bargaining model thus yields a downward-sloping rela-
tionship between the real wage and the level of unemployment which
corresponds to the aforementioned wage curve. At the same time, the
labor demand function in equation (45) establishes a negative rela-
tionship between hours worked and the real wage, and thus between
employment and the real wage. Following Nymoen and Rødseth (2003)
we can assume that unemployment is a decreasing function of employ-
ment and draw the wage curve in Fig. 1 as a function of total employ-
ment. The intersection of the wage curve and the downward-sloping
labor demand curve in equation (45) determines the level of employ-
ment.
26 We have confirmed, that our main results are robust to an alternative func-
tional form set to V(W) = cN + W1−𝜎N
1−𝜎N
and values of 𝜎N chosen to be between 1
and 2. These results are available on request.
Fig. 1. The wage and labor demand curve.
The level of unemployment is then simply the difference between
total labor supply in equation (12) and total employment.
Wage stickiness and downward nominal rigidity The wage deter-
mined through Nash bargaining is not adopted by the economy imme-
diately. Instead we follow Hall (2005) and Shimer (2004) and assume
an ad-hoc form of wage stickiness, implying that wages at time t are a
function of wages in the previous period t − 1 and this period’s Nash
bargaining wage:
W∗t = 𝜌WWt−1 + (1 − 𝜌W )W
NB
t , (16)
where W∗t is the real wage in the economy in period t absent any down-
ward nominal wage rigidity and 𝜌W captures the persistence of wages
and thus (1 − 𝜌W ) the speed of adjustment of wages towards the Nash
bargaining equilibrium.27 Note, that we implicitly assume that while
wages are bargained for the manufacturing sector, the service sector
follows the norm set and thus pays the identical wage. This is in line
with the frontfag model and empirical evidence documented by Gjelsvik
et al. (2015).
We assume, that nominal wages are subject to downward nominal
rigidities. Specifically, we impose
WNomt ≥ 𝛾WWNomt−1 ⇔ Wt ≥ Wt−1𝛾W∕𝜋t ,
where WNomt and Wt =
WNomt
Pt
capture the nominal and real wage and
𝛾w the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity. In doing so, we fol-
low the functional form assumed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016),
who study emerging economies. However, there is ample evidence that
DNWR play an important role in developed economies as well. Shen and
Yang (2018) document DNWR for the US context, Holden and Wulfs-
berg (2008) for a range of OECD countries including Norway. More
recently, Ku et al. (2020) find strong evidence for DNWR in Norway
exploiting quasi-experimental variation in payroll taxes following a EU
regulation intervention.
Imposing the DNWR onto the model, we obtain the dynamic wage
equation
Wt = max{W∗t , 𝛾
WWt−1
1
𝜋t
}, (17)
27 Wages in this setup react, despite the lack of an explicit forward-looking
term in equation (16), to news shocks (i.e. shocks known prior to their realiza-
tion) as both Ricardian households and firms are forward-looking and take deci-
sions that affect the level of unemployment, prices and profitability in anticipa-
tion of future economic developments. Furthermore, assuming that labor union
utility is a function of the negotiated nominal wage deflated by the expected
future price level only marginally affects the path of wages relative to the pre-
sented model setup for two reasons. First, sticky wages slow down the response
of today’s wages to future price changes considerably. Second, price setting
by firms (both domestic and importers) is already forward-looking such that
future increases in prices are usually accompanied by increases in the current
price level.
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Note, that the DNWR only plays a role in economic circumstances where
nominal wage growth is sufficiently small. In section 5 we will create
this situation by generating a recession induced by a negative shock
to consumption preferences, which lowers aggregate demand, increases
unemployment and thus depresses wage growth. Once, equation (17)
becomes binding by the lower nominal wage growth limit, fiscal stimu-
lus will not increase nominal wages if the additional aggregate demand
impulse is insufficient to lift the economy off the DNWR. Instead, due
to stimulus-induced increase in inflation, real wages may fall, which
further stimulates the economy. As we will later see, this mechanism
can give rise to higher multipliers in recessions.
2.4. Banking sector
To simplify the Ricardian household’s portfolio choice problem it is
convenient to include a simple banking sector in NORA. In particular,
we follow Sánchez (2016) and include a perfectly-competitive represen-
tative bank whose sole purpose is to collect deposits from the Ricardian
household and borrow from abroad in order to finance loans to domes-
tic firms and the government. The balance sheet (in real terms) of the
perfectly-competitive representative bank can be written as
DPt + RERtBFt = B
M
t + B
S
t + Dt (18)
where BFt is the foreign debt of the bank (in units of the foreign final
consumption good), RERt the real exchange rate, B·t loans to manufac-
turing/service sector firms and Dt loans to the government. The real
exchange rate is defined as RERt ≔ EXtPTPt ∕Pt, where EXt is the nom-
inal exchange rate and PTPt the foreign price level. The representative
bank aims to maximize the present discounted value of profits
Et
∞∑
j=0
Δt,t+j
[
RLt−1+j
𝜋ATEt+j
(
BMt−1+j + B
S
t−1+j + Dt−1+j
)
−
Rt−1+j
𝜋ATEt+j
DPt−1+j −
RTPt−1+jRPt−1+j
𝜋TPt+j
RERt+jBFt−1+j
]
subject to the bank’s balance sheet constraint. The bank lends at a rate
RLt to firms and the government. The bank pays an interest rate Rt
(set by the monetary authority) on deposits. The last term in the profit
equation captures the cost of foreign borrowing where the foreign gross
interest rate RTPt is subject to a debt-elastic risk premium RPt . The risk
premium on foreign borrowing is adapted from Adolfson et al. (2008)
and given by
RPt ≔ exp
(
𝜉NFA(At − Ass) − 𝜉OF (OFRPt − OF
RP
ss ) + Z
RP
t
)
,
where At =
RERtBFt
YCPIss
is the domestic-currency value of private sector net
foreign liabilities as a ratio to long-run GDP (expressed in consump-
tion units, to be introduced later). In addition, we assume that the risk
premium responds indirectly to the oil price through its impact on the
value of Norway’s offshore sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pen-
sion Fund Global (GPFG). The oil price is assumed to affect the value of
the GPFG according to the following rule
OFRPt = 𝜌OF,RPOF
RP
t−1 + (1 − 𝜌OF,RP)
(
POilt ∕P
Oil
ss − 1
)
.
Hence, we capture in a reduced-form fashion that an increase in the oil
price would, over time, increase our proxy of the GPFG (OFRPt ) and thus
reduce the risk-premium on foreign borrowing by the private sector
(𝜉OF > 0).28 ZRPt is a shock to the risk premium.
The first-order conditions for domestic lending and foreign borrow-
ing are given by
Et
[
Δt+1
𝜋ATEt+1
(RLt − Rt)
]
= 0, (19)
Et
[
Δt+1
(
Rt
𝜋ATEt+1
−
RTPt RPt
𝜋TPt+1
RERt+1
RERt
)]
= 0. (20)
The first expression simply states that because the bank is assumed to be
perfectly competitive it will set the lending rate such that the expected
return from borrowing equals the interest rate the bank pays on its
deposits. The second equation is an uncovered interest parity condition
which relates the expected (domestic-currency equivalent) return on
foreign bonds to the expected return on domestic deposits.
2.5. Firms
The production side of the economy consists of two
monopolistically-competitive intermediate good sectors, the man-
ufacturing and the service sector, that use domestic labor and capital
as factor inputs, finance investments via debt or retained profits
and sell their output to a final goods sector, introduced in section
2.5.3. Monopolistically-competitive importing firms, see section 2.5.4
purchase the foreign good at the world market price and sell it to
the final goods sector. With the exception of the final consumption
and export goods sector, perfectly-competitive firms in the final goods
sector bundle the domestic manufacturing and service goods, and the
imported good, into composite manufacturing and services goods that
are in turn combined to form the final goods in the economy, see 2.5.1.
Firms in the final consumption and export good sector, however, are
assumed to be monopolistically competitive and thus have price-setting
power, see section 2.5.2. Exporting firms sell on the world market with
a price set in foreign currency, while final consumption good producer
sell their goods in the domestic market and choose how quickly to pass
through changes in consumption taxes and fees to retail prices.
2.5.1. Final goods sector
The production process of firms in the final goods sector can be sepa-
rated into two stages as shown in Fig. 2. In the first stage, domestically-
produced manufacturing and services goods are combined with imports
to form a composite manufacturing and services good. In the second
stage, the two composite goods are combined to form final consump-
tion, investment, export, and government consumption goods. While
the first stage is perfectly competitive for all four final goods, the sec-
ond stage is monopolistically-competitive for the export and consump-
tion good sector.
Note, in order to measure the multiplier from government pur-
chases, it is important to account for the import leakage of expendi-
ture expansions. If fiscal stimulus, e.g. in the form of tax cuts, leads to
higher disposable incomes, then the response of imported consumption
is also to be taken into account. Our final good structure, and its cali-
bration to Norwegian Input-Output Tables, is thus essential in allowing
us to properly measure fiscal multipliers for a small open economy as
Norway.
First stage: composite manufacturing and services sector good
For each final good Zt ∈ {Ct , It ,Xt ,GCt }, a composite manufacturing
28 This is similar in spirit to NEMO (Kravik and Mimir, 2019), where the value
of the GPFG affects the risk premium directly, and to KVARTS (Boug and Dyvi,
2008), where a higher oil price is assumed to reduce the risk premium. Note,
we distinguish between the GPFG as it relates to the risk premium on foreign
borrowing (OFRPt ) and the GPFG as it relates to the government budget (OFt),
see section 2.6.4 for more details. We make this distinction to limit the num-
ber of interlinkages between the oil price and the real exchange rate, and the
government budget.
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Fig. 2. Final good sector production.
good of volume ZMt is produced using domestically-produced manufac-
turing sector goods of volume YM,Zt , and imported goods of volume
IMM,Zt using the following production function:
ZMt =
[
(1 − 𝛼M,Z)1∕𝜂M,Z (YM,Zt )
𝜂M,Z−1
𝜂M,Z
+ 𝛼1∕𝜂M,ZM,Z (IM
M,Z
t )
𝜂M,Z−1
𝜂M,Z
]𝜂M,Z∕(𝜂M,Z−1)
,
where 𝛼M,Z is the parameter governing the import/home bias for the
composite manufacturing good employed in the production of the final
good ZMt and 𝜂M,Z is the elasticity of substitution between the imported
and the domestically-produced manufacturing sector good.
The objective of final goods firms in the first stage of produc-
tion is to minimize the cost of producing the composite good. Let
PMt = P
Nom,M
t ∕Pt be the relative price of a domestically-produced man-
ufacturing good, and PIMt = P
Nom,IM
t ∕Pt the relative price of imported
goods. The cost minimization problem yields the following final-good-
specific demand functions for domestically-produced manufacturing
and imported goods:
YM,Zt = (1 − 𝛼M,Z)
(
PMt ∕P
M,Z
t
)−𝜂M,Z
ZMt , (21)
IMM,Zt = 𝛼M,Z
(
PIMt ∕P
M,Z
t
)−𝜂M,Z
ZMt , (22)
where the relative price of the composite manufacturing good, PM,Zt is
given by
PM,Zt =
(
(1 − 𝛼M,Z)
(
PMt
)1−𝜂M,Z + 𝛼M,Z
(
PIMt
)1−𝜂M)1∕(1−𝜂M,Z)
. (23)
Because final goods firms are perfectly competitive it holds that the
total value of the composite manufacturing good equal the cost of pro-
duction:
PM,Zt Z
M
t = P
M
t Y
M,Z
t + P
IM
t IM
M,Z
t .
The composite service good is produced completely analogously to the
composite manufacturing good.
Second stage: final good For final good Zt ∈ {It ,GCt } (i.e. excluding
the export and consumption good), final-good-specific composite man-
ufacturing and service goods are combined to form final goods using
the following production function
Zt =
[
(1 − 𝛼Z)1∕𝜂Z (ZMt )
𝜂Z−1
𝜂Z + 𝛼1∕𝜂ZZ (Z
S
t )
𝜂Z−1
𝜂Z
]𝜂Z∕(𝜂Z−1)
, (24)
where 𝛼Z is the final-good-specific composite service good bias param-
eter and 𝜂Z the elasticity of substitution between the composite man-
ufacturing and service good. The objective of final goods firms in the
second stage of production is to minimize the cost of producing a certain
level of production Zt , given the price of the composite manufacturing
PM,Zt and service P
S,Z
t good. This yields the following final-goods-specific
demand functions
ZMt = (1 − 𝛼Z)
(
PM,Zt ∕P
Z
t
)−𝜂Z
Zt , (25)
ZSt = 𝛼Z
(
PS,Zt ∕P
Z
t
)−𝜂Z
Zt . (26)
The relative price of final good Z is then given by
PZt =
(
(1 − 𝛼Z)
(
PM,Zt
)1−𝜂Z + 𝛼Z
(
PS,Zt
)1−𝜂Z)1∕(1−𝜂Z )
.
The market clearing conditions for each final good Zt are given by
PIt Invt = P
M,I
t I
M
t + P
S,I
t I
S
t , (27)
PGCt G
C
t = P
M,GC
t G
C,M
t + P
S,GC
t G
C,S
t . (28)
Note that as equation (27) makes clear, IMt does not capture invest-
ments into the manufacturing sector, which is given by InvMt . Instead
IMt captures the amount of composite manufactured goods used in the
production of the final investment good. The same distinction applies
to ISt and Inv
S
t .
2.5.2. Final consumption and export good sector
In contrast to the final investment and government consumption
good we assume that the second stage of the final good sector for con-
sumption and export goods is monopolistically-competitive. This allows
the second-stage firms to act as price setters. Pricing is subject to price
adjustment costs such that export and consumption good prices are
sticky.
In the case of the final consumption good sector we impose the
value-added (consumption) tax onto firms (as opposed to households)
with firms setting the after-tax price of the final consumption good.
Given price adjustment costs, changes in the taxation of consumption
then do not have an immediate pass-through to retail prices, as also
found empirically by Benedek et al. (2015) and Voigts (2016). This
model feature will lead to a hump-shaped consumption tax (cumula-
tive) multiplier in our results.
The rationale for the export sector’s pricing power is unrelated to
taxation. Instead it allows local currency price setting, i.e. the setting of
prices in the currency of foreign markets to which exporters sell their
goods, a practice sometimes called pricing-to-market. This is consistent
with the significant amount of evidence of deviations from the law of
one price even for traded goods (Betts and Devereux, 2000). As a con-
sequence, crowding-out of fiscal stimulus through appreciation of the
exchange rate and depression of exports does not occur immediately
but slowly over time.
In the following, we will derive the overall second stage production
problem for the export sector, and later state the analogous consump-
tion sector problem. The final export good sector consists of a contin-
uum of firms i ∈ [0,1] that each produce a differentiated export good
that are imperfect substitutes. Export firm i produces output of volume
Xt(i) and sells it at the relative price PXt (i) =
PNom,Xt (i)
PTPt
where PNom,Xt (i) is
the nominal price of a unit of exports in foreign currency and PTPt is
the foreign price level which, given the small open economy assump-
tion, is exogenous. A perfectly-competitive (foreign) retailer combines
the differentiated export goods into an aggregate export good Xt using
the following bundling function
Xt =
⎛⎜⎜⎝∫
1
0
Xt(i)
𝜖Xt −1
𝜖Xt di
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝜖Xt
𝜖Xt −1
,
where 𝜖Xt is the elasticity of substitution across the differentiated export
goods. Retailers aim to maximize output of the aggregate export good Xt
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for a given level of inputs ∫ 10 PXt (i)Xt(i)di, which yields a set of demand
functions given by
Xt(i) =
(
PXt (i)
PXt
)−𝜖Xt
Xt . (29)
Foreign trading partners’ demand for the final aggregate export good is
given by
Xt =
(
PXt
)−𝜂TP
YTPt , (30)
where YTPt denotes output among foreign trading partners which will
be discussed in section 2.7. The parameter 𝜂TP is the elasticity of substi-
tution between domestic and imported goods in the foreign economy,
which captures how sensitive Norwegian exports are to changes in the
aggregate export price. This relationship is taken as given by Norwe-
gian exporters who individually are assumed to be too small to affect
the aggregate export price.
Equivalently, a continuum of final consumption good firms set the
relative price PCt (i) =
PNom,Ct (i)
Pt
on their output Ct(i). The bundling func-
tion is completely analogous to the export sector but subject to the elas-
ticity of substitution given by 𝜖C . This gives rise to equivalent demand
functions and aggregate price equations. However, the demand for the
aggregate consumption good Ct is, in contrast to the export sector, not
given by a reduced-form relationship but endogenously determined by
the two household types in the economy.
Cost minimization The production function of final good exporter
i is given by
Xt(i) =
[
(1 − 𝛼X)1∕𝜂X (XMt (i))
𝜂X−1
𝜂X + 𝛼1∕𝜂XX (X
S
t (i))
𝜂X−1
𝜂X
]𝜂X∕(𝜂X−1)
,
where 𝛼X is the service good bias parameter for exports and 𝜂X is the
elasticity of substitution between the composite manufacturing XMt (i)
and service XSt (i) good for the final export good. Exporter i seeks to
minimize its costs of producing a certain desired level of production
Xt(i), given the price of the composite manufacturing PM,Xt and service
PS,Xt good derived earlier. The solution yields the following demand
functions for the composite manufacturing and service good by the final
good export sector
XMt (i) = (1 − 𝛼X)
(
PM,Xt ∕MC
X
t (i)
)−𝜂X
Xt(i), (31)
XSt (i) = 𝛼X
(
PS,Xt ∕MC
X
t (i)
)−𝜂X
Xt(i), (32)
where marginal cost can be shown to be the same across firms MCXt (i) =
MCXt and given by
MCXt =
(
(1 − 𝛼X)
(
PM,Xt
)1−𝜂X + 𝛼X
(
PS,Xt
)1−𝜂X)1∕(1−𝜂X)
. (33)
Cost minimization in the consumption sector is completely analogous.
Note, however, that the consumption sector is subject to a different
service good bias parameter, 𝛼C, and elasticity of substitution between
the composite manufacturing CMt (i) and service CSt (i) good, 𝜂C. Nom-
inal marginal costs in the consumption sector MCNom,Ct are chosen to
be the price level in the model, i.e. Pt = MC
Nom,C
t . In other words, the
relative price of marginal costs in the consumption sector is MCCt =
MCNom,Ct ∕Pt = 1.
Price setting in the export sector Firms in the final goods export
sector set prices to maximize profits
ΠXt = [(P
X
t (i)RERt − MC
X
t )Xt(i) − AC
X
t (i)]. (34)
Profits each period are therefore a function of the sales price in domestic
currency PXt (i)RERt and the cost of production MCXt . Following Norges
Banks DSGE model in Kravik and Mimir (2019), adjustment costs are
given by
ACXt (i) =
𝜒X
2
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
PXt (i)
PXt−1(i)
𝜋TPt
(
PXt−1
PXt−2
𝜋TPt−1
)𝜔Ind
(𝜋TPss )1−𝜔Ind
− 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
2
XtRERtPXt , (35)
where ACXt (i) denotes adjustment costs in real domestic currency terms
for exporter i, 𝜒X is a parameter determining the magnitude of adjust-
ment costs, and 𝜔Ind is a parameter determining the degree of price
indexation.29
The solution to the price-setting problem, which involves maximiz-
ing the net present value of the expected future value of profits each
period in equation (34) subject to the demand function given by equa-
tion (29), yields, that all exporting firms set identical prices such that
PXt (i) = PXt . Because exporters set identical prices they also have the
same output, the same profits, and the same demand for composite
manufacturing and service goods, allowing us to drop the i subscript.
Export prices in steady state are set at a mark-up over marginal costs:
RERssPXss = MC
X
ss
𝜖Xss
𝜖Xss − 1
.
The full, dynamic pricing equation is given in the technical appendix.
Price setting in the consumption sector Since the price-setting
problem of consumption firms is quite different we outline it separately
here. A consumption sector firm i has the per-period profit given by
ΠCt =
[
(PCt (i) − (1 + 𝜏
C
t + 𝜏
CF
t )MC
C
t )Ct(i) − AC
C
t (i)
]
. (36)
Hence per-period profits of the final consumption good sector are given
by the difference in retailer price (i.e. the selling price of the consump-
tion good) and the cost of production of one consumption good plus
taxation. Note, since we express profits in real terms, the relative cost of
production is given by MCCt = MC
Nom,C
t ∕Pt = 1. The taxation term 𝜏Ct is
a value-added tax (VAT) on consumption and 𝜏CFt are volume-based fees
on consumption, where 𝜏CFt = FCt ∕Pt such that FCt is the nominal fee per
consumption good.30 Price adjustment costs are analogously defined
(with price adjustment cost parameter 𝜒C). Maximizing the present dis-
counted value of the consumption good sector profits gives rise to a
pricing equation analogous to the export good sector. In particular, in
steady state, the price of the consumption good to households is given
by PCt =
𝜖C
𝜖C−1
(1 + 𝜏Ct + 𝜏CFt )Pt , and is thus given as a mark-up over the
(after-tax) production cost of a consumption good.
2.5.3. Intermediate good manufacturing and services sector
The intermediate good manufacturing and services sectors each con-
sist of a continuum of firms i ∈ [0,1] that produce a differentiated man-
ufacturing and services good which are assumed to be imperfect sub-
stitutes, and set prices as a markup over marginal costs. Firms choose
the optimal level of hours, investment, borrowing, and set prices in
order to maximize firm value given by the present discounted value of
future after-tax dividends. We solve the maximization problem for the
manufacturing sector. The solution for the service sector is completely
symmetric and will not be derived explicitly. The production function
of firm i in the manufacturing sector is given by
YMt (i) = exp
ZYMt (KGt )
𝜅M (KMt (i))
𝛼M (NMt (i))
1−𝛼M − FCM, (37)
29 Note that since P
X
t (i)
PXt−1(i)
𝜋TPt =
PNom,Xt (i)
PNom,Xt−1 (i)
adjustment costs are a function of the
change in nominal export prices.
30 Consumption taxes are levied on the composite consumption good Ct . We
therefore implicitly assume that the domestically-produced and the imported
component of the consumption good are taxed at the same rate.
330
65
T.A. Aursland et al. Economic Modelling 93 (2020) 321–353
where YMt (i) denotes output of firm i in the manufacturing sector, KMt (i)
and NMt (i) are the amount of capital and labor inputs used in the pro-
duction process, 𝛼M is the output elasticity of capital, and FCM are fixed
costs or subsidies. Additionally and following Baxter and King (1993)
and Sims and Wolff (2018a) we assume that public capital KGt can aug-
ment productivity of private firms, where 𝜅M measures the effective-
ness of public capital in increasing productivity in the manufacturing
sector.31 The term ZYMt captures the total factor productivity shock.
Analogous to the export sector, perfectly-competitive retailers buy
the output of intermediate goods firms YMt (i) at a relative price PMt (i) =
PNom,Mt (i)
Pt
and bundle them into a domestic manufacturing good YMt using
the bundling function
YMt =
(
∫
1
0
YMt (i)
𝜖M−1
𝜖M di
) 𝜖M
𝜖M−1
,
where 𝜖M is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced by dif-
ferent manufacturing sector firms. Retailers aim to maximize output
of the aggregate manufacturing good YMt for a given cost of inputs∫ 10 PMt (i)YMt (i)di, which yields a set of demand functions given by
YMt (i) =
(
PMt (i)
PMt
)−𝜖M
YMt .
The aggregate price is given by PMt = (∫ 10 PMt (i)1−𝜖M di)
1
1−𝜖M . The retail-
ers sell the domestic manufacturing good to the final good sector, which
combines it with imports and the composite service good to generate
the final goods as discussed in the previous section.
Intermediate sector firms face adjustment costs when changing
prices. These are a given by
ACMt (i) =
𝜒M
2
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
PMt (i)
PMt−1(i)
𝜋ATEt
(
PMt−1
PMt−2
𝜋ATEt−1
)𝜔Ind
𝜋1−𝜔Indss
− 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
2
YMt P
M
t ,
where ACMt (i) denotes real adjustment cost for manufacturing firm i, 𝜒M
is a parameter determining the magnitude of adjustment costs in the
manufacturing sector, and 𝜔Ind is a parameter determining the degree
of price indexation.
The firm’s capital stock evolves according to the following capital
accumulation equation
KMt+1 = Inv
M
t + (1 − 𝛿KP)K
M
t , (38)
where InvMt denotes investments in the manufacturing sector and 𝛿KP is
the capital depreciation rate.32 Following Gadatsch et al. (2016), firms
incur costs to adjusting the level of investment
ACInv,Mt ≔
⎛⎜⎜⎝
𝜒Inv
2
(
InvMt
InvMt−1
− 1
)2⎞⎟⎟⎠
InvMt ,
where 𝜒 Inv is a parameter determining the magnitude of investment
adjustment costs.
Manufacturing firms borrow money to finance their operations by
issuing bonds BMt . Nominal firm debt accumulates according to
PtBMt = PtBN
M
t + Pt−1B
M
t−1, (39)
where BNMt denotes the real value of new domestic borrowing. We
define the debt-to-capital ratio as bMt ≔ BMt𝜆K,Mt KMt where 𝜆
K,M
t is the
31 In the baseline calibration of the model we assume 𝜅M to be zero.
32 We can drop the i subscript as the problem is symmetric for each individual
firm in the manufacturing sector.
shadow price of capital defined below. The cost of borrowing for man-
ufacturing firms is given by RLt−1RP
B,M
t−1 -1, where RP
B,M
t captures a risk
premium that increases with the amount of borrowing, as captured by
the firm’s debt-to-capital ratio. In particular, we assume that
RPB,Mt = exp
𝜉B
(
bMt −𝛽
M
)
, (40)
where 𝜉B captures the responsiveness of the risk premium to the debt-
to-capital ratio and 𝛽M is a parameter calibrated to ensure that NORA
matches the empirical debt-to-capital ratio in Norwegian firms. The
firm payments associated with the risk premium, i.e. the debt ser-
vicing costs exceeding the rate of lending charged by the bank, are
assumed to be redistributed in a lump-sum fashion to the Ricardian
household.33 This risk premium on the borrowing costs of firms creates
a credit spread between the interest rate at which banks service deposits
(RLt = Rt) and the effective rate at which firms borrow (RLt RP
B,M
t ). The
spread is generally counter-cyclical as it will increase in recessions
which reduce the shadow price of the capital stock of the firm.
Additionally, firms face costs when adjusting the level of new bor-
rowing, following Alfaro et al. (2018) who argue that it is costly in
terms of managerial time to change existing borrowing arrangements.
Preserving the symmetry with investment adjustment costs we assume
borrowing adjustment costs to be given by
ACBN,Mt ≔
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
𝜒BN
2
(
BNMt
BNMt−1
− 1
)2⎞
⎟⎟⎠
BNMt .
Profits and Dividends Total before-tax profits of a firm in the man-
ufacturing sector are given by
ΠMt (i) = P
M
t (i)Y
M
t (i) − (1 + 𝜏
SSF
t )WtN
M
t (i)
−(RLt−1RP
B,M
t−1 − 1)
BMt−1(i)
𝜋ATEt
−
−(ACMt (i) + AC
Inv,M
t (i) + AC
BN,M
t (i)) (41)
where 𝜏SSFt is the social security tax (payroll tax) paid by firms.34 The
tax base for the corporate profit tax is then given by
TBΠ,Mt = Π
M
t − 𝛿𝜏P
I
tK
M
t − TD
OIF .
Deductable from profits is a depreciation allowance, where the tax
depreciation rate is given by 𝛿𝜏 . The term TDOIF captures an allowance
on corporate profits and is calibrated such that the tax base profits in
steady-state are in line with data. Implicit in the definition of the tax
base and in line with the Norwegian tax code is the fact, that costs of
borrowing are considered a deductible expense for tax purposes while
new investments financed by equity are not.
Total profits are either retained in order to finance net investments,
used to pay dividends to shareholders, or used to pay profit taxes to the
government. Hence, it holds that
ΠMt (i) = Π
R,M
t (i) + DIV
M
t (i) + TB
Π,M
t (i)𝜏
OIF
t . (42)
where ΠR,Mt are retained profits. Investments are financed either by
retained profits ΠR,Mt or new borrowing BNMt :
PIt Inv
M
t = Π
R,M
t + BN
M
t . (43)
33 This represents a short-cut to explicitly modeling the risk premium as a
profit to banks that is then redistributed to the owner of the bank, the Ricardian
household. Note, that the total value of risk premiums that both, manufacturing
and service sector firms pay are given by RLt−1(RP
B,M
t−1 − 1)
BMt−1
𝜋ATEt
+ RLt−1(RP
B,S
t−1 −
1) B
S
t−1
𝜋ATEt
.
34 We reintroduce the i-dependency to make clear the variables under control
of individual firms.
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Firm’s stock price As noted in equation (7), which we repeat below
for convenience, the firm’s stock price is equal to the present discounted
value of future dividends
PE,Mt (i) =
∞∑
j=1
1
Ret+j
DIVMt+j(i),
where the firm’s discount factor (from time t = 1) is equal to Ret+j =
∏j
l=1
1−Δt+l∕𝜋ATEt+l 𝜏
D
t+l(1+RRAt+l)
Δt+l(1−𝜏Dt+l)
. It will prove useful to write the period-to-
period discount factor for dividends as
DFDIVt+j+1 ≔
Ret+j+1
Ret+j
=
1 −Δt+j+1∕𝜋ATEt+j+1𝜏
D
t+j+1(1 + RRAt+j+1)
Δt+j+1(1 − 𝜏Dt+j+1)
. (44)
We can now identify
RKt ≔ DF
DIV
t+1 − 1
1 − 𝜏OIFt+1
as the implied interest rate on equity-financing. To see this note, that
shareholders are indifferent between one unit of (pre-tax) dividends
in period t and DFDIVt+1 many in period t + 1 (in real terms) as DF
DIV
t+1
captures their discount factor on dividends. Hence, for firms to rely on
equity financing, i.e. a reduction in dividends paid out, the investment,
ignoring corporate taxes for now, needs to earn a gross return of DFDIVt+1
and hence a net return of DFDIVt+1 − 1. Since, however, the return on these
equity investments is taxed again at the corporate profit tax rate, the
required return and thus cost of equity financing needs to be scaled by
the inverse of the tax factor (1 − 𝜏OIFt+1).
Firm’s maximization problem Firm i’s decision variables are the
amount of labor it wants to employ NMt (i) given the wage rate in the
economy, the amount of investment InvMt (i) it wants to undertake, the
amount of new borrowing BNMt (i) it needs to carry out that investment,
and the price it wants to charge for the good it produces PMt (i). The
firm chooses the optimal value of these variables in order to maximize
its share price, taking into account the physical capital and firm debt
constraint as well as the need to satisfy the demand given their price
decision. The derivations are provided in the technical appendix.
The first-order condition on labor is given by
(1 − 𝜏OIFt )(1 + 𝜏
SSF
t )Wt = (1 − 𝛼M)𝜆
Y ,M
t
YMt (i) + FCM
NMt
. (45)
Hence, firms choose the amount of labor they want to employ in such a
way that the after-tax wage equals the marginal product of labor. The
first-order condition on investment states, that
PIt = −(1 − 𝜏
OIF
t )
(
𝜒Inv
(
InvMt
InvMt−1
− 1
)
InvMt ∕Inv
M
t−1
+ 𝜒Inv
2
(
InvMt
InvMt−1
− 1
)2⎞
⎟⎟⎠
+ 𝜆K,Mt +
(1 − 𝜏OIFt+1)
DFDIVt+1
𝜒Inv
(
InvMt+1
InvMt
− 1
)
InvMt+1
InvMt+1
(InvMt )2
(46)
Hence, firms choose the amount of investment in such a way that the
marginal value of capital is equal to the price of investment good, con-
sisting of the price of investment and investment adjustment costs. The
envelope condition on capital is given by
𝜆K,Mt DF
DIV
t+1 = 𝜏
OIF
t+1𝛿𝜏P
I
t+1 + 𝜆
K,M
t+1 (1 − 𝛿KP) + 𝜆
Y ,M
t+1 𝛼M
YMt+1 + FC
M
KMt+1
. (47)
The condition captures that the marginal value of capital is a function of
its marginal product, the depreciation allowance and the cost of equity-
financing. The first-order condition on new borrowing states, that
𝜆B,Mt = −1 + (1 − 𝜏
OIF
t )DAC
BN
t −
1 − 𝜏OIFt+1
DFDIVt+1
DACBNt+1
BNMt+1
BNMt
.
Hence, each additional unit of new borrowing decreases the value of
the firm by one unit, subject to adjustment costs, where DACBN cap-
tures the derivative of the adjustment costs on borrowing, analogously
defined to DAC in the technical appendix. New borrowing, however,
also allows the firm to invest, which has positive effects on the value of
the firm. This is captured by the envelope condition on the level of debt
BMt , which is given by
−𝜆B,Mt DFDIVt+1𝜋
ATE
t+1 + 𝜆
B,M
t+1
(1 − 𝜏OIFt+1)
= (RLt RP
B,M
t (1 + 𝜉Bb
M
t ) − 1).
The right-hand side of equation captures the marginal cost of borrow-
ing. It depends on the interest rate charged by banks on firm loans RLt ,
the risk premium on firm borrowing RPB,Mt , and the marginal increase
in the risk premium 𝜉BbMt caused by an increase in the debt-to-capital
ratio, see equation (40). The left-hand side of equation captures the cost
of equity financing. In particular the cost of equity declines with the
rate-of-return allowance RRAt , see equation (44). Hence, a higher rate-
of-return allowance will reduce the marginal cost of equity financing
and shift financing away from debt to equity.35 The first-order condi-
tion on prices implies that all firms set the same price PMt (i) = PMt which
in steady state is given by
(1 − 𝜏OIF)PM = 𝜆Y ,M 𝜖M
𝜖M − 1
. (48)
Hence, the after-tax price of the manufacturing good in steady-state is
set as a mark-up over the value of one unit of production.36 The full
dynamic pricing equation is given in the technical appendix.
2.5.4. Imported goods sector
Individual importing firms sell their output IMt(i) at a relative price
PIMt (i) to perfectly-competitive import retailers who use the bundling
function
IMt =
⎛⎜⎜⎝∫
1
0
IMt(i)
𝜖IMt −1
𝜖IMt di
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝜖IMt
𝜖IMt −1
,
where 𝜖IMt is the elasticity of substitution across imported goods sold by
individual importers. Output maximization then implies
IMt(i) =
(
PIMt (i)
PIMt
)−𝜖IMt
IMt . (49)
where the aggregate price index is PIMt = (∫ 10 PIMt (i)1−𝜖IMt di)
1
1−𝜖IMt . Prof-
its by importing firms are given by ΠF,t(i) = (PIMt (i) − RERt)IMt(i) −
ACIMt (i) where the cost of production equals the real exchange rate RERt
since this is the price at which the importer can purchase one unit of
foreign output. Price adjustment costs are analogous to those in the
domestic intermediate sectors. The solution to the price-setting prob-
lem, which involves maximizing the net present value of profits subject
to the demand function is given in the technical appendix. The result
implies that all import firms set the same price PIMt (i) = PIMt , and that
in steady state the price is set as a markup over the real exchange rate,
i.e. PIM = RER 𝜖
IM
𝜖IM−1 .
35 In the appendix section A.6, we show that if the ordinary income tax rate
on households 𝜏OIHt and on firm profits 𝜏
OIF
t are equal, transaction costs are zero
and the rate-of-return allowance RRAt is set equal to the after-tax return on
deposits, there is no tax-induced distortion towards debt financing for firms.
36 In our framework firms operate as stock price maximizer rather than cost
minimizer as usually the case in standard DSGE models. This gives rise to a
problem whereby the value of one unit of production enters the maximization
problem as opposed to the more commonly used measure of marginal costs
arising in cost minimization. The two measures are, however, equivalent. As
evident from equation (48), the term 𝜆Y,Mt can be interpreted as marginal cost
in the manufacturing sector such that the after-tax price is set as a mark-up, a
function of the elasticity 𝜖M , over marginal cost.
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2.6. Monetary and fiscal policy
2.6.1. Central bank
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to Norges
Banks DSGE model NEMO, see (Kravik and Mimir, 2019), given by the
expression
R∗t
R̃t
=
(
Rt−1
R̃t
)𝜌R ((𝜋ATE,Annt
𝜋ATE,Annt
)𝜓𝜋(𝜋ATE,Annt+1
𝜋ATE,Annt
)𝜓𝜋,F( 𝜋W,Nt+1
𝜋Nom,Wt
)𝜓W
(
Yt
Ỹt
)𝜓Y (
RERt
R̃ERt
)𝜓RER)1−𝜌R
exp(ZRt )
where X̃t ∈ {R̃t , 𝜋ATE,Annt , 𝜋
Nom,W
t , Ỹt , R̃ERt} denotes the (potentially
time-varying) “target” value of Xt .37 The term 𝜋
ATE,Ann
t is annualized
quarterly inflation, and 𝜋Nom,W is nominal wage inflation. The param-
eters 𝜌R, 𝜓𝜋, 𝜓𝜋,F , 𝜓W , 𝜓Y and 𝜓RER capture the weight placed by the
central bank on smoothing changes in the interest rate, preventing devi-
ations of annual inflation, current and one quarter ahead, and nominal
wage inflation from target as well as keeping output at potential and
the real exchange rate at its steady-state value. The term ZRt captures a
shock to the nominal interest rate.
The rule above governs the interest rate in the absence of the zero
lower bound, which we call the shadow interest rate R∗t . However, we
impose, that
Rt = max{R∗t ,1} (50)
For most shocks this lower bound of one will not be reached and the
interest rate in the economy will simply be given by the shadow inter-
est rate rule above. However, for larger recession, the gross interest
rate according to the rule can fall below unity, implying a negative net
interest rate, which the ZLB in equation (50) will prevent. In the sense
of Leeper (1991), we consider thus an active monetary policy regime
in our model as long as the ZLB is not binding. Once the ZLB binds,
however, monetary policy becomes temporarily passive.
As will be shown in our results in section 5, a binding ZLB implies
less crowding-out of fiscal stimulus since increases in inflation following
the boost in aggregate demand will not result in higher real interest
rates. This mechanism, alongside the channel operating through the
DNWR as discussed in equation (17), is thus important in our model’s
ability to give rise to the state-dependent nature of fiscal interventions.
2.6.2. Government budget
The government finances its expenditures by levying a range of taxes
and through withdrawals from the Government Pension Fund Global
(GPFG). Total government revenue is given by the various taxes intro-
duced in the household and firm sector:
Tt = TLt + Ct(𝜏
C
t + 𝜏
CF
t ) + (WtN
P
t + W
G
t N
G
t )𝜏
SSF
t
+
(
WtNPt + W
G
t N
G
t + UBt(Lt − Et) + TRt + DPt−1
37 In most case this target captures simple the corresponding steady-state
value. However, following permanent shocks it is possible that the steady-state
interest rate and level of potential output changes. To capture the fact that the
central bank would gradually recognize that the economy has moved to a new
steady-state and adjust their policy targets, we follow Laxton et al. (2010) and
implement a moving average process
X̃t =
(
XT
(
X̃t−1
)𝜌X) 1𝜌X+1
for the variables Xt ∈ {Rt , 𝜋ATE,Annt , 𝜋
Nom,W
t ,Yt ,RERt}. The process ensures that
following such a shock or change in policy, the central bank’s “target” values
for the interest rate and output will move gradually towards the new end steady
state, with the speed of adjustment determined by the smoothness parameter
𝜌X .
∕𝜋ATEt (Rt−1 − 1) − TD
OIH
)
𝜏OIHt
+(WtNPt + W
G
t N
G
t + UBt(Lt − Et) + TRt − TD
LS)
(𝜏LSt + 𝜏
SSH
t )
+(ΠM,TB +ΠS,TB)𝜏OIFt +
(
DIVt + AVt − RRAtPEt−1
)
𝛼OIHt 𝜏
OIH
t .
(51)
Thus, total tax revenue consists of the lump-sum tax, consumption tax
revenue, social security contributions of employers, ordinary income
tax on personal income, additional taxes on labor income and trans-
fers, corporate income taxation and dividend as well as capital gain
taxation. For the latter, we exploit the fact that number of stocks are
normalized to one, and sum up total dividends DIVt = DIVMt + DIVSt ,
total capital gains AVt = AVMt + AVSt and stock values PEt = P
E,M
t + P
E,S
t
across sectors. Total government primary expenditures are given by the
sum of government purchases, government investment, unemployment
benefits, lump-sum transfers and the government wage bill:
Gt = PG
C
t G
C
t + P
I
tG
I
t + UBt(Lt − Et) + TRt + AVTt
+WGt N
G
t (1 + 𝜏
SSF
t ). (52)
The government’s real value of debt at time t is given by Dt . Recall-
ing that RLt−1 is the nominal gross lending rate, the real value of debt
interest payments DIt is then given by DIt = (RLt−1 − 1)∕𝜋
ATE
t Dt−1. With-
drawals from the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), that will
be discussed in section 2.6.4, are given by OFWt . In almost all budget
years, Norway does not borrow money to finance government expen-
ditures. We therefore enforce a zero total petroleum-adjusted surplus,
implying the following government budget:
Tt + OFWt = Gt + DIt . (53)
Hence, we are considering a passive fiscal policy regime in our model
(in the sense of Leeper (1991)) as government debt by construction is
always held stable. Unless they are “fiscal instruments” used to balance
the budget in equation (53), the revenue and current (non-investment)
spending components of the government budget are modeled as simple
auto-regressive shock processes. Tax rates are assumed to follow the
following additive process
Xt = Xss + 𝜌X(Xt−1 − Xss) + ZXt , (54)
where Xt ∈ {𝜏Ct , 𝜏OIHt , 𝜏OIFt , 𝜏LSt , 𝜏SSHt , 𝜏SSFt } and Xss denotes the steady
state of Xt . Spending components (except public investment which is
discussed in section 2.6.3) and non-tax-rate revenue instruments are
assumed to follow the following multiplicative process
Xt = Xss
(
Xt−1
Xss
)𝜌X
exp(ZXt ), (55)
where Xt ∈ {GCt ,TLt ,OFWt ,TRLt ,TRRt ,UBt ,NGt , 𝛼OIHt }. Shocks to ZXt may
be temporary, as would the case with a temporary increase in govern-
ment spending, or permanent, as would be the case with a structural
change to the tax system. Finally, the RRAt is set to the level which
avoids double taxation of the risk-free return on equity. As shown in
the technical appendix this implies that the RRAt depends on the pre-
vailing interest rate and the household’s ordinary income tax rate, i.e.
RRAt = (Rt − 1)(1 − 𝜏OIHt ).
2.6.3. Public investment and capital
We model the public capital stock using a time-to-build specification
as in Leeper et al. (2010) and Coenen et al. (2013). In the following,
we assume that it takes N ≥ 1 periods for a given authorized public
investment project to become public capital. The accumulation of the
public capital stock is then given by
KGt+1 = (1 − 𝛿KG)K
G
t + G
I,Auth
t−N+1,
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where 𝛿KG is the depreciation rate of public capital and G
I,Auth
t−N+1 is the
authorized amount of public investment N − 1 periods ago. The cost of
the authorized public investment project is spread over the time it takes
to complete the project. We assume that the spending shares for each
period n from authorization to completion of the project are given by
𝜔n. Hence, 𝜔n indicates what share of the total authorized investment
is constructed in the n-th period since the investment was authorized.
Public investment volume each period GIt is then given by
GIt =
N−1∑
n=0
𝜔nG
I,Auth
t−n . (56)
Equation (56) captures the amount of public investment in period t
on all ongoing public investment projects dating back to N − 1 periods
ago. Since public investments have to be fully funded over the imple-
mentation period,
∑N−1
n=0 𝜔n = 1 holds. The amount of authorized public
investments follows the autoregressive process
GI,Autht = G
I,Auth
ss
(
GI,Autht−1
GI,Authss
)𝜌A
exp(ZGI,Autht ),
where GI,Authss is the steady-state level of authorized investment, ZG
I,Auth
t
is a shock to authorized public investment, and 𝜌A is an autoregressive
parameter that determines the speed at which a shock ZGI,Autht translates
into higher authorized public investment.
2.6.4. Government pension fund global
NORA includes a simplistic model of the Government pension fund
global (GPFG). The first simplification relates to the fact that we do not
model the oil production sector, and thus abstract from any inflows into
the GPFG. The second simplification relates to the fact that we abstract
from exchange rate movements that would alter the domestic currency
value of the GPFG.38 The third simplification relates to the fact that we
assume a constant real rate of return on the fund. These simplifications
allow us to focus exclusively on the trade-offs associated with increasing
or decreasing the pace of withdrawals from the GPFG.
The real value of the GPFG in foreign currency OFt (for “oil fund”)
is assumed to evolve according to the following process:
OFt = (1 + ROF )OFt−1 −
OFWt
RERss
, (57)
where ROF is the constant real rate of return of the fund, RERss is the
steady-state exchange rate, and OFWt denotes the domestic-currency
value of withdrawals from the GPFG. Hence, OFWtRERss captures the value
of oil fund withdrawals in foreign currency. During simulations it is
possible to use oil fund withdrawals OFWt as a temporary financing
instrument. In order to avoid an imploding (or exploding) value of the
fund, however, the take-out rate TORt ≔ OFWtRERss·OFt has to return to the
real rate of return of the GPFG in the long run TORss = ROF . This can be
achieved in several ways. For example, a temporary increase in oil fund
withdrawals followed by a temporary decrease sufficient to restore the
GPFG to its original value would ensure that the take-out rate returns
to its sustainable level. Alternatively, a temporary increase in oil fund
withdrawals could be followed by a permanently lower level of oil fund
withdrawals to take account of the now lower level of sustainable capi-
tal income generated by the fund. We resort to this latter alternative in
section 6, when checking whether our main state-dependency result is
robust to alternative ways of financing the fiscal stimulus.
38 Keeping the exchange rate applied to the value of the GPFG fixed helps
prevent potentially large wealth effects associated with changes in the expected
future tax burden stemming from movements in the domestic currency value of
the fund.
2.7. Foreign sector
Following Norges Bank’s NEMO, see Kravik and Mimir (2019), we
model the foreign sector using an exogenous block that links foreign
inflation 𝜋TPt , foreign output by trading Y
TP
t and non-trading Y
NTP
t part-
ners, the foreign interest rate RTPt and the oil price P
Oil
t . In contrast to
NEMO, which includes a microfounded oil production sector, we model
also the demand for domestically-produced investment goods from the
off-shore oil sector InvOilt in a reduced-form fashion depending on the oil
price. We exploit this model of the foreign sector in our result section
by testing whether the state-dependency of the fiscal multiplier, which
in the literature is usually generated by recessions induced by a con-
sumption preference shock, also holds in global demand recessions.
The output of trading partners YTPt is given by the following system
of equations
YTPt = Y
TP
ss
(
YTPt−1
YTPss
)𝜌YTP (YF,TPt
YF,TPss
)1−𝜌YTP (POilt
POilss
)−𝜓YTP ,POil
(
YNTPt
YNTPss
)𝜓YTP ,YNTP
exp(ZYTPt ),
YF,TPt = Y
F,TP
ss
(
YF,TPt+1
YF,TPss
)𝜓YF,TP ,YF,TP ( RTPt
𝜋TPt+1
∕
RTPss
𝜋TPss
)−𝜓YF,TP ,RTP
.
Hence, we model the output of foreign trading partners as partly
backward-looking, as having dynamic IS-curve features by being linked
to the real interest rate through the term YF,TPt , capturing the forward-
looking component of output, as responding negatively to the oil price
due to trading partners being net oil importers and finally, as respond-
ing positively to the output gap among non-trading partners, YNTPt , who
are assumed to trade with Norway’s trading partners but not directly
with Norway. The term ZYTPt denotes a shock to the output of trading
partners. The output of non-trading partners YNTPt is given by
YNTPt = Y
NTP
ss
(
Y∗,NTPt−1
YNTPss
)𝜌YNTP (POilt
POilss
)−𝜓YNTP ,POil
(
YTPt
YTPss
)𝜓YNTP ,YTP
exp(ZYNTPt ).
Hence, the output of non-trading partners is partly backward-looking
and responds negatively to the oil price and positively to demand from
foreign trading partners. Following Kravik and Mimir (2019), we use
the shock ZYNTPt to simulate a global demand recession in our analysis
of the state-dependency of the multiplier in section 6. Overall global
output is then given by a weighted sum of the output of trading partners
and non-trading partners:
YGlobt
YGlobss
= 𝜔Y ,TP
YTPt
YTPss
+ (1 − 𝜔Y ,TP)
YNTPt
YNTPss
,
where 𝜔Y,TP captures the steady-state share of trading partners’ output
in total global output. Inflation in Norway’s trading partners is given by
the following system of equations
𝜋TPt = 𝜋
TP
ss
(
𝜋TPt−1
𝜋TPss
)𝜌𝜋TP (𝜋F,TPt
𝜋F,TPss
)1−𝜌𝜋TP (POilt
POilss
)𝜓𝜋TP ,POil
,
𝜋F,TPt = 𝜋
F,TP
ss
(
𝜋F,TPt+1
𝜋F,TPss
)𝜓𝜋F,TP ,𝜋F,TP (YTPt
YTPss
)𝜓𝜋F,TP ,YTP
exp(Z𝜋TPt ).
Hence, inflation in foreign trading partners is partly backward looking,
captures the positive effect of oil prices on marginal costs and hence on
inflation, and incorporates the standard forward-looking Phillips curve
dynamics through 𝜋F,TPt . The shock Z
𝜋TP
t to the foreign inflation rate
can be interpreted as a foreign markup shock. Foreign trading partners’
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monetary policy is given by a standard Taylor rule where the interest
rate responds to the contemporaneous inflation and output
RTPt = R
TP
ss
(
RTPt−1
RTPss
)𝜌RTP ((𝜋TPt
𝜋TPss
)𝜓𝜋TP (YTPt
YTPss
)𝜓YTP )1−𝜌RTP
exp(ZRTPt ).
The parameters𝜓𝜋TP and 𝜓YTP capture the weights placed by the foreign
trading partner central bank on preventing deviations of inflation from
target and keeping output at potential, while 𝜌RTP captures the weight
placed on interest rate smoothing. The shock ZRTPt can be interpreted
as a shock to the nominal interest rate in foreign trading partners. The
international oil price is forward-looking and responds to movements
in global demand
POilt = P
Oil
ss
(
POilt+1
POilss
)𝜓POil (YGlobt
YGlobss
)𝜓Poil,YGlob
exp(ZPOILt ),
where ZPOILt can be interpreted as an oil price shock. The equations
above are parametrized in the same way as in the estimated version
of NEMO. Demand for domestically-produced investment goods by the
offshore oil production sector is assumed to depend positively on the oil
price and is given by a following reduced-form autoregressive process
InvOilt = Inv
OIL
ss
(
InvOilt−1
InvOILss
)𝜌InvOil (POilt
POilss
)𝜓InvOil,POil
exp(ZInvOILt ),
where ZInvOILt captures a shock to oil sector investment demand. Note,
that a shock to non-trading partner output will directly affect the price
of oil and thus stimulate oil sector investment demand faced by the
mainland economy. The demand for traditional exports from Norway is
stimulated indirectly through an increase in output from trading part-
ners.
2.8. Aggregation
To complete the technical description of NORA we define aggregate
investment and housing variables as well as define GDP. We also discuss
the balance of payments and the aggregate market clearing condition.
Housing We differentiate between housing investment and invest-
ment in physical capital in the corporate sector.39 Housing investment
is modeled as a reduced-form process and assumed to evolve in line
with long-run changes in GDP, i.e. InvHt = InvHssỸ t∕Yss. The moving-
average process for GDP (Ỹ t , defined in section 2.6.1) ensures housing
investment will gradually converge to a new level following permanent
changes in GDP. This implies that for any temporary shocks, housing
investment will not react at all. Housing capital evolves according to
KHt+1 = (1 − 𝛿H)K
H
t + InvHt , where 𝛿H is the depreciation rate on hous-
ing capital. Consumption of housing services, a component of GDP, is
defined as CHt = RHKHt where RH is the return on housing capital. We
are agnostic about who owns the housing capital and consumes the
associated housing services and do therefore not take these into account
when we model the household sector.
Total investment demand Total investment demand in the econ-
omy is given by the sum of investments in the manufacturing and
service sector, housing investment, demand for domestically-produced
investment goods by the offshore oil sector, and public investment
It = InvMt + Inv
S
t + Inv
H
t + Inv
Oil
t + G
I
t .
39 This approach avoids having to calibrate corporate investments to an empir-
ical target that includes housing investments, which would alter the transmis-
sion mechanism of corporate taxation. For example the tax on corporate profits
would then implicitly be applied not only to the returns to corporate capital but
also to housing capital.
For calibration purposes, we define mainland investment as IMLt ≔
InvMt + InvSt + InvHt + GIt and mainland private-sector investment as
IML,Pt ≔ InvMt + InvSt .
Production in the manufacturing, service and import sector
Total production in the manufacturing, service, and import sector is
given by the sum of inputs required to produce the four final goods
Zt ∈ {Ct , It ,Xt ,GCt } in the economy
YMt = Y
M,C
t + Y
M,I
t + Y
M,GC
t + Y
M,X
t ,
YSt = Y
S,C
t + Y
S,I
t + Y
S,GC
t + Y
S,X
t ,
IMt = IMM,Ct + IM
M,I
t + IM
M,GC
t + IM
M,X
t + IM
S,C
t
+IMS,It + IM
S,GC
t + IM
S,X
t . (58)
Hence, total output in the manufacturing, service, and import sector
consists of the corresponding first-stage inputs into the production of
the four final goods. Since, as shown in Fig. 2, imported goods are bun-
dled both with the intermediate manufacturing good and the interme-
diate service good in the production of the four final goods, the expres-
sion for total production in the import sector consists of a total of eight
terms.
Domestic output Before introducing the total volume of domestic
production, it is useful to define domestically-sold production in the
service and manufacturing sector:
YD,Mt = Y
M
t − Y
M,X
t ,
YD,St = Y
S
t − Y
X,S
t .
The total value of domestic output (in consumption units) is given by
PYt Y
D
t = P
M
t Y
D,M
t + P
S
t Y
D,S
t⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
Value of domestically−sold output
+RERtPXt Xt − P
IM
t (IM
M,X
t + IM
S,X
t )⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
Value added in the export sector
,
where PYt is the relative price of domestic output and Y
D
t denotes the
volume of domestic output. Note that we need to split domestic pro-
duction into a domestically-sold part and an exported part as the latter
will be sold at a price set by exporters in the local currency of sale. In
addition we need to subtract the value of imports that are used to pro-
duce the exported good in order to arrive at value-added in the export
sector. The total value of domestic output can then be rewritten as
PYt Y
D
t = P
M
t Y
M
t + P
S
t Y
S
t + VA
X
t Xt , (59)
where VAXt = RERtPXt − MCXt is the value added per unit in the export
sector. Profits in the export sector are then given by ΠXt = VAXt Xt − ACXt .
We use the Törnqvist-Index to construct the relative price of domes-
tic output PYt , which in turn allows us to obtain a measure of domes-
tic output volume YDt , see the technical appendix for further details.
GDP is then defined as the sum of domestic output, the return to hous-
ing (which equals housing services consumption), the government wage
bill, public capital depreciation and inventory changes
Yt = YDt + R
HKHt +
(1 + 𝜏SSFss )WGss
PYss
NGt +
PIss𝛿KG
PYss
KGt +ΔINVt . (60)
The public wage bill and public capital depreciation are divided by
the relative price of domestic output to translate their values, which
are given in consumption units, into units of the domestic good. The
terms preceding NGt and K
G
t in equation (60) are held constant at their
steady-state value following the national accounts convention that gov-
ernment employment and capital depreciation are to be valued at base
prices. As a consequence, only volume changes (i.e. changes in public
employment or the public capital stock) affect the government wage
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bill and public capital depreciation components in the GDP definition.
Inventory changes ΔINVt are given by an exogenous process.40
2.8.1. Balance of payments
Before deriving the balance of payments we introduce “residual”
imports IMRest that are necessary for NORA to match the national
accounts. IMRest are imports that are not captured by inputs to produc-
tion in the manufacturing and service sector. These stem from imports
by the offshore oil industry that are embedded in the domestically-
produced investment good purchased by the oil industry, which NORA
is currently not able to capture. To avoid having to introduce a theoret-
ical model of the offshore oil industry we simply assume that “residual”
imports move in line with imports, i.e. IMRest = IMResss
IMt
IMss
, where IMResss
is the steady-state level of “residual” imports necessary to match the
national accounts data.
We can then define net exports NXt as the difference between
exports and overall imports, i.e. NXt = RERtPXt Xt − PIMt (IMt + IMRest ),
where RERtPXt is the relative domestic-currency price of exports and
PIMt is the relative price of imports. The balance of payments for the
economy is then given by
NXt + OFWt + PIt Inv
Oil
t
=
EXtPTPt
Pt
(−BFt ) −
EXtPTPt−1
Pt
(−BFt−1)R
TP
t−1RPt−1(At−1). (61)
The left hand side denotes payments to the domestic economy, con-
sisting of net exports, withdrawals from the GPFG, and the sale of
domestically-produced investment goods to the offshore oil sector. The
right hand side captures the net change in foreign assets (excluding the
GPFG) including interest payments.
Aggregate market clearing We obtain the aggregate market clear-
ing condition by inserting the balance of payments, the government
budget constraint in equation (53), the budget constraint for liquidity-
constrained households in equation (9), the profit functions of interme-
diate goods firms in the manufacturing and service sector in (41), and
the bank balance sheet in equation (18) into the budget constraint of
Ricardian households in equation (4), yielding
PYt Y
D
t = Ct + NXt + P
I
t It + P
GC
t G
C
t + ACt , (62)
where ACt are total adjustment costs in the economy. The equation,
thus, shows that total demand in the economy equals total supply as
given in equation (59).41
3. Theoretical insights into state-dependent multipliers
Before considering quantitative simulations of our full, nonlinear
model, we first consider a linear approximation of a simplified ver-
sion of the full model, enabling us to derive theoretical insights into
the role of the ZLB and DNWR in generating state-dependent spending
and tax multipliers. Specifically, we consider a closed economy without
liquidity-constrained households, banks, and productive capital. There
is only one production sector using labor to produce a final good, which
is consumed by Ricardians and the government. The production sec-
tor sets prices subject to Rotemberg adjustment costs. Wages are set
by a union with unemployment in the reference utility. These sim-
plifications isolate the most important transmission channels of fiscal
multipliers and are thus instructive in understanding our main results.
The details of this model simplification are discussed in Appendix B.
40 Steady-state GDP in consumption units YCPI is then given by the sum of the
components of Y expressed in consumption units YCPI = PYY, a measure used in
steady-state calibration.
41 A full derivation of the aggregate market clearing condition can be found in
Aursland et al. (2019).
The simplification ultimately yields a generic small-scale New Keyne-
sian (NK) DSGE model, close in spirit to standard handbook approaches
such as in Schmidt and Wieland (2013), consisting of a Euler equation,
a market clearing condition, a Taylor rule and a NK Phillips curve and
a wage-setting equation:
C̃t = Et[C̃t+1] −
1
𝜎
(
R̃t − Et[𝜋t+1]
)
− ZUt (63)
Ỹt =
Css
Yss
C̃t +
Gss
Yss
G̃t (64)
R̃t = 𝜓𝜋𝜋t + 𝜓Y Ỹt (65)
𝜋t = 𝛽Et[𝜋t+1] + 𝜅M̃Ct ,MCt = (1 + 𝜏SSFt )Wt (66)
W̃t = −𝜅𝜏𝜏SSFt + 𝜅Y Ỹt (67)
where X̃t = (Xt − Xss)∕Xss captures the percentage deviation of variable
X relative to its steady state and variable names correspond to those
used in the full model.42 The parameters used in equation (63)–(67)
are detailed in the Appendix B and all positive. Hence, the simplified
model is characterized by a standard Euler equation in which growth of
private consumption (C) increases with the real interest rate and with
the consumption preference shock (ZU). Hence, a negative preference
shock will lower the level of private consumption such that its growth
to the next period increases. Total production is used for private and
public consumption (G). The Taylor rule implies that the interest rate
increases with the inflation and output gap, where due to the Taylor
principle 𝜓𝜋 > 1. Inflation is a function of expected inflation and the
marginal cost in production, given by the wage level. Finally, wage bar-
gaining implies that wages increase with employment and thus output
(as Yt = Nt), as well as with prices, while falling with the tax rate for
social security contributions by firms.43
To analyze the state-dependency of the fiscal multiplier and in line
with most approaches in the literature, we consider the impact multi-
plier44 for a change in government spending Gt , given by
M = ΔYΔG =
Δ(G + C)
ΔG =
(
1 + ΔCΔG
)
. (68)
Hence, the size of the fiscal multiplier is directly related to the con-
sumption response to the fiscal expansion.
3.1. The role of the ZLB and DNWR
In the following, we consider four scenarios, in which the fis-
cal expansion can take place: (1) from steady state or (2) during a
preference-shock induced recession, in which (2a) only the ZLB is active
and becomes binding, (2b) only the DNWR is active becomes binding,
(2c) both rigidities are active and become binding. We will show that
the differential response of consumption to the government spending
increase causes state-dependency of the fiscal multiplier. Specifically,
the theoretical analysis will establish, that while each rigidity gives
rise to higher fiscal multipliers, the DNWR tends to dampen the state-
dependency generating effects of ZLB when interacting.
42 The Euler equation refers to aggregate consumption C rather than CR as the
economy only consists of Ricardians. Government purchases are captured by G,
rather than GC as there are no other spending components.
43 Note, that the arguments made within this section are also valid in a model
where wages are set following household’s trade-off between utility from con-
sumption and leisure. In this set-up, following Schmidt and Wieland (2013),
wages would follow the equation W̃t = 𝜂Ñ − 𝜎C̃t where 𝜂 is the parameter cap-
turing the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Hence, also in this case, wages tend
to increase with the level of employment and thus output in the economy.
44 In the full model we will additionally consider the cumulative multiplier.
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1) Fiscal expansion from steady state:
Given an increase in Gt , output increases (equation (64)) and thus
also wages (equation (67)). As a consequence of the NK Phillips curve,
inflation picks up, which in turn causes a hike in nominal interest
rates (equation (65)). According the Taylor principle, nominal inter-
est rates increase more than inflation, such that the real interest rate
(R̃t − Et[𝜋t+1]) rises. Consequently, the Euler equation (equation (63))
predicts a postponement and thus fall in consumption on impact. Given
this crowding out of consumption, the multiplier falls below one.45
2a) Fiscal expansion during a recession in which only the ZLB exists
and binds:
We now consider a sufficiently negative shock EU , such that R hits
the lower limit imposed by the ZLB, i.e. R = 1 (as R captures the gross
return). The shadow gross nominal interest rate R∗, defined as the inter-
est rate that would hold in the absence of the ZLB, is then below unity.
In the log-linearized model, this implies that equation (65) is replaced
by R̃t = R̃ZLB, where R̃ZLB corresponds to a gross interest rate of one.
Considering, the same fiscal expansion as before, we still obtain
an increase in output, wages and inflation. However, if the govern-
ment expansion is small enough not to increase R∗t beyond the limit
imposed by the ZLB, the nominal interest rate will not increase and
remain at R̃ZLB. Hence, as inflation increases, while the nominal rate
remains unchanged, the real interest rate falls, generating a positive
substitution effect on consumption. The government spending multi-
plier in a recession with a binding ZLB lies thus above the multiplier
during steady-state as in the latter case real interest rates increase and
a negative substitution effect on consumption materializes.
2b) Fiscal expansion during a recession in which only the DNWR
exists and binds:
The existence of the DNWR implies a lower bound on the real wage,
as given by (17). The real wage at the DNWR in log-linearized form, is
then given by W̃t = W̃t−1 − 𝜋t . Analogously, we now consider a neg-
ative consumption preference shock, which is sufficiently strong to
induce a negative output gap and consequently a fall in the real wage
(through equation (67)), such that the DNWR becomes binding.
When considering the same fiscal expansion as before, we obtain an
increase in the output gap. However, the inflation gap is not increased
to the same extent as before, as the wage gap does not increase ini-
tially. Given this weaker inflation response, the nominal interest rate
will respond less than in the scenario when the expansion occurs in
steady state, but more, than when the expansion occurs in a recession
with a binding ZLB (where it does not respond at all). From this follows,
that the multiplier in a recession with a binding DNWR will be larger
than the steady-state multiplier but smaller than the multiplier during
a ZLB episode.
2c) Fiscal expansion during a recession in which both the ZLB and
DNWR bind:
We now consider the same preference shock as before, such that
both the ZLB and DNWR become binding. The fiscal expansion increases
the output gap, while only weakly affecting inflation due to the initial
unresponsiveness of wages at the DNWR. Due to the ZLB, the nominal
interest rate does not increase. However, as inflation only weakly picks
up, the real interest rate (R̃t − Et[𝜋t+1]) does not fall strongly, contrary
to the scenario when the fiscal expansion is implemented in a recession
45 For the sake of this theoretical analysis we ignore financing effects, that
would by themselves reduce consumption, e.g. through a cut in transfers or a
rise in taxes. However, these financing effects are present both in steady state as
well as in recessions such that they do not affect the degree of state-dependency
of the fiscal multiplier. In fact, in the simulation of the full model, see section
6, we will show that state-dependency of the fiscal multiplier is upheld for a
number of different financing instruments.
with the DNWR not existing. Consequently, the multiplier in a recession
with both rigidities present and active is still larger than the multiplier
from steady-state (as the real interest rate does not increase), but it is
smaller than the multiplier in the recession with only the ZLB active
and binding (as the real interest rate only weakly falls).
In the full model, a number of additional channels will play a role in
determining the spending multiplier, but ultimately these follow similar
patterns as found in this simplified model. One important deviation
from the closed economy character of the simple model will be the
consideration of imports and exports in the full model, whose existence
tend to lower the size of the fiscal multipliers. This will be discussed in
more detail in robustness section 6.
3.2. The paradox of toil
In this section we will demonstrate the existence of the paradox of
toil for tax cuts at the ZLB, as established by Eggertsson (2010). How-
ever, we also show, that the paradox is relaxed when a given recession
not only activates the ZLB but also the DNWR. The theoretical insights
on the tax multiplier derived here, will be instrumental in understand-
ing the full model simulation result in 5.5.
As household level tax cuts in our model mostly operate through
demand-side effects (through higher disposable incomes), we consider
for the sake of analyzing the paradox of toil the social security contribu-
tions by firms. Cuts to these can be considered supply-side interventions
similar in spirit to the cut in labor taxes studied by Eggertsson (2010).
First, we consider the steady-state transmission of this reform, which
implies a drop in marginal costs due to the cut in the payroll tax. This
translates into lower inflation. While nominal wages fall (following the
general price level), real wages increase due to surplus sharing in Nash
bargaining across firms and unions.46 This prompts monetary policy to
cut the nominal interest rate, and due to the Taylor principle, the real
interest rate falls. Both the drop in the real interest rate as well as the
increase in real wages induce a crowding in of consumption, leading to
a positive tax multiplier.
If the same reform is undertaken during a recession in which the
ZLB is active and binding, the interest rate cannot fall despite the fall
in inflation. As a result, the real interest rate increases and tends to
crowd out consumption, decreasing the tax multiplier and possibly even
pushing it into negative territory. This is what Eggertsson (2010) coined
the paradox of toil: A tax cut at the ZLB decreases output rather than
stimulating it.
However, the paradox is considerably relaxed when taking into
account that the recession also implies a binding DNWR. In this case
the tax cut will not affect nominal wages. Consequently, the drop in
marginal costs is not as pronounced and the corresponding drop in infla-
tion milder than in the scenario without the DNWR. This causes a less
severe increase in real interest rates and less crowding out of private
consumption. As we will see in the numerical simulation of the payroll
tax cut, see section 5.5, this relaxation of the paradox of toil is strong
enough to reverse the sign of the tax multiplier, such that supply-side
tax cuts are expansionary at the ZLB when at the same time the DNWR
binds.
4. Calibration
NORA is calibrated to the Norwegian mainland economy and at
quarterly frequency. In a first step a subset of the parameters that
determine the steady state of NORA are chosen such that the model’s
deterministic steady state replicates a number of long-run moments in
46 Wage costs fall despite the increase in wages, as the additional surplus of
lower payroll taxes is shared in Nash bargaining. Hence, unions benefit from
higher wages, while the increase in wages is held low enough to not increase
after-payroll-tax wages relative to the pre-reform level.
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the data, while the remaining steady-state parameters are set either
according to microeconomic evidence or by following the related liter-
ature. Second, we chose values for the parameters, which only affect the
dynamic behavior of the model, such, that to obtain a good match with
impulse responses of Norges Banks estimated DSGE model of the Nor-
wegian economy, called NEMO (Kravik and Mimir, 2019). While the
parameters values here describe our baseline calibration, note, that we
later perform extensive robustness checks on our results with respect to
several important parameter values.
4.1. Steady-state parameters
Table 1 contains the model and long-run empirical values for a num-
ber of important moments, indicating also whether the empirical values
are used as a target. We solve the steady state analytically conditional
on the long-run targets, and the parameters chosen in line with microe-
conomic evidence and the literature, see Appendix A.10 for the techni-
cal details. An overview of the values of the steady-state parameters in
NORA are reported in Table 2.
The steady-state gross inflation rate in Norway 𝜋ATEss is set to Norges
Banks inflation target of 2% annually as is inflation in Norway’s trading
partners 𝜋TPss following NEMO (Kravik and Mimir, 2019). Setting the
discount factor 𝛽 to 0.9973 yields a steady-state nominal interest rate
of 3.94 percent per annum, equalling NEMOs long-run value. In line
with the assumptions in NOU (2016) we assume that the steady-state
equity premium is 3 percent per year, necessitating a value for financial
fees of FS = 0.0074.
We set the service sector bias of the four final goods (𝛼Z with
Z ∈ {C, I,GC,X}) to match the corresponding sector-contents of the final
goods as reflected in Norwegian input-output tables.47 Analogously, we
use input-output tables to determine the import content of the compos-
ite manufacturing and service good used in the production of all four
final goods. Taken together these parameters yield GDP shares of the
four final goods Ct , It , GCt , and Xt that are in line with the national
accounts.48
The depreciation rate of public capital 𝛿KG is set to 0.0201 (approx-
imately 8.3 percent per annum) to match the empirical government
investment to GDP ratio. Since government investment must equal
depreciated public capital in the steady state, we can not match both
empirical moments and, thus, we overestimate public capital deprecia-
tion as a share of GDP (at the cost of matching inventory changes). The
tax depreciation rate is set to 𝛿𝜏 = 0.033 corresponding to the aver-
age tax depreciation rate in the data, see Appendix E.2 for details. The
government wage bill as a share of GDP is calibrated to its empirical
counterpart by setting the wage mark-up MARKUPGW to 1.41. The size
of Norway’s trading partners YTPss is set to be consistent with the cali-
brated export-to-GDP ratio. To match the empirical private sector capi-
tal to output ratio, we set 𝛼S and 𝛼M to 0.32, imposing identical capital
intensities in the two domestic sectors. We set the deprecation rate of
private capital 𝛿KP to 0.0217 (approximately 9.0 percent per annum) to
match the private investment to capital ratio. Analogously, we set the
depreciation rate for housing 𝛿H = 0.0121 (approximately 4.9 percent
per annum) using the housing investment to capital ratio. The return on
housing is set to RH = 0.0169 in order to match the housing consump-
tion to GDP ratio.
Components of the government budget that follow AR(1) processes
can in most instances be calibrated directly by setting their steady-state
47 These data are based on a version of the input-output tables that correspond
to the aggregation level in NORA.
48 As noted in section 2.8.1 the combined import-content of the four final
goods in NORA does not match the aggregate import share in the national
accounts. We overcome this discrepancy by setting steady-state residual imports
IMResss to the value necessary to exactly offset this gap in steady state. This allows
us to match total imports in the economy according to the national accounts.
to their corresponding value in the data. This is the case, for example,
with unemployment benefits, government transfers, and effective tax
rates in NORA, see more details in Appendix E. We set the tax deduction
parameters according to the values in Table 2 such that the tax base to
GDP ratio is in line with the data. In order to replicate the size of the
labor income share in domestic production, we set fixed costs in the
manufacturing (FCM) and service sector (FCS). Despite not being able
to calibrate the amount of oil fund withdrawals OFW directly as it is
used as a residual to ensure the balance of payments, the fit with the
empirical value is very good. Lump-sum taxes, which do not have any
empirical counterpart, are used as a residual in the government budget
and therefore not calibrated.
We normalize (without loss of generality) hours worked per worker
per period NE to one in steady state. This has the convenient conse-
quence that total hours worked N equals the employment rate E in
steady-state and can be interpreted as such. The private (NP) and public
(NG) sector employment to population ratios are set to their empir-
ical counterparts. Steady-state participation rates for the seven sub-
populations are taken from KVARTS and yield an aggregate steady-state
participation rate of 71 percent, implying an equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate of 4.4 percent. The labor income share is matched exactly by
setting the fixed costs in the manufacturing and service sector to the
appropriate values, see Appendix A.10 for details. The constant in the
union utility function cN is set to 103.3 to ensure that the wage setting
equation holds in steady state.
The remaining steady-state parameters are set according to microe-
conomic evidence and the related literature. The intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution 𝜎 is set to 1.01 to approximate the logarithmic
within-period utility function for consumption used in NEMO and much
of the literature. Furthermore, we set the share of liquidity-constrained
households 𝜔 to 0.3, which is within the range of estimates found by
Campbell and Mankiw (1991), as well as in line with estimates of the
share of liquidity-constrained households within medium-scale DSGE
models in Cogan et al. (2010) and Coenen et al. (2012).
The elasticity of substitution between domestically-produced and
imported goods in the domestic economy is set to 0.5 in both the man-
ufacturing (𝜂M,Z) and service (𝜂S,Z) sectors for each of the four final
goods Z ∈ {C, I,X,GC}. This is identical to the value used in NEMO and
within the 0.25–0.75 range of values for the elasticities of substitution
across different types of intermediate goods used in Statistics Norway’s
multisectoral SNOW model (Rosnes et al., 2019). The corresponding
elasticity for the foreign economy 𝜂TP is set at 1.5, in line with the
most of the literature including Konjunkturinstitutet’s SELMA model
(Konjunkturinstitutet, 2019) and the estimated RAMSES model at the
Swedish Riksbank (Adolfson et al., 2013). The elasticity of substitu-
tion across sectors 𝜂Z is set close to 1 for each of the four final goods
Z ∈ {C, I,X,GC}. This is in line with the value used by Bergholt et al.
(2019) for Norway. The elasticity of substitution between differentiated
intermediate home goods can be related to the degree of competition
in the domestic economy given that 𝜖∕(𝜖 − 1) can be interpreted as a
price markup. In line with NEMO we set the elasticity of substitution to
6 for domestically-produced manufacturing (𝜖M) and service sector (𝜖S)
goods, imported goods (𝜖IMt ), and exported goods (𝜖Xt ), which implies a
markup of 20 percent. Following Voigts (2016) we set the elasticity of
substitution across final consumption good firms to 𝜖C = 30.
The parameters governing the wage bargaining problem are chosen
as follows. We follow Gertler and Trigari (2009) and set the bargaining
parameter 𝛾 to 0.5. We chose the weight of unemployment in the ref-
erence utility 𝜈U to be 0.8. This value is calibrated to match the peak
response of 0.3–0.4 pp fall in unemployment in response to a 1% perma-
nent increase in public spending as estimated in Holden and Sparrman
(2018).
The steady-state value of the scale-up factor on dividend taxation,
𝛼OIHss is set to 1.44, in accordance with the statuary scale-up factor from
the Norwegian tax code. The fixed rate of return of the oil fund is set
to the steady-state risk-less return on foreign bonds RTPss . The tax deduc-
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Table 1
Steady-state calibration.
Description Model Data Target
Monetary variables (annualized rate)
Inflation rate Norway 1.02 1.02 Yes
Nominal interest rate Norway 1.039 1.039 Yes
Inflation rate trad. part. 1.02 1.02 Yes
Nominal interest rate trad. part. 1.039 1.039 Yes
GDP components (ratio to mainland GDP)
Consumption 0.431 0.431 Yes
Housing consumption 0.086 0.086 Yes
Government purchases of goods and services 0.067 0.067 Yes
Government wage bill 0.169 0.169 Yes
Public capital depreciation 0.056 0.038 No
Government investment 0.056 0.056 Yes
Housing investment 0.062 0.062 Yes
Private investment 0.090 0.090 Yes
Oil sector investment 0.073 0.073 Yes
Total imports 0.348 0.348 Yes
Imports by importing firms 0.315 0.315 Yes
Residual imports 0.033 No
Exports 0.224 0.224 Yes
Changes in inventory 0.001 0.052 No
Stocks (ratio to mainland yearly GDP)
Private capital stock 1.036 1.036 Yes
Housing capital stock 1.266 1.266 Yes
Public capital stock 0.694 0.694 Yes
Net foreign debt 0.504 0.504 Yes
Government Debt 0.397 0.397 Yes
Government budget (ratio to mainland GDP unless otherwise indicated)
Unemployment benefits 0.006 0.006 Yes
Transfers 0.192 0.192 Yes
Transfers to liquidity-constrained household 0.101 No
Transfers to Ricardian household 0.091 No
Oil fund withdrawals 0.060 0.058 No
Lump-sum taxation 0.054 No
Labor surtax tax base 0.654 0.654 Yes
Ordinary income (household) tax base 0.518 0.518 Yes
Social security rate (firms) tax base 0.413 0.479 No
Corporate profit tax base 0.124 0.124 Yes
Consumption value-added tax rate 0.191 0.191 Yes
Consumption volume fees tax rate 0.063 0.063 Yes
Ordinary income tax rate 0.205 0.205 Yes
Labor surtax rate 0.028 0.028 Yes
Social security rate (households) 0.077 0.077 Yes
Social security rate (firms) 0.150 0.150 Yes
Corporate profit tax rate 0.242 0.242 Yes
Labor market (ratio to population unless otherwise indicated)
Total employment rate 0.682 0.682 Yes
Public sector employment rate 0.191 0.191 Yes
Private sector employment rate 0.490 0.490 Yes
Unemployment rate (percent of labor force) 0.044 0.044 Yes
Labor force participation rate 0.713 0.713 Yes
Labor income share 0.471 0.471 Yes
Note: Empirical targets are based on the 2010-17 mean of the relevant empirical
moments we take from Statistics Norway databases. The exception is the tax base
for the social security tax (households) where data is only available from 2015,
and the labor surtax tax base where data is only available from 2016. Note that
we set steady-state tax rates equal to the most current effective rate, i.e. the rate
from 2017.
tion parameters TDOIH ,TDOIF,M ,TDOIF,S,TDLS are chosen, such that the
steady-state size of the corresponding tax bases (as % of GDP) match
their empirical counterparts.
4.2. Dynamic parameters
The dynamic parameters, of which an overview is provided in
Table 3, are chosen either in line with corresponding parameter val-
ues in Norges Banks estimated DSGE model NEMO or, where this is not
possible due to differences in the models, to achieve model behavior
in line with NEMO or other empirical evidence.49 Table 4 provides a
quantitative comparison with relevant studies.
We begin with the labor market. We chose 𝜌E to obtain a sluggish-
ness of unemployment to a permanent government spending shock in
line with Holden and Sparrman (2018). The parameter governing the
49 Details on the methodology of matching NEMO’s impulse responses can be
found in an earlier technical documentation of NORA (Aursland et al., 2019).
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Table 2
Steady-state parameters.
Parameter Description Value
𝛴 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.01
𝜂M,C , 𝜂S,C Elasticity of substitution across imports and domestic goods for consumption 0.5
𝜂M,I , 𝜂S,I Elasticity of substitution across imports and domestic goods for investment 0.5
𝜂M,GC , 𝜂S,GC Elasticity of substitution across imports and domestic goods for government purchases 0.5
𝜂MX , 𝜂S,X Elasticity of substitution across imports and domestic goods for exports 0.5
𝜂C Elasticity of substitution across sectors for consumption 1.01
𝜂I Elasticity of substitution across sectors for investment 1.01
𝜂GC Elasticity of substitution across sectors for government purchases 1.01
𝜂X Elasticity of substitution across sectors for exports 1.01
𝜂TP Foreign elasticity of substitution across imports and domestic goods 1.5
𝜖M Elasticity of substitution across differentiated intermediate manufacturing sector goods 6
𝜖S Elasticity of substitution across differentiated intermediate service sector goods 6
𝜖IM Elasticity of substitution across differentiated imported goods 6
𝜖X Elasticity of substitution across differentiated export goods 6
𝜖C Elasticity of substitution across differentiated consumption goods 21
𝛺 Share of liquidity-constrained households 0.3
B Discount factor 0.9973
𝛿KP Private capital depreciation (quarterly) 0.0217
𝛿KG Public capital depreciation (quarterly) 0.0201
𝛿H Housing capital depreciation (quarterly) 0.0121
𝛿𝜏 Tax depreciation rate (quarterly) 0.0330
𝛼M,C , 𝛼S,C Import content of composite consumption good 0.54, 0.25
𝛼M,I , 𝛼S,I Import content of composite investment good 0.68, 0.28
𝛼M,GC , 𝛼S,GC Import content of composite government purchases good 0.87, 0.15
𝛼M,X , 𝛼S,X Import content of composite export good 0.33, 0.20
𝛼C Service sector bias of final consumption good 0.65
𝛼I Service sector bias of final investment good 0.84
𝛼GC Service sector bias of final government purchases good 0.83
𝛼X Service sector bias of final export good 0.55
𝛼M , 𝛼S Capital elasticity in production function 0.32
FS Financial fees on stocks (quarterly) 0.0074
cN Constant in union’s utility function 103.3
RH Return on housing capital (quarterly) 0.0169
𝛤 Bargaining power parameter 0.5
𝜈U Weight of unemployment in reference utility 0.8
rate of adjustment of wages 𝜌W is set to 0.95 generating similar degrees
of wage stickiness as in NEMO. The elasticity of the risk premium to
net foreign assets (𝜉NFA) is set to 0.001 close to the value in NEMO.
Finally, we determine the role of oil price movements on the risk pre-
mium via the introduced wealth fund proxy (𝜌OF,RP) to be 0.81 and the
elasticity of the risk premium to changes in the wealth fund (𝜉OF) to
be 0.017. These parameters give us movements in the risk premium
for comparable shocks in line with NEMO. The parameter governing
the risk premium for firm borrowing (𝜉B) is set to 0.025 in line with
Bernanke et al. (1998) and Christensen and Dib (2008). In line with the
NEMO estimate, we impose a high degree of consumption habits.
Adjustment cost parameters for investments as well as in the domes-
tic, import and export sectors are chosen to obtain equally sluggish
responses as in NEMO. The adjustment cost parameter in the final good
consumption sector, 𝜒C = 21, is calibrated to match the results from
Benedek et al. (2015), who measure the total pass-through of a stan-
dard VAT reform, announced 1 year ahead. The parameter determining
the degree of backward indexation of prices (𝜔Ind) is set 0.63 to achieve
best fit with NEMO.
The parameters of the monetary policy rule are directly taken from
NEMO. In the presence of permanent shocks, see section 2.6.1, there
is a role for the parameters governing the speed at which monetary
policy moves to new targets for output and nominal interest rate. We
set both 𝜌Ỹ and 𝜌
R to 10, implying a rather slow transition to new tar-
gets. This way we ensure that the movements in the targets only play a
role in the long-run. The persistence parameters for the shock process
are also directly taken from NEMO. All parameters governing the for-
eign sector are directly taken from NEMO due to identical functional
forms, with the exception of the last two parameters. Here we converge
from the structure in NEMO but find parameter values that yield similar
responses of oil investments for a number of shocks. We set the elastic-
ity of the demand for investment goods by the oil production sector
with respect to the oil price (𝜓 InvOil,POil) to 0.092 and the persistence
parameter of oil sector investments (𝜌InvOil ) to be 0.7428.
Finally, NORA contains a number of autoregressive parameters 𝜌X
that capture the persistence of the tax rates (equation (54)) and various
spending components (equation (55)). These are generally set to zero,
if not otherwise stated in the simulation section.
4.3. Model validation
In this section we compare the dynamic properties of the model
with evidence from established and estimated models of the Norwegian
economy as well as empirical results on Norway. We use Statistic’s Nor-
way large-scale macroeconometric model KVARTS as well as the empir-
ical work by Holden and Sparrman (2018) to validate our response to
an increase in government consumption. We also use Norway’s cen-
tral bank estimated DSGE model NEMO and the structural VAR study
by Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2014) to compare our results for selected
non-fiscal shocks.50 As evident from Table 4, our results are well in line
with these studies.
5. The state-dependency of the fiscal multiplier
In this section we investigate the degree of state-dependency of fis-
cal multipliers. To do so we first discuss the transmission channels of
an increase in public purchases of goods and services from the steady
state. Second, we investigate the effect of the same fiscal intervention
50 We provide additional comparisons to NEMO in our technical documenta-
tion in Aursland et al. (2019).
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Table 3
Overview on dynamic parameters.
Parameter Description Value
Labor market
𝜌E Persistence in employment 0.72
𝜌W Persistence in wages 0.95
Risk premia
𝜉NFA Risk premium parameter for net foreign assets 0.001
𝜉OF Risk premium parameter for sovereign wealth fund proxy 0.017
𝜌OF,RP Persistence in wealth fund proxy 0.81
𝜉B Risk premium parameter on firm borrowing 0.025
Habits
H Habit persistence in consumption utility 0.95
Adjustment costs
𝜒M Adjustment cost parameter for manufacturing sector 1000
𝜒S Adjustment cost parameter for service sector 1000
𝜒 IM Adjustment cost parameter for imports 1000
𝜒X Adjustment cost parameter for exports 864.7
𝜒C Adjustment cost parameter for consumption goods 21
𝜔Ind Degree of indexation in price adjustments 0.62
𝜒 Inv Adjustment cost parameter for investments 13.0
𝜒BN Adjustment cost parameter for new debt 0.025
Monetary policy
𝜌R Persistence in interest rate 0.67
𝜓𝜋 Interest rate response to annual inflation 0
𝜓𝜋,F Interest rate response to one-quarter-ahead annual inflation 0.29
𝜓W Interest rate response to nominal wage inflation 0.87
𝜓Y Interest rate response to output 0.24
𝜓RER Interest rate response to real exchange rate 0.02
𝜌X Persistence in target 10
Shock processes
𝜃U Persistence in consumption preference shock 0.7248
𝜃YNTP Persistence in global demand shock 0
Foreign sector
𝜔Y,TP Weight of trading partner output in global output 0.1
𝜌YTP Persistence in trading partners’ output 0.615
𝜌YNTP Persistence in non-trading partners’ output 0.926
𝜌𝜋TP Persistence in foreign inflation 0.886
𝜌RTP Persistence in foreign interest rate 0.841
𝜓YF,TP ,YF,TP Persistence in forward-looking foreign output 1
𝜓YF,TP ,RTP Effect of real interest rate on foreign IS curve 0.757
𝜓YTP ,POil Effect of oil price on trading partners output 0.0048
𝜓YNTP,POil Effect of oil price on non-trading partners output 0.0012
𝜓YTP ,YNTP Effect of non-trading partner on trading partner output 1.0994
𝜓YNTP,YTP Effect of trading partner on non-trading partner output 0.0114
𝜓𝜋F,TP ,𝜋F,TP Effect of inflation in foreign forward-looking Philips curve 0.1497
𝜓𝜋F,TP ,YTP Effect of output in foreign forward-looking Philips curve 0.0462
𝜓𝜋TP ,POil Effect of oil price on foreign price level 0.0006
𝜓𝜋TP Responsiveness to inflation in foreign Taylor rule 1.4606
𝜓YTP Responsiveness to output in foreign Taylor rule 0.04
𝜓POil Persistence in oil price 0.2026
𝜓Poil,YGlob Effect of global output on oil price 4.0027
𝜓 InvOil,POil Effect of oil price on oil sector investment 0.0929
𝜌InvOil Persistence in oil sector investment 0.7428
during an economic recession caused by a negative consumption pref-
erence shock, which is strong enough such that both the ZLB and the
DNWR become binding. Third, we compare the fiscal multiplier for the
intervention undertaken from the steady-state economy and the econ-
omy in a recession. Fourth, we investigate the relative contribution of
the ZLB and DNWR in generating the observed state-dependency of the
fiscal multiplier. Fifth, we consider an economic stimulus policy in the
form of tax cuts rather than spending increases and determine the mag-
nitude of state-dependency of various tax multipliers. In doing so we
shed new light on the paradox of toil.
To allow for the nonlinear effects from the imposed rigidities, we
follow Michaillat (2014) and solve the model under perfect foresight.
The nonlinear solution method takes into account the lower limit on
nominal wage growth as well as the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate and allows all agents to internalize these constraints.
5.1. Increase in government purchases from steady state
We begin by analyzing the effect of an increase in public purchases
of goods and services (GC), which is the government expenditure com-
ponent that is most often considered in the literature. To gain a better
understanding of our main results, we therefore first analyze the trans-
mission channels of an increase in government spending from steady
state. Fig. 3 illustrates the impulse responses of the main economic vari-
ables to an increase in public purchases. The shock is chosen such that
the increase in spending occurs gradually and peaks at 1% of GDP after
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Table 4
Comparison of dynamic responses in NORA and other models.
Government consumption shock
Financed Variable Study Horizon
1Y 2Y 3Y
75% debt, 25% labor tax Unemployment rate NORA −0.4 −0.2 −0.1
75% debt, 25% tax Unemployment rate Holden and Sparrman (2018) −0.3 −0.4 −0.4
75% debt, 25% labor tax Impact multiplier NORA 0.85
75% debt, 25% tax Impact multiplier Holden and Sparrman (2018) 0.8
100% labor tax Unemployment rate NORA −0.3 −0.15 −0.1
100% labor tax Unemployment rate KVARTS −0.25 −0.15 −0.1
100% labor tax Impact multiplier NORA 0.6
100% labor tax Impact multiplier KVARTS 0.6
Monetary policy shock
Variable Study Horizon
Impact 4Q 8Q 12Q
Nominal interest rate
NORA 1 1.1 0.3 0.0
NEMO 1 1.1 0.3 −0.4
Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2014) [0.4,1.4] [0.5,1.8] [−0.5,1.3] [−1.5,0.5]
Output
NORA −0.1 −0.3 −0.3 −0.2
NEMO 2019 −0.1 −0.4 −0.3 −0.2
Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2014) 0 [−1.4,−0.6] [−1.8,−0.8] [−1.8,0.2]
Inflation
NORA −0.1 −0.2 −0.2 −0.1
NEMO −0.1 −0.2 −0.3 −0.2
Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2014) 0 [−0.1,0.5] [−0.8,0.1] [−0.6,0.1]
Real exchange rate
NORA −2.0 −1.0 −0.1 0.1
NEMO −2.0 −1.0 −0.1 0.1
Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2014) [−5.2,−0.6] [−5,−0.6] [−2.5,0.2] [−2.0,1.0]
Exchange rate shock
Nominal interest rate
NORA 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.02
NEMO 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.03
Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2014) [0.10,0.30] [0.00,0.35] [−0.10,0.40] [−0.10,0.47]
Output
NORA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NEMO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2014) [0,0] [−0.2,0.1] [−0.2,0.2] [−0.2,0.2]
Inflation
NORA 0.0 0.02 0.03 0.01
NEMO 0.0 0.03 0.01 0.01
Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2014) [0,0] [−0.08,0.10] [−0.04,0.11] [−0.05,0.10]
Real exchange rate
NORA 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.0
NEMO 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.0
Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2014) [0.4,1.2] [0.1,1.0] [−0.6,0.4] [−0.7,0.3]
Note: In Holden and Sparrman (2018) the spending expansion is to three-quarters debt-financed, the remaining share by
taxes. In the KVARTS simulation available to us, the spending increase is fully financed by labor taxes. We individually
replicate both scenarios in NORA.
five quarters.51 This reflects that the implementation of discretionary
fiscal spending is likely to take time in an event of a recession. Our
results are, however, robust to other assumptions about the shock pro-
cess as we show in section 6.1. The expansion in purchases is financed
by a cut in transfers to Ricardians (equivalent to lump-sum taxation)
51 Specifically, we impose an exogenous shock to government purchases from
period one to period 5 with the corresponding auto-correlation parameter set
to 0.8 such that the level of purchases slowly reverts to its long-run value.
such that the government runs a balanced budget. Hence, in the sense
of Leeper (1991), we consider an active monetary policy (as monetary
policy responds to inflation and output)/passive fiscal policy regime (as
the government runs a balanced budget) in our benchmark analysis.
The increase in government purchases raises demand on domestic
firms, who expand production, leading to an increase in GDP. The
increase in the real interest rate (to be discussed below) and the cut
in transfers to Ricardian households induce a modest reduction in
aggregate consumption, which is highly persistent due to consump-
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Fig. 3. Fiscal policy shock from steady state.
tion habits.52 The initial increase in consumption is due to liquidity-
constrained households, who face no cut in transfers and experience
higher disposable income. The latter increases for two reasons: First,
the increase in production of domestic firms is only possible as firms
increase hours worked, which leads to an increase in employment. Sec-
ond, due to the fall in unemployment and the associated increase in
the reference utility of unions, real wages increase. The fall in manu-
facturing sector profits, which follows from a rising real interest rate
(and thus higher financing costs) and appreciated real exchange rate
(with an absence of a large increase in manufacturing sector demand
due to the high service sector bias of public purchases), would by itself
tend to lower the bargained wage. However, this effect is, at least in the
52 Despite this persistence, all variables, including consumption, will ulti-
mately return to their initial steady state as the government spending shock
is of temporary nature.
short-run, outweighed by the fall in unemployment.53
The increase in aggregate demand induces firms to increase prices
and inflation increases. In response, the central bank increases the nom-
inal interest rate (also in response to higher wage growth), such that the
real interest rate rises. Given an increase in real wages and inflation,
nominal wage inflation increases above its steady-state level.
The increase in mainland GDP is quantitatively smaller than the
increase in government spending. There are two reasons for that. First,
government purchases of goods and services have a significant import
share (approx. 27% in steady state), such that only the remaining
domestic share increases aggregate demand in Norway. Second, crowd-
ing out of domestic production occurs through an increase in marginal
cost.
53 However, note that the fall in manufacturing sector profits is more persis-
tent than the fall in unemployment. This is because unemployment returns to its
initial level at approximately the same speed as output, due to the close link of
production volume and employment. The more persistent effect of higher inter-
est rates, however, tends to depress manufacturing sector profits for a longer
time. As a consequence, in the medium-run, real wages fall to help the man-
ufacturing sector regain its initial level of profitability quicker, which is a key
goal in the Norwegian wage formation system.
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5.2. Increase in government purchases in a recession
The previous section has already alluded to the channels through
which fiscal policy can be affected by the state of the economy. If the
nominal interest rate and wage growth do not respond to the fiscal
stimulus, the crowding out channels are muted. For this reason, we con-
sider a consumption preference shock, which is strong enough to drive
the economy into a recession, and make both the zero lower bound
on the nominal interest rate and the downward nominal wage rigidity
temporarily binding. In particular, we consider a negative shock to con-
sumption utility (ZU) in period one to three.54 Note, that in a robustness
exercise in section 6.2, we show that our main results are largely robust
to alternative assumptions about the nature of the shock causing the
recession. Given the unresponsiveness of monetary policy due to the
binding ZLB, the economy is now in a passive monetary policy/passive
fiscal policy regime. This is the case for all experiments in which the
ZLB becomes binding.55
The consumption preference shock is illustrated by the blue, solid
line in Fig. 4. We observe that the lower utility derived from consump-
tion induces Ricardian households to reduce consumption expenditures
leading to a sizeable drop in mainland GDP. The decline in production
results in a fall in labor demand and consequently a large increase in
the unemployment rate. Despite the increase in manufacturing sector
profits (which is a consequence of the low manufacturing input in con-
sumption and an increase in exports due to a depreciated real exchange
rate) the induced fall in the union’s reference utility is strong enough
to drive real wages down. In fact, the downward pressure on wages is
sufficient to reduce nominal wage inflation down to its lower bound.56
In other words, the economy would exhibit a negative nominal wage
growth rate in the absence of DNWR. The existence of DNWR, how-
ever, implies that gross nominal wage growth exactly equals 𝛾w = 1.57
The drop in aggregate demand induces firms to cut prices, leading
to a large fall in inflation and consequently a cut in the nominal inter-
est rate.58 The latter is strong enough to be constrained by the ZLB.
This becomes clearer when studying the equation governing the shadow
interest rate R∗t given in section 2.6.1, i.e. the interest rate that would
be obtained in the economy in the absence of a ZLB. The fall in price
and wage inflation and output caused by the recession implies that the
shadow interest rate falls strongly. However, once the shadow (gross)
interest rate falls below one, the ZLB (see equation (50)) imposes that
the actual policy rate deviates from the shadow interest rate.
In a further simulation illustrated by the red, dashed line in Fig. 4
we now impose the same government purchase shock as in section
5.1 onto the economy that is hit with the preference shock discussed
above. The increase in purchases is discretionary and the future path
of fiscal spending and financing is known to the agents in the econ-
omy at the time of implementation of the program in quarter one (see
a related robustness check in section 6.1). Since the increase in gov-
ernment spending acts on an economy whose GDP has been reduced,
government spending as percent of GDP now exceeds 1%, despite the
54 The recession-causing shock is chosen such that the ZLB and DNWR are
binding for two to three years. We achieve this by shocking the consumption
utility weight ZU , such that it falls to approx. 15% of its steady-state value up
to period three and gradually reverts back to the steady-state value over the
long-run.
55 Note, that once the negative preference shock abates and the ZLB does not
bind anymore, we again return to the benchmark regime of active monetary
policy/passive fiscal policy. The model, thus, features only one equilibrium.
56 Nominal wage inflation in steady-state equals 0.5 percentage points per
quarter (equaling 2% annually).
57 Note, that we perform a robustness check with respect to 𝛾w in Appendix C
and show that also lower values of 𝛾w uphold our main result.
58 The steady-state nominal net interest rate (quarterly) equals 0.97%
(equalling approx. 4% annually), such that a drop by 0.97 pp implies a zero
net nominal interest rate.
identical shock size as in the previous section. The qualitative effects of
the increase in purchases on output and employment as well as unem-
ployment remain unaltered across the steady-state and recession sce-
nario. However, the crowding-out channels described in section 5.1 are
dampened for two reasons.
First, the shadow interest rate has been pushed below the ZLB fol-
lowing the preference shock. While the fiscal stimulus increases the
shadow interest rate just as described in the previous section, this
increase will be inconsequential for the economy as long as it does not
lead to a shadow interest rate higher than the ZLB. As evident from the
lower-right plot in Fig. 4, this is exactly what happens. The net interest
rate in the fiscal intervention scenario does not exceed the value of zero
during the recession.59 Hence, the nominal interest rate is not higher
relative to the scenario when no fiscal stimulus is provided. In fact, the
real interest rate is now lower as inflation lies above the level of the sce-
nario in which the fiscal intervention is not present. As a consequence,
the increase in aggregate demand is crowded out to a lesser extent.
Second and very similarly, once wage growth is at the lower bound
implied by the DNWR, nominal wages do not increase relative to the
baseline. It is again useful, to consider the analogous concept of the
shadow nominal wage growth, i.e. the wage growth that would be
obtained in the absence of DNWR. The recession pushes the shadow
(gross) nominal wage growth below one, such that the tendency of fis-
cal policy to induce higher wages is dampened as far the increase in
shadow nominal wage growth still lies below the limit imposed by the
DNWR. Again, this is the case in our experiment, as can be seen from
the lower-left plot in 4. With a binding lower bound on gross nominal
wage inflation, higher inflation induced by fiscal policy tends to lower
the real wage. As a consequence, there is less crowding out of employ-
ment and output.
Overall these mechanisms dampen the crowding-out channels, and
we expect fiscal policy will have larger effects on output in recessions
where the DNWR or ZLB binds. In the next section we seek to quantify
the degree of this state-dependency.
5.3. The fiscal multiplier in different states
We are interested in the full dynamic effects associated with the
fiscal policy shifts and thus we resort to the use of present-value mul-
tipliers. This definition of the multiplier captures the present value of
additional output generated by the policy intervention at different time
horizons. Specifically, we define the present value multiplier PVM as in
Leeper et al. (2017) by
PVM(k) =
∑k
j=0 (
∏j
i=0 (rt+i)
−1)ΔYt+j∑k
j=0 (
∏j
i=0 (rt+i)−1)ΔGt+j
Here ΔY captures the difference between output in the scenario where
the fiscal intervention is implemented and output in the otherwise iden-
tical scenario where the fiscal intervention is not active.60 The term ΔG
captures the difference in the government spending component that
is shocked.61 Note, that at k = 0 the present-value multiplier captures
59 Note, that the government spending intervention also has the effect of a
slight postponement of the point in time when the ZLB becomes binding. This
is due to the fact that our simulation design reflects a situation in which fis-
cal policy is acting quickly enough to slow down the transition to the ZLB and
DNWR. In section 6 we show that the result does not change if the policy inter-
vention comes as a surprise during the trough of the recession.
60 Hence, for the purpose of calculating the fiscal multiplier during a recession,
ΔY captures the difference in output between a simulation in which both the
recession (preference) shock as well as the fiscal policy intervention are active
and a simulation in which only the recession shock is present.
61 The multiplier for taxes, which we will consider in section 5.5, is analo-
gously defined (whereby ΔG is replaced by the absolute value of the difference
in tax revenue ΔT for the tax revenue component that is shocked).
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Fig. 4. Fiscal policy shock in a recession.
exactly the impact-multiplier, while at any value k > 0 the PVM(k)
captures the cumulative effect on output relative to the cumulative
expenses of the fiscal intervention.
Fig. 5 reveals a large difference in the fiscal multiplier when the
ZLB and DNWR bind. We observe, for example, that the present value
multiplier after 10 quarters for government purchases from steady-state
is 0.55 while the same intervention during the recession has a multiplier
of 0.78 and is thus considerably more effective in boosting output. In
the long-run, the difference in present value multipliers becomes even
stronger. While crowding out is almost complete after 60 quarters in
the steady-state intervention, the recession intervention is crowded out
at a much slower pace and we obtain a present value multiplier of 0.65
after 60 quarters.
The impact multiplier, however, is not strongly state-dependent.
This reflects that consumption habits slow down the response of con-
sumption to increases in the interest rate. We show in Appendix C, that
a lower value of consumption habits yields a much smaller impact mul-
tiplier for the steady-state intervention, while the stimulus during reces-
sion is not greatly affected by this parameter change. Hence, large dif-
ferences in impact multipliers arise only in the absence of frictions such
as consumption habits.62 Moreover, in section 6, we test the robustness
62 In Appendix C we perform several other robustness checks with respect to
important parameters in the model and show, that our main result holds for
many different parameterizations of the model.
Fig. 5. Present-value fiscal multiplier for government purchases.
of the model’s ability to generate state-dependent multipliers for dif-
ferent assumptions about the openness of the economy considered, as
well as about the nature of the recession and spending stimulus. The
state-dependency of the fiscal multiplier is generally upheld in a wide
range of circumstances.
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5.4. The role of the zero lower bound and downward nominal wage rigidity
As we have seen in the previous sections, the dampening of crowd-
ing out channels are due to the muted response of both the nominal
interest rate as well as nominal wage growth to the government spend-
ing shock. In this section we perform three counter-factual exercises in
which we seek to quantify the relative importance of the two rigidi-
ties. First, we perform a comparison of fiscal multipliers in recession vs.
steady-state in a model where both the ZLB and DNWR are switched off,
i.e. nominal interest rates can fall below zero and gross nominal wage
growth below 𝛾W = 1. As evident from Fig. 6b, the state-dependency of
the fiscal multiplier is nearly non-existent. Hence, it is only due to the
inclusion of strong non-linearities arising from the ZLB and DNWR that
the model is able to generate economically significant state-dependency
of the government spending multiplier. Other nominal and real rigidi-
ties on wages, investments and consumption are not sufficient.63
We now resort to a comparison of fiscal multipliers when only one of
the two rigidities is active as illustrated in the plots of Fig. 6. Our model
suggests that the fiscal multiplier is considerably higher in a recession
when only the ZLB is imposed while nominal wages are allowed to fall
unrestrictedly. The reason for this is two-fold. First, without a lower
bound on nominal wage growth the fall in nominal (and real) wages is
larger for a given size of the recession shock. This larger fall in wages
leads to a larger reduction in marginal costs and a corresponding larger
fall in inflation. Both effects push the shadow interest rate lower than in
the case of an active DNWR. As a consequence, a larger part of the fiscal
stimulus occurs while at the ZLB and there is less crowding out. Second,
and as reflected in a section on theoretical insights in 3.1, the absence of
the DNWR leads to an increase in wages following the fiscal expansion,
which increases inflation above the level of the recession. As the ZLB
implies an unresponsive nominal interest rate, real interest rates fall in
response to fiscal spending, which stimulate consumption and invest-
ment. However, with a DNWR only the shadow wage increases while
real wages do not adjust, such that inflation and the real interest rate
fall by less compared to the scenario when the DNWR is not present.
Hence, we obtain a smaller fiscal multiplier when both rigidities inter-
act.64
Hence, the presence of a DNWR dampens the consequences of the
ZLB on the economy for a given size of the recession. This is, however,
not to say, that the DNWR by itself does not generate state-dependent
effects of fiscal policy. As evident from 6d and in line with our the-
oretical results from section 3.1 the presence of the lower bound on
nominal wage growth is sufficient to obtain higher multipliers during
the recession. This is because the absence of an increase in nominal
wage growth following the fiscal stimulus, combined with the increase
in inflation caused by higher aggregate demand leads to a fall in real
wages. This in turn limits the increase in marginal costs and thus infla-
tion and requires a smaller increase in the interest rate as compared
to the steady-state fiscal stimulus scenario. Hence, both the lower real
wage level (through higher employment) as well as the lower real inter-
est rate enhance the expansionary effects of a spending increase relative
to the steady-state intervention.
63 Looking more closely at the state-dependency of the fiscal multiplier when
neither ZLB nor DNWR is binding, we find a weakly pro-cyclical impact multi-
plier for government purchases, which is in line with Sims and Wolff (2018a).
However, this small degree of state-dependency is an order of magnitude
smaller than the (counter-cyclical) state-dependency of the multiplier found
when comparing states with binding and non-binding ZLB and DNWR.
64 In Appendix D we perform a number of robustness checks, focusing on iden-
tifying the importance of the Nordic elements in our model in generating this
result. As already argued in 3.1, the tendency for the DNWR to reduce the fiscal
multiplier at the ZLB is present in any generic NK DSGE model and should thus
not depend on these Nordic elements. Our robustness analysis confirms this as
the main results are upheld for alternative assumptions about the openness of
the economy, the bargaining power of unions and the use of oil fund resources.
Overall the results from this section are in line with Sims and Wolff
(2018a) who find no state-dependency of the multiplier for public pur-
chases in a DSGE model without strong non-linearities. We also repro-
duce the result from the large literature reviewed in the introduction
of higher fiscal multipliers at the ZLB, and the insights from Shen and
Yang (2018) by showing that the existence of DNWR generates state-
dependency of the spending multiplier. However, as evident from com-
paring Fig. 6a and c, we additionally find that the co-existence of both
nominal rigidities do not reinforce each other. Instead, for a given reces-
sion scenario, the existence of the DNWR (i) leads to the ZLB being a
constraint to the economy to a lesser extent and for a shorter period of
time and (ii) prevents an increase in nominal wage inflation and the fol-
lowing increase in inflation, and corresponding fall in real interest rates.
Both effects work to diminish the fiscal multiplier during the recession.
This effect is quantitatively important. Considering the cumulative mul-
tiplier after five years (20 quarters), the multiplier is about three times
as large in a recession relative to steady state when only the ZLB is
present and binding. When both rigidities are present and binding, the
five year multiplier is only twice the size in the recession.
5.5. State-dependency of tax multipliers: revisiting the paradox of toil
NORA features a range of tax rates levied on households or firms,
allowing us to compare various tax multipliers in Fig. 7 to the purchase
multiplier from our baseline comparison in Fig. 5. In this section we
consider a permanent tax cut by 1 percentage point in the respective tax
rate, as opposed to temporary spending increases.65 The tax cuts are,
as in the case of the spending stimulus, financed by a cut in transfers
to Ricardians. Moreover, when calculating the tax multiplier we divide
by the absolute value of the tax cut, such that we obtain positive tax
multipliers for expansionary tax cuts.
Consider first Fig. 7a–c. A cut in taxes applied to households via
the labor surtax, the consumption tax or the ordinary income tax
increases the purchasing power of households and increase their con-
sumption level (particularly driven by liquidity-constrained agents as
they increase consumption one to one with the amount of reduced
taxes). The multipliers are generally smaller than for spending-side pol-
icy interventions. We observe some degree of state-dependency of the
tax multiplier, which is a consequence of how the increase in aggre-
gate consumption affects the economy from steady state and during
the recession: While the aggregate demand increase is crowded out
through hikes in the interest rate and wages from steady state, these
responses are muted in recessions as in the case of the fiscal spending
increase. The hump-shaped response of the consumption tax multiplier
arises from the smooth after-tax pricing of the consumption good sec-
tor. The state-dependency of the ordinary income tax rate (applied to
income from savings and shareholder income) is more pronounced. This
is as the tax cut not only stimulates consumption but also investment
expenditures in the medium- to long-run, further boosting aggregate
demand.
These results are similar to those by Coenen et al. (2012). In their
review of several medium-scale fiscal policy models, they find that labor
and consumption tax cuts generally exhibit small multipliers and a weak
degree of state-dependency. In line with Coenen et al. (2012) we find
no pro-cyclicality of the labor tax multiplier, which is in contrast to the
paradox of toil found by Eggertsson (2010). This is largely due to the
existence of liquidity-constraint agents in our model and in the models
analyzed in Coenen et al. (2012), where demand-side impact of tax
cuts play an important role, a channel only weakly represented in the
65 This is as tax cuts in Norway are more likely to occur as part of permanent
tax reforms rather than a temporary business cycle stimulus instrument.
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Fig. 6. Present-value fiscal multiplier for government purchases: Role of rigidities.
representative agent framework of Eggertsson (2011).66
There are two more reasons for why we observe no paradox of toil
for the labor tax cut in NORA. First, contrary to Eggertsson (2010) a
cut in the taxation of labor does not induce a shift in the labor sup-
ply and a strong fall in wages. As argued in the model description of
our wage bargaining setup, unions in Norway internalize a cut in tax-
ation as a cut to public welfare and will for this reason not be willing
to accept lower pre-tax wages in response to it. Wages still fall moder-
ately as a response to higher participation (induced by lower taxation of
labor income) and consequently higher unemployment. However, these
effects are quantitatively smaller and dominated by the positive effect
on consumption through an increase in disposable income of liquidity-
constrained households, described in the beginning of this section.
The second reason we do not observe a paradox of toil is the pres-
ence of a downward nominal wage rigidity in NORA, as already dis-
cussed in theoretical section 3.2. To understand this consider a cut in
the social security contributions of firms (i.e. a cut in the payroll tax)
as illustrated in Fig. 7d. The tax cut implemented from steady state
increases the profitability of the exposed sector as wage costs fall. Pro-
duction increases as more workers are hired, while prices fall due to
66 Sims and Wolff (2018b) find pro-cyclical tax multipliers both in a model
with liquidity-constrained households (but with responsive monetary policy)
as well as when monetary policy is accommodative (but with no liquidity-
constrained households). They report no results, however, for the situation
reflected in our model and Coenen et al. (2012), when monetary policy is con-
strained and at the same time the economy is partly populated by liquidity-
constrained agents. Only the combination of both assumptions gives rise to
counter-cyclical tax multipliers: When liquidity-constrained agents are present,
labor tax cuts will stimulate consumption. When interest rates are unresponsive
in recessions, this demand-side stimulus of the tax cut will be crowded out less.
Hence, consumption is stimulated more by the tax cut in recessions as compared
to the steady state.
lower marginal cost. This drop in inflation is such that nominal wage
growth drops below its steady-state value. Nevertheless, the real wage
increases as the decline in inflation dominates the lower nominal wage
growth rate. The central bank cuts the nominal interest rate in response
to lower inflation. This and the real wage increase generate the demand
needed to satisfy higher production. Hence, this cut can be considered
a supply-side intervention by the government similar in spirit to the cut
in labor taxes studied by Eggertsson (2010).
When the same tax cut is implemented during a recession in which
the ZLB binds, the cut in wage costs faced by firms cannot develop the
same effect as the interest rate is constrained and cannot fall further.
Instead, the real interest rate increases as inflation falls while the nom-
inal interest rate remains unchanged. In Eggertsson (2010) this leads to
a strong negative effect on output induced by the tax cut. In fact, we can
replicate this negative effect on output if we remove the DNWR from
NORA as shown in Fig. 8. However, in our full model with the DNWR
in place and binding, the paradox is considerably relaxed. Now, prices
fall to a lesser extent as nominal wages are constrained downwards. As
a consequence, the real interest rate increases less as compared to when
the DNWR is not present and the negative effect on output is reduced. In
fact, the recession multiplier for the payroll tax cut multiplier in our full
model is positive at most time horizons as firms increase employment.
The analysis thus points to three ways through which the paradox
of toil might be resolved. First, in line with Coenen et al. (2012), the
presence of liquidity-constrained agents gives rise to strong demand-
side effects of tax-cuts which are particularly effective when the ZLB or
DNWR are binding. Second, in economies where there are institutions
limiting the effect of taxation on supply-side factors (as through the
union’s concern for the public welfare associated with tax revenue in
Norway) the expansionary effects of taxes are upheld and may even be
larger in times of a recession than in steady state. Third, when nominal
wage growth is constrained downwards the fall in prices induced by the
tax cut and thus the increase in the real interest rate is dampened, and
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Fig. 7. Present-value tax multiplier.
Fig. 8. Present-value tax multiplier for the payroll tax.
the paradox of toil thus considerably relaxed.
6. Robustness
In this section, we perform several robustness checks with respect
to the model’s ability to generate state-dependent multipliers. These
checks can be divided into five groups: We analyze how the degree of
state-dependency of the multiplier is affected by (i) different assump-
tions about the size, duration and anticipation of the purchase stimulus,
(ii) different assumptions about the origin and size of the recession and
(iii) the state-dependency of the public employment and transfer multi-
plier. Furthermore, we check (iv) the role of the fiscal instrument used
to finance the fiscal expansion as well as for (v) model calibrations
reflecting a less open economy.
6.1. The role of the size, duration and timing of public purchases
In Fig. 9 we study the state-dependency of the multiplier under dif-
ferent assumptions about the timing and anticipation of the public pur-
chase increase, its size as well as duration.
Fig. 9a studies a situation in which the purchase expansion does not
occur while the recession is evolving as in the baseline scenario but
instead begins during the peak of the recession, i.e. in quarter 8. More-
over, the fiscal expansion is unanticipated during quarters 1 to 7. The
fiscal expansion at the peak of the recession is equally effective dur-
ing the first 10 quarters as compared to when the fiscal expansion is
initiated at the beginning of the recession. However, as the recession
disappears around 10 quarters after its peak, the effectiveness of fiscal
policy is strongly reduced as the economy leaves the ZLB and DNWR.
Hence, if the fiscal expansion occurs later, a smaller share of the stim-
ulus occurs at a time when it has the highest effect. This has important
implications for fiscal policy. While it does not seem to matter greatly,
whether the fiscal intervention is anticipated or comes as a surprise, the
timing of the fiscal intervention is decisive. If it comes too late, when
the economy is already recovering and not constrained by the ZLB or
DNWR, the stimulus will be less effective.
Fig. 9b illustrates, that the larger the spending increase (we simu-
late a small increase half the size of the baseline purchase increase, and
a large increase double the size) the smaller will be the fiscal multi-
plier during a recession. The reason for this phenomenon is that a large
increase in purchases will put more upward pressure on wages and the
interest rate and consequently the recession the purchase increase oper-
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Fig. 9. Present-value fiscal multiplier for government purchases: Alternative assumptions about the size, duration and timing of public purchases.
ates within will be less constrained. A less constrained environment will
lead to relatively stronger crowding-out effects.
Fig. 9c illustrates that the duration of the spending increase affects
the multiplier considerably. When considering a permanent rather than
a temporary expansion (as in the baseline) of public purchases, the mul-
tiplier is crowded out much quicker. The reason lies in a negative con-
sumption response of Ricardians who internalize a much larger present
discounted value of loss in transfers and hence wealth. This reduction in
consumption occurs irrespective of the state such that the relative dif-
ference between multipliers from steady state and during a recession is
less pronounced compared to a temporary increase in public purchases.
6.2. The role of the nature of the recession
In this section we test the robustness of our main result with respect
to two characteristics of the recession considered: its origin and size.
The literature on state-dependent multiplier generally uses discounting
shocks to drive the economy into a recession (equivalent to our con-
sumption preference shock). An important driver of the business cycle
in small open economies is fluctuations in global economics activity and
particularly their effects on export good demand from abroad. Hence, in
Fig. 10a we test the state-dependency of the fiscal multiplier when the
recession is caused by a shock to global output. In particular, we impose
a negative shock to non-trading partner output (ZNTP). The shock size
is chosen such that the ZLB and DNWR are binding for approximately
the same number of quarters as in the preference-induced recession. We
observe that the degree to which the multiplier is state-dependent is not
severely affected by the origin of the recession.
As shown earlier, the state-dependent nature of the fiscal multi-
plier arises only in a quantitatively significant way if at least one of
the rigidities becomes binding during the recession. A complementary
way to illustrate this is to vary the size of the recession. We study in
Fig. 10b two additional preference-induced recession scenarios, where
the underlying shock to the consumption preference weight is 50%
lower or higher than in the baseline scenario. The small-scale reces-
sion, which is chosen weak enough to not drive the economy into the
ZLB nor into the DNWR, does not give rise to a significantly higher fiscal
multiplier relative to the steady-state experiment. On the other hand,
the large-scale recession increases the effect of the purchase expansion
relative to the baseline recession.
6.3. State-dependency of the multiplier of other public spending
components
In Fig. 11 we investigate the state-dependency of the fiscal multi-
plier of two alternative spending instruments, public employment and
directed transfers towards the liquidity-constraint household. In each
case, we consider an increase in government spending equal in size and
duration to our baseline scenario capturing an increase in public pur-
chases.
We observe that the employment multiplier is somewhat larger than
the public purchases multiplier. This is because public employment by
construction has full home bias as only domestic workers are hired. Dur-
ing a recession the stimulus provided by public employment is crowded
out to a higher extent than for the purchase program during the reces-
sion. This is due to the fact that employment increases are mainly
crowded out through the wage channel (as unemployment falls and
the union’s bargaining position strengthens), such that the binding ZLB
matters less. Hence, the state-dependency of the employment multiplier
is somewhat smaller, but nevertheless still clearly observable.
The multiplier associated with directed transfers to hand-to-mouth
spenders is relatively small. This, however, simply reflects the fact that
about 40% of the transfers is immediately taxed as personal income
and return to the government. The state-dependency of the multiplier,
however, is strong as higher consumption expenditures by liquidity-
constrained households during a recession, contrary to the steady state,
do not increase wage demands or boost interest rates.
6.4. The role of the financing instrument
In our baseline result we have assumed that the fiscal expansion
is financed by a reduction in transfers to Ricardians. While this is a
fairly standard assumption in the literature, policy makers are partic-
ularly interested in the implications of using more realistic financing
instruments. In this section we explore the state-dependency of the fis-
cal multiplier when a distortionary labor tax or withdrawals from the
oil fund are used.67
Fig. 12a illustrates the multipliers in the two states considered when
the spending increase is financed by transfers (our considered bench-
mark) and when it is financed by oil fund withdrawals.68 We observe
that the multiplier in either state is largely unaffected by the change in
financing instrument. When instead labor taxes are used to balance the
budget during the fiscal spending expansion a different pattern arises,
see Fig. 12b. The multiplier, both at impact as well as at later points,
is considerably lower relative to when transfers are used. This is due to
the distortionary effects of labor taxes that not only depress the avail-
able income of consumers (directly affecting consumption of liquidity-
constrained households) but also induce people to leave the labor force.
67 Note, that conceptually withdrawals from the oil fund are very similar to
the use of government debt as an increase in the take-out rate today will require
a fall at a later point to ensure sustainability of the fund. This fall needs then
to be compensated by higher taxes (or less spending). In that sense the fund
simply represents a positive, rather than negative, net financial position of the
public sector.
68 Note, that oil fund withdrawals are used only during the first 20 quarters of
the simulation to balance the budget, while labor surtaxes are used afterwards.
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Fig. 10. Present-value fiscal multiplier for government purchases: Alternative assumptions about the nature of the recession.
Fig. 11. Present-value fiscal multiplier for other public spending components.
However, the multiplier is affected in both states in approximately the
same way such that again the state-dependency of the public purchase
multiplier is upheld. Hence we conclude that the type of financing
instrument does not have an important impact on the state-dependency
of the fiscal multiplier.
6.5. State-dependency in less open economies
The state-dependency of the fiscal multiplier has in most cases
been analyzed within the context of closed economy models. A notable
exception is Coenen et al. (2012) who show that the state-dependency
falls with the economy’s export-to-GDP ratio. In subsequent analysis,
we are able to reproduce this result and additionally show, that the
state-dependency also falls with lower foreign borrowing costs as well
as with the import-content of government purchases.
In Fig. 13 we first depart from our baseline calibration by follow-
ing Coenen et al. (2012) and scale down the import and export share
of our model economy. More specifically, we consider the fiscal multi-
plier when imports and exports make up only 10% of their benchmark
GDP share. In steady-state the multiplier is somewhat larger, reflect-
ing that the home bias of government purchases has increased. How-
ever, the multiplier during the recession is considerably larger. This
reflects, that crowding out in the new economy mainly occurs through
domestic channels rather than a depression of international competi-
tiveness. However, domestic crowding out channels are severely muted
during a recession due to the ZLB and DNWR. Consequently, the state-
dependency of the purchase multiplier is very large.
In small open economies the world interest rate plays an impor-
tant role. In fact, a no-arbitrage condition imposes that real returns
abroad have to equal real returns domestically with the risk premium
on foreign borrowing being the only intermediating factor. The risk pre-
mium parameter on foreign borrowing,𝜒NFA, governs, how sensitive the
domestic interest rate is to changes in the net foreign asset position of
the domestic economy. Hence, a higher value of that parameter implies
that financing abroad is more costly, such that the economy relies to
a higher degree on domestic capital markets. We test the fiscal multi-
plier in a setting where capital markets are relatively more closed in
Fig. 13b. For the fiscal intervention from steady state, we now obtain
a lower multiplier. This follows from the fact, that the fall in saving
induced by the fiscal expansion is partly compensated by borrowing
abroad, which now is more costly. As a consequence interest rates are
higher leading to stronger crowding out. When purchases are increased
during a recession, the interest rate is bound by the ZLB. Instead, more
closed capital markets ensure that more of the purchase increase acts
domestically rather than leaking abroad. As a consequence, the state-
dependency increases considerably with a 0.8 point difference across
steady state and the recession.
A final way to emulate the conditions of a more closed economy
is to depart from our baseline calibration for the home bias of gov-
ernment purchases, which is based on an input-output analysis of the
Norwegian national accounts, yielding, that approximately a quarter
of government purchases are imported. In contrast, we now assume in
Fig. 13c, that the import content is 10% of the level in the baseline
calibration. Not surprisingly, the multiplier both from steady state as
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Fig. 12. Present-value fiscal multiplier for government purchases: Comparing financing instruments.
Fig. 13. Present-value fiscal multiplier for government purchases: Alternative assumptions about openness of the economy.
well as during a recession is higher since a larger part of the spending
impulse actually ends up affecting the domestic economy and boosting
output. The state-dependency also increases slightly: While the cumu-
lative multiplier after 60 quarters is higher by about 0.5 in the bench-
mark calibration, the model with a higher home bias yields a difference
of 0.6.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a medium-scale DSGE model for
fiscal policy analysis in Norway, called NORA. The model contains sev-
eral novel extensions. NORA contains two domestic sectors proxying a
sheltered service sector and an exposed manufacturing sector, allowing
us to include a realistic model of wage setting as the outcome of Nash
bargaining between firms in the exposed sector of the economy and
a labor union. NORA features a rich government sector including the
most important sources of government revenue and public expenditures
in Norway. Specifically, we model a sovereign wealth fund and distin-
guish between household-level capital income tax and corporate profit
taxes. NORA thus allows for the analysis of the transmission channels of
a wide array of fiscal policy instruments in a realistic model economy.
We believe that the novel extensions contained in this model of the
Norwegian economy can be of interest for the development of models
for many other countries, particularly for open economies where the
distinction of exposed and sheltered sectors is equally important, for
countries with a sovereign wealth fund and economies characterized by
institutionalized collective wage setting systems.
Inspired by fiscal responses of many governments to recessions and
the call for a more active role of fiscal policy in stabilizing economies
during recessions expressed by Blanchard (2019), Eichenbaum (2019)
as well as Rachel and Summers (2019), we investigate the state-
dependency of fiscal multipliers. Specifically, we focus on the differ-
ent transmission channels of fiscal stimulus when the economy is in
steady state as opposed to a recession in which the zero lower bound
and downward nominal wage rigidity constrain the economy. We find
that both the ZLB and the DNWR can individually generate state-
dependency of the multipliers of various fiscal instruments. However,
in combination, the presence of DNWR limits the increase in inflation
and leads to a smaller fall of the real interest rate. Consequently, the fis-
cal multiplier during a given recession will be lower when both rigidi-
ties are present as opposed to when only the ZLB is binding. We also
find, that the existence of the DNWR will dampen deflationary effects
from supply-side fiscal stimulus of labor taxation and thus relaxes the
paradox of toil significantly. Our results, thus, point to important inter-
action effects of the ZLB and DNWR during recessions, which have not
received attention yet in the literature on state-dependent fiscal mul-
tipliers. We perform a number of robustness checks, showing that less
open economies tend to have larger degrees of state-dependency and
the degree of state-dependency is largely robust to alternative assump-
tions about the nature of the recession, the size and timing of the stim-
ulus as well as the way of financing it.
Finally, while not explicitly designed to study the coronavirus out-
break, our model can nevertheless provide a starting point for the analy-
sis of fiscal policy measures undertaken to combat the adverse economic
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effects caused by the pandemic. This is because our two main assump-
tions about recessions have already or are likely to materialize in the
next months. Many central banks around the world have lowered their
nominal interest rates considerably, including Norway, which recently
(May 2020) set their key policy rate to 0%. Moreover, given the exten-
sive quarantine measures undertaken and the related disruptions to eco-
nomic activity, large increases in unemployment have occurred, which
likely will lead to nominal wage growth falling to low levels. Given the
recent developments, we believe that our framework can be adopted to
study the effectiveness of fiscal policy measures that we may want to
implement after the immediate pandemic crisis is dealt with.
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Unemployment shocks, cyclical prices and shopping
behavior
Thor Andreas Aursland, Frode Steen and Simen A. Ulsaker
Abstract
We use rich data from Norway’s biggest grocery chain to show how households
and grocery stores react to changing economic conditions. We exploit the regional
nature of a recession following the drop in the oil price in 2014 and find that when the
local unemployment rate increases, households shift toward cheaper stores, and toward
bulk and private label products. Households also buy more on sale and the average
store level prices decreases. We then derive a novel decomposition of the changes in
the prices households pay for products a in large number of product categories. The
decomposition allows us to measure the relative importance of the different sources of
price cyclicality. We find that a significant part of the cyclicality is explained by grocery
stores responding to economic downturns by lowering their prices. Still, changes in
household behavior are the main driver of price cyclicality, primarily through increased
willingness to take advantage of sales.
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1 Introduction
Do households and stores change their behavior over the business cycle? If so, which aspects
of shopping behavior and store strategy change, and how large are the effects on average
prices and total expenditure? Adverse economic conditions may affect shopping behavior
and store strategy along several dimensions. First, individuals who become unemployed have
more time available. Second, unemployment is associated with a fall in life-time earnings.
These two effects tend to reduce the opportunity cost of time, and thus reduce search costs
and thereby increase search effort and result in lower transaction prices. In addition, declines
in life-time earnings may result in wealth effects on the composition of the consumption
bundle, leading to substitution toward lower priced goods within a given product category.
Furthermore, stores may respond to changes in the households’ wealth and opportunity
cost of time by adjusting their strategies with respect to pricing, campaigns and product
assortment.
In this paper, we use two rich data sets from a large Norwegian grocery chain to provide
new evidence on how shopping behavior, store choices, and household-level average prices
vary over the business cycle. The first data set contains complete transaction histories for
a large sample of households, while the second contains complete price-quantity data at the
store level for a large set of product categories. Our empirical strategy exploits how the
collapse of the oil price in the middle of the 2010s led to a severe worsening of the economic
conditions and increasing unemployment rates in certain regions of Norway, while leaving
other regions more or less unaffected.
Grocery expenditures are a potential source of cost savings for households when economic
conditions deteriorate. Most households allocate a substantial part of their budget to gro-
ceries, and, in the short term, it is easier to save on groceries than on other substantial budget
posts. According to Statistics Norway’s consumer expenditure survey of 2012, expenditures
on food and nonalcoholic beverages made up 11.8 percent of the total consumption expendi-
ture, with alcohol and tobacco contributing a further 2.7 percent [Statistics Norway, 2013].
If we count that consumption on housing and transportation as fixed, food and nonalcoholic
expenditures alone make up close to 25 percent of the variable consumption. With groceries
being the dominant category in the households’ variable consumption budget, major changes
in income are very likely to affect this consumption category.
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We find that households indeed adjust their shopping behavior in response to changes
in the local economic conditions. In line with Griffith et al. [2009] and Nevo and Wong
[2019], we provide strong evidence for reallocation of household expenditures toward generic
brands, bulk items, items on sale, and low-price retailers when the local unemployment rate
increases. Having established this evidence, we calculate average (per-unit) household-level
prices in a large set of product categories, and find that the average price a household pays in
a given category is responsive to business cycle fluctuations. Exploiting changes in prices and
in the household’s volume shares (at the product–store level), we derive a new decomposition
that separates the change in the average price into a set of distinct factors: one component
capturing changes in the prices charged by the store (holding the choices of the household
unchanged), two components capturing changes in the store and product shares (holding
prices charged by the store unchanged), and three components related to the customer’s
shopping intensity. Our decomposition is new to the literature on price cycles and shopping
behavior. We find that while a part of the cyclicality is explained by grocery stores adjusting
their prices, changes in household behavior are the main driver of price cyclicality. What we
find particularly intriguing with this approach is that it allows us to incorporate the various
aspects of household and store responses in the same framework, and to estimate the relative
contribution of each component to the aggregate change in the category price.
Our evidence of significant shopping behavior responses to changes in economic condi-
tions have consequences for a wide range of topics. For example, take the measurement of
consumption inequality, which often relies on consumption expenditures. Aguiar and Hurst
[2007] find that prices paid correlate with household characteristics. Hence, relying on ex-
penditures alone is likely to give an imperfect picture of consumption inequality. Similarly,
our results show that the price paid for the same product by a household varies with the
business cycle. Thus, taking into account the cyclicality of transaction prices is important
when studying consumption inequality (as in e.g., Coibion et al. [2012] and Bayer et al.
[2020]).
The Boskin report [Boskin et al., 1996] highlighted four sources of bias in the household
price index: i) product substitution, ii) store substitution, iii) quality change, and iv) new
products. The current study sheds light on the two first sources. Specifically, we find that
both product and store substitution are sensitive to business cycle fluctuations, and that in
our data, store substitution is more important than product substitution.
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In many theories of monetary nonneutrality and policy, and business cycles, the real
interest rate is key in the transmission of shocks. Our results indicate that there may not be
one inflation rate across households (as documented for the United States by Kaplan and
Schulhofer-Wohl [2017]), and therefore the real interest rate will likely vary across house-
holds. Thus, our results should be of interest to policy makers. For instance, Kaplan and
Menzio [2015] develop a model where shopping behavior plays a crucial role in generating
self-fulfilling employment fluctuations. Hence, shopping behavior might not only affect the
economy’s response to shocks, but also the source of fluctuations itself.
The cyclical behavior of the markup over marginal cost is another key aspect of the
transmission of shocks [Nekarda and Ramey, 2013]. While we do not study the markup
directly, the cyclical behavior of households is an important co-determinant of the cyclicality
of the markup. Finally, price dispersion, and heterogeneity in households’ response margins
may have implications for important political economy questions on adjustment of public
benefits when measuring inequality and comparing real purchasing power [Griffith et al.,
2009].
Main findings Overall, we find strong evidence of cyclicality in shopping behavior and
store prices.
We estimate a number of household-level fixed effects regressions where we estimate the
effect of the unemployment rate in the local market on different aspects of a household’s
shopping behavior. First, we find that the households substitute toward lower priced stores
when local unemployment increases. Second, we consider the shares of total expenditure
involving private label products, products bought in bulk, and products bought on sale.
We find that all of these shares increase when there is an economic downturn, and that
the effects are economically significant. For example, we estimate that a five percentage
point increase in the local unemployment rate leads to an increase in the sales share of over
two percentage points, which corresponds to over 40 percent of the average sales rate. Not
only households but also stores may change their behavior in response to changes in local
economic conditions, for example by reducing prices or running more campaigns to counter
reductions in household demand. In addition to the household-level regressions, we run two
store-level fixed effects regressions where we establish that the average price levels of the
stores follow a cyclical pattern.
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Both household and store responses to business cycle variations will have an impact on the
average (per-unit) price a household pays for products in a given product category. Indeed,
we find that household-level average prices for given categories is reduced substantially by an
increase in the local unemployment rate. We then decompose the cyclicality of the category
prices. An advantage of such a decomposition is that it allows us to estimate the effects
stemming from changes both in store and household behavior in a unified model using large
and detailed household-level data. This not only allows for high statistical precision but also
makes it possible to quantify the relative contribution of the different channels through which
the business cycle affects average prices. When decomposing the changes in the category
prices, we find that over ten percent of the cyclicality of average prices can be explained
by changes in the store prices alone (holding the households’ choices fixed). However, most
of the variation is due to factors that can be affected by the households. Of these, the
component with the greatest contribution (accounting for over 50 percent of the total effect)
is the households’ propensity to take advantage of temporary price reductions. We also find
that households allocate more of their expenditure in low-cost stores, contributing about ten
percent of the total effect.
Related literature Our paper is related to a number of articles studying shopping be-
havior. Aguiar and Hurst [2007] study transaction prices over the life-cycle and find that
households with higher incomes and those who spend more time shopping pay lower prices
than other types of households. Similarly, Griffith et al. [2009] find that British households
realize significant savings from buying in bulk and on sale, and by product and store substi-
tution. Griffith et al. [2015] document how these effects were also present during the great
recession in the UK: households decreased the average price paid per calorie by substituting
towards generic brands and increasing shopping effort, among several adjustment margins.
Studying shopping behavior in the US during the great recession, Nevo and Wong [2019]
find that households systematically increased the use of coupons, purchases of generics, and
the average size of units purchased when the local unemployment rate increased. Coibion
et al. [2015] find that individual households allocated expenditure toward lower-price retail-
ers when the local unemployment rate increased. Argente and Lee [2014] document large
differences across income groups in how they adjusted consumption and shopping behavior
during the great recession. While low income households already purchased the low price
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option within a product category, higher income households substituted towards lower priced
options.
Missing data on actual consumption, economists are left to use consumption expenditure
when imputing individual consumption. As expenditures reflect both price and quantity,
interpreting declines in consumption expenditure as declines in consumption will exaggerate
the actual decline in consumption if – as our findings suggest – individuals who enter unem-
ployment realize significant price savings. Related to our paper is Campos and Reggio [2019],
who find that roughly one sixth of the decline in consumption expenditure when entering
unemployment is explained by a drop in transaction prices. Furthermore, this effect might
vary across the income distribution.
Nekarda and Ramey [2013] argue that the common assumption of a countercyclical
markup in New Keynesian models is based on inconclusive evidence. The authors review the
literature, and revisit the methods that have tended to result in countercyclical markups.
They conclude that using new data and methods, the evidence points toward procyclical or
acyclical markups. Anderson et al. [2018] use scanner data from the retail sector, and find
that product prices and replacement costs are acyclical in the United States and Canada.
Additionally, for Canada, the authors find no discernible effect on these variables in response
to oil price shocks across regions. While our results do not speak to the cyclicality of the
markup for each product, they suggest that the average prices charged by stores is coun-
tercyclical and that the average household’s purchasing prices contribute to a procyclical
markup.
****
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our empirical
strategy, before we describe our data in Section 3. Section 4 presents reduced form evidence
on business cycle changes and household behavior. Section 5 shows how we decompose a
change in a household’s average category price using product–store volume shares and prices.
Section 6 presents the empirical results using our decomposition. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Empirical strategy: The oil shock and the Norwegian
economy
Our empirical strategy is to exploit how the collapse of the oil price in the middle of the
2010s led to a severe worsening of economic conditions and higher unemployment in cer-
tain regions of Norway, while leaving other regions largely unaffected. Using data on local
unemployment rates together with data on households’ transaction histories and store-level
prices, we investigate how business cycle variation in prices can be explained by changes in
household and store behavior. Specifically, we rely on fixed effects (and first differencing) to
eliminate unobservable time-invariant effects (at e.g., the household and store levels). The
geographical heterogeneity in the effect of the oil price shock allows us to efficiently control
for country wide shocks using time fixed effects.
The petroleum industry is essential for the Norwegian economy, contributing 20 percent of
GDP and 49 percent of exports in 2013 [Statistics Norway, 2020a,b]. In 2013, the petroleum
industry directly or indirectly employed 8.7 percent of the Norwegian labor force [Hungnes
et al., 2016]. However, the industry is largely concentrated along the southwestern coast,
where it accounts for substantially larger shares of the economy. In Rogaland county, for
example, the petroleum industry directly employs between 15 and 20 percent of the workforce
in several municipalities [Ekeland, 2015, 2017].
In January 2013, the Europe Brent spot price was 112 USD per barrel. From the end of
2014 and through 2015, the price dropped dramatically, reaching a 12-year low of 30 USD
by January 2016. The price then slowly increased, reaching 74 USD by June 2018 [U.S.
Energy Information Administration, 2020]. Figure 1 plots county-level unemployment rate
for the counties in South Norway, illustrating the regional nature of the effects of the oil
price shock.1 The highly oil-dependent coastal regions in the South and West experienced
significant increases in the unemployment rate from January 2013 to January 2016. At the
same time, other counties were unaffected by the shock–some even experienced a reduction
in their unemployment rate in the same period. The county most severely hit by the oil
price shock was Rogaland. In January 2013, Rogaland’s unemployment rate of 1.8 percent
was the lowest in the country. By January 2016, the unemployment rate had increased to
4.8 percent, which was the highest in the country. In June 2018, the unemployment had
1South Norway covers all but the three most northern counties. See also Table 9 in Appendix D.
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Figure 1: County-level unemployment
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Notes: The unemployment rate is the share of the workforce that, 1) is actively seeking a job, 2) has been
without any work for the last two weeks, and, 3) has registered as unemployed at the Norwegian Labour and
Welfare Administration. Data source: Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration [2018]. See Appendix
D for the underlying data.
fallen to 2.6 percent. As illustrated in Figure 2, the recession was even more pronounced in
some of the municipalities in Rogaland.2 In the municipality of Sandnes, for example, the
unemployment rate rose from 1.9 percent in January 2016 to 5.6 percent in January 2016,
before falling back to 2.8 percent by June 2018.3
The oil-dependent regions also experienced weak developments in gross product, wage
costs, and median income. Figure 3 shows the accumulated percentage increase in these
quantities from 2013 to 2016. Rogaland stands out by performing worst by all three measures.
In this county, the growth rate in median income was only 1.6 percent, compared with the
unweighted average across all counties of 7.3 percent. Similarly, gross product grew only by
2.2 percent, compared with the average of 13.6 percent. Finally, wage costs grew by only 5.3
percent in Rogaland over the period, again significantly below the national average of 10.6
2See also Table 10 in Appendix D.
3The municipality with the most extreme difference between January 2013 and January 2016 is Lund,
where the unemployment rate increased from 1.7 percent to 9.3 percent. However, this increase was not
driven primarily by the oil price shock but by a flood in late 2015 that led to the temporary closure of a
local factory.
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Figure 2: Municipality-level unemployment in Rogaland county
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Notes: The unemployment rate is the share of the workforce that, 1) is actively seeking a job, 2) has been
without work for the last two weeks, and, 3) has registered as unemployed at the Norwegian Labour and
Welfare Administration. Data source: Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration [2018]. See Appendix
D for the underlying data.
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Figure 3: Additional business cycle measures
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Notes: The figures shows the accumulated growth rates between 2013 and 2016. Gross product is measured
in current prices. Income is the median total income at the household-level. Wage cost is measured in
current prices. Data sources: Statistics Norway [2019a,b]. See Appendix D for the underlying data.
3 Data
Our main source of data is a large umbrella chain with several grocery chain concepts. The
umbrella chain is present in all counties of Norway and has 13 chain concepts covering all
market segments. We have two main data sets. The first contains complete transaction his-
tories from January 2013 to June 2018 for a random sample of households that were members
of the umbrella chain’s frequent buyer program. Our sample covers roughly five percent of
the households in the program.4 For each transaction, we have information about the name
of the product, the store at which it was bought, the price, a sales campaign indicator,
and the product category (as defined by the umbrella chain). The second data set contains
weekly sales expenditure and quantities at the product level from all the grocery stores in
the umbrella chain. These weekly figures are based on transactions from all customers, not
only the sample present in our transaction-level data set.
The main purpose of the paper is to investigate how households and stores respond to
4In 2018, more than two million Norwegians (out of a population of 5.3 million) were members of the
program.
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changing economic conditions, and how this translates into the average prices households pay
for products in given categories, such as minced meat or soda. We are restricting attention
to categories where we can calculate comparable unit prices across products.5 This means
that we do not include categories such as newspapers and ready-to-eat meals, where there is
no straightforward and comparable measure of unit. We want to be able to compare prices
for exactly the same products across stores and time periods. Therefore, we do not include
fresh fruit and vegetables, because the quality of these products may vary between stores
and time periods. See Appendix C for a list of the included categories and their expenditure
shares. Transactions from all other categories are dropped from all the following analyses
and descriptive statistics. In the transaction-level data set, the included categories account
for about 32 percent of the total expenditure.
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics on the households and stores in the data set.
From the table, we see that there are 100,261 distinct households in the data set and 2339
distinct stores.
Let us first consider the monthly expenditures at the household-level. Here, we first cal-
culate the average monthly expenditure for each household, before we calculate the average,
median and standard deviation for this variable across households. When calculating the
within household averages, we only use months where a given household had positive expen-
diture.6 The average value (across households) of the average (within household) monthly
expenditure is about 734 NOK, which corresponded to about 132 USD at the start of our
sample period.7 This monthly expenditure is well below what we would expect the average
household to spend on groceries during a month. Note however that this expenditure only
covers the categories we consider in the subsequent analysis. As mentioned above, these
categories cover about 32 percent of the total expenditures of the households in our sample.
In addition, monthly expenditures are only from one umbrella chain, while a household may
5To calculate unit prices, we need to determine the number of units of a product (e.g., the number of
kilos or liters) from the product’s name. We drop transactions of products that have a different measure of
unit in their name than the mode of the category (e.g., products whose name describes the amount of liters
while the mode unit of measurement of the category is kilos). We also exclude products where the product
name does not contain information about the number of units.
6We exclude months with zero expenditure because many households appear in our data well into the
sample period, presumably because they were not members of the frequent buyer program at the beginning
of the sample period.
7In January 2013, the price of one USD was 5.56 NOK (monthly exchange rates from The Central Bank
of Norway).
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visit more than one umbrella chain in a given month. Turning to the number of stores visited,
the average (across households) of the average (within household) number of distinct stores
visited is 2.30, again only counting months where a given household visited at least one
store. The months active variable indicates that on average the households made purchases
in about 40 of the 66 months in the sample period, reflecting the fact that many households
are not present in the data in the beginning of the sample period. Among the households
present in the first quarter of the sample period, the average of the months active variable
is about 54.
In the subsequent analysis, we keep only observations where we have information about
the municipality of residence of the household, and where the household is registered as living
in the same local market as the store. This is to avoid transactions where a customer no longer
lives (and works) in the registered local market, and transactions made while travelling. We
define local markets by local labor market regions. The labor market regions are defined by
Statistics Norway using data on commuting patterns [Bhuller, 2009]. The 46 labor market
regions nest the municipalities in Norway.8 The reason for defining local markets by labor
market regions rather than by municipalities is that consumers may live in one municipality
but do much of their grocery shopping in neighboring municipalities. From Table 1, we see
that this is indeed the case. The mean share of total expenditure that households spend
in their home municipality is 0.73, while the mean share households spend in their home
region is 0.87. Furthermore, 75 percent of the households spend 88 percent or more of their
total expenditure in their home labor market region, while the corresponding figure for the
home municipality is only 59 percent. As we will be analyzing households’ willingness to
switch to cheaper stores when economic conditions worsen, defining local markets by local
labor market regions can be especially important in situations where the umbrella chain
has few (if any) stores in a household’s home municipality. While the umbrella chain has
stores in all 46 labor markets, it is during our sample period never present in more than 370
municipalities. Furthermore, 75 municipalities have only one store from the umbrella chain
(during the sample period), and 58 municipalities have only two stores, implying that the
umbrella chain has two or fewer stores in about 45 percent of the municipalities.9
8In the beginning of our sample period there were 428 municipalities in Norway. At the end of our sample
period, mergers had reduced the number of municipalities to 423.
9In addition, the umbrella chain is represented by either zero or one chain concepts in almost 40 percent
of the municipalities. Since substituting toward cheaper stores typically involves substituting toward cheaper
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Turning now to the store-level variables, we see that the average (across stores) of the
average (within store) monthly revenue is about 1,175,937 NOK, which corresponded to
about 211,499 USD at the start of our sample period.10 The mean number of distinct
months a store is active is about 44, and the median is 56.
chain concepts, this reinforces the impression that defining the relevant market by municipality is too narrow.
10Note that this is only the revenue coming from the subset of categories we consider in the subsequent
analysis. The monthly revenue is calculated using the data set with weekly sales and quantities at the
product–store level, so it covers revenue from all customers, not only the sample included in our transaction-
level data set.
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Table 1: Customer and store characteristics
Mean Median Std. dev. Observations
Households
Monthly expenditure 733.79 498.51 730.72 100261
Stores visited 2.30 2.02 1.15 100261
Chains visited 1.72 1.59 0.60 100261
Stores in home municipality 29.05 9.00 48.80 100261
Stores in home region 159.55 53.44 169.42 100261
Chains in home municipality 4.30 4.00 2.52 100261
Chains in home region 8.08 8.00 2.87 100261
Home municipality share 0.73 0.87 0.32 100260
Home region share 0.87 0.97 0.24 100260
Months active 40.01 42 22.51 100261
Stores
Monthly revenue 1175937 1019418 965686 2339
Months active 43.92 56 24.57 2339
Notes: Monthly expenditure is the average (within household) monthly expenditure in NOK, counting
only months with expenditure above zero and only the categories considered in the subsequent analysis
(see Table 8 in Appendix C). Stores visited is the average (within household) number of stores visited,
counting only months with expenditure above zero. Chains visited is equivalently defined. Months ac-
tive is the number of months where a household had expenditure above zero. Age is the age of a house-
hold’s primary member. Monthly revenue is store-level revenue in NOK counting only the categories
considered in the subsequent analysis. Months active is the number of months with revenue above zero.
All household-level variables are calculated using the transaction-level data set. All store-level variables
are calculated using the weekly store-level data set.
4 Household and store behavior over the business cycle
Aguiar and Hurst [2007] and Nevo and Wong [2019] argue that variation in the opportunity
cost of time can induce households to increase effort to find items at lower prices. Further-
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more, wealth effects may make households more price sensitive and more willing to substitute
toward goods on sale. Wealth effects can also induce substitution toward generic brands,
items bought in bulk, and lower priced stores. In Appendix B, we outline a theoretical
framework based on Aguiar and Hurst [2007] and Nevo and Wong [2019]. This framework
illustrates how business cycle variation in the opportunity cost of time can induce households
to spend more time looking for items on sale.
As discussed earlier, stores may also adjust their behavior in response to an economic
downturn. If households become more willing to hunt for bargains, stores may find it more
profitable to run campaigns. A negative income shock that shifts the demand downwards
may also induce price reductions by the stores. Finally, if the households become more
inclined to buying generic brands or bulk items, stores may find it beneficial to give such
items more exposure, e.g., through shelf space allocation. In this section, we will study how
households and stores adjust their behavior along these dimensions over the business cycle.
We will use simple reduced form fixed effects regressions to analyze the effect of changes in
the unemployment rate on carefully designed variables measuring changes in household and
store behavior.
We will start at the household-level. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for a number
of household-level measures that may be affected by the business cycle. We also report
descriptive statistics on the unemployment rate.
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Table 2: Household-level variables
Mean Median 75th pct. 25th pct. Std. dev.
Generic PL share 0.0499 0.0052 0.0607 0.0000 0.0983
Sales share 0.0512 0.0000 0.0422 0.0000 0.1228
Bulk share 0.1910 0.1776 0.2520 0.1022 0.1464
Low price retailers share 0.3262 0.1004 0.6967 0.0000 0.3868
High price retailers share 0.0983 0.0000 0.0380 0.0000 0.2354
Unemployment rate 0.0275 0.0270 0.0333 0.0210 0.0086
Notes: The unit of observation is household-quarter. The number of observations with nonmissing values
of all variables is 1,376,188. There are 97,379 distinct households. Markets are defined by labor market
regions. The sample period is 2013q1 to 2018q2.
Generic PL share is the share of total expenditures that involved the umbrella chain’s
low-cost private label. Sales share is the share of total expenditures made on sale. To
obtain the Bulk share, we follow Griffith et al. [2009] and rank all product (defined by EAN
numbers) within each product category by size. For each category, we then calculate the
share of purchases a given household makes that are in the top quartile of the category
distribution.
To investigate whether households substitute towards low price stores when economic
conditions worsen, we follow Coibion et al. [2015] and construct an aggregate measure of a
store’s price level, relative to the median price level in a given market and time period.11
High price retailer share is the share of expenditure a consumer allocates to stores in the top
quartile of the store distribution, while Low price retailer share is the share of expenditure
the consumers allocate to stores in the bottom quartile of the store distribution.
Even though all these variables are measured at the household-level, some of them may
11First, we calculate for each product j in category c and local market m the log-difference, denoted
Rmscj,t, between the average price at store s, calculated as total sales amount divided by the total quantity
bought, and the median price of the product in the market in that time period. The average relative price of
store s is given by Rms,t =
∑
c Ωc,t
∑
j ωmscj,tRmscj,t, where ωmscj,t is product j’s share of the expenditure
in the category in the given market and time period, and Ωc,t is category c’s share of the total expenditure
in the time period. We calculate Rms,t using only products that are sold by at least 90 percent of the stores
in the market. We then rank the stores in a market by price level.
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also reflect strategic decisions by the stores. A household’s sales share may for example be
affected by the local stores’ sales campaign strategies. In addition, a household’s bulk and
private label shares may rise if the local stores give such items increased exposure through
their shelf space and assortment decisions. However, low and high price retailer shares are
less likely to be systematically affected by store-side responses.12 For each of the household-
level variables, we estimate a model of the following form,
Yhm,t = αhm + βURhm,t + λt + εhm,t, (1)
where Yhm,t is the dependent variable of interest, αhm are household fixed effects, URhm,t
is the unemployment rate in the home municipality of the household, and λt are time fixed
effects. Table 3 reports the results for the household-level regressions.
12However, to the extent that there is variation in the economic conditions within the labor market regions
and local store strategies are sensitive to this, the households’ store shares could be systematically affected
by store-side responses.
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Table 3: Household-level regressions
Unemployment rate
Generic PL share 0.109***
(0.020)
Sales share 0.482***
(0.041)
Bulk share 0.157***
(0.030)
Low price retailers share 0.361***
(0.078)
High price retailers share −0.483***
(0.056)
Observations 1376188
Households 97379
Notes: This table reports results from fixed effects esti-
mation of models of the form specified in (1). The vari-
ables in the first column are dependent variables with
the coefficients showing the effect of the unemploy-
ment rate on the dependent variable in question. The
unit of observation is household-quarter. In the regres-
sions, we only use observations with nonmissing values
for all variables in the table. The standard errors re-
ported in parentheses are clustered at the household-
level. Markets are defined by labor market regions.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
All variables are sensitive to the local business conditions as measured by the unemploy-
ment rate, and all coefficients have the expected signs. The private label, sale, and bulk
shares increase significantly when local unemployment increases. Likewise, the low price
retailer share increases and the high price retailer share decreases.
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What is the economic significance of these results? Let us consider an increase in the
unemployment rate of five percentage points to get a better understanding of our results.
Such an increase is estimated to increase the private label share by 0.6 percentage points,
implying a increase relative to the average reported in Table 2 of about 11 percent. Similarly,
the sales share is estimated to increase by 2.4 percentage points, which is an increase of
about 47 percent relative to the average. The expenditure share of bulk items is estimated
to increase by roughly 0.8 percentage points, which is about four percent relative to the
mean. The expenditure share allocated to low price stores is estimated to increase by nearly
two percentage points, but because the average low price retailer share is above 32 percent,
the relative increase is relatively modest at about five percent. The high price retailer share
is estimated to fall by roughly 2.5 percentage points, which relative to the average share is
about 25 percent.
In summary, we find both statistically significant and economically important effects from
an increase in the local unemployment rate, suggesting that households do indeed adjust their
behavior when hit by unemployment. Next we consider the price levels at the stores, and
see whether we can find similar evidence of cyclicality. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics
for two store-level price measures that may be affected by the business cycle.
Table 4: Store-level variables
Mean Median 75th pct. 25th pct. Std. dev.
Chain deviation −0.0025 −0.0015 0.0014 −0.0072 0.0134
Total deviation −0.0093 −0.0271 0.0284 −0.0430 0.0418
Notes: The unit of observation is store-quarter. The number of observations with non-
missing values for both variables is 33,830. There are 2313 distinct stores. The sample
period is 2013q1 to 2018q2.
The variables Chain deviation and Total deviation measure the price level of a store,
compared with the price level of the other stores in the store chain and all stores in the
sample, respectively.13 Even though these variables are measured at the store level, they
13The Chain deviation variable is constructed as follows. First, we calculate for each product j in category c
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are constructed to also capture changes in household shopping behavior. Households may
drive down the average price paid for a particular product in a particular store in a given
time period (e.g., quarter) by concentrating their purchases in weeks when the product is
relatively cheap, e.g., by taking advantage of sales campaigns.
For the two store-level variables, we estimate a model of the following form,
Ysm,t = αsm + βURsm,t + λt + εsm,t, (2)
where Ysm,t is the dependent variable of interest, αsm are store fixed effects, URsm,t is the
unemployment rate in the municipality of the store, and λt are time fixed effects.
Table 5 reports the results of the store-level regressions.
and chain k the log-difference, denoted Rkmscj,t, between the average price at store s in market m, calculated
as total expenditure in period t divided by total quantities, and the median price of the product in the chain
in that time period. The Chain deviation of store s is given by Rsm,t =
∑
c Ωc,t
∑
j ωkcj,tRkmscj,t, where
ωkcj,t is product j’s share of the monthly expenditure in category c in the given chain and time period, and
Ωc,t is category c’s share of the expenditure in the given time period. We calculate Rsm,t using only products
that are sold by at least 90 percent of the stores in the chain. The variable Total deviation is defined in the
same way, but here we are comparing the price level of the store with all the stores in the sample (rather
than only the stores from the same chain).
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Table 5: Store-level regressions
Unemployment rate
Chain deviation −0.028**
(0.014)
Total deviation −0.080***
(0.024)
Observations 33830
Stores 2313
Notes: This table reports the results from
fixed-effects estimation of the models of the
form specified in (2). The variables in the
first column are dependent variables with
the coefficients showing the effect of the
unemployment rate on the dependent vari-
able in question. The unit of observation is
store-quarter. In the regressions, only ob-
servations with nonmissing values of both
variables are used. The standard errors re-
ported in parentheses are clustered at the
store level. Markets are defined by labor
market regions.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
We see from the table that average prices are indeed countercyclical. An increase in
the unemployment rate of five percentage points is estimated to reduce Chain deviation by
roughly 0.002, which is about 0.13 standard deviations. A similar increase in the unem-
ployment rate is estimated to reduce Total deviation by roughly 0.05, which corresponds to
about 0.11 standard deviations.
As mentioned above, this cyclicality in the store prices may reflect both household- and
store-side responses, which was also the case for several of the household-level variables. In
the next section, we propose a decomposition of changes in the average prices households pay
in given categories which will allow us to better separate the relative contributions stemming
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from the stores and households.
5 Decomposing price changes
The previous section has indicated that both households and stores respond to changes in
the local economic conditions. In this section, we develop a new framework for analyzing
and decomposing the cyclicality of the average prices the households pay for goods in a given
category, such as skimmed milk or filter coffee.
Let j refer to products (e.g., one liter of a specific brand of skimmed milk) and s to
stores. In order to normalize prices across categories, we do the following. For household h
in market m, we measure the log-difference, denoted rhmscj,t, between the average price the
household pays for product j belonging to category c in store s in period t, and the average
price paid for products in category c, where the average is taken over all products, stores,
households and time periods. We measure the category price as the share-weighted average
of the normalized prices, which for a household in a given market for products in a given
category and time period is given by
phcm,t =
∑
j
∑
s
αhmscj,trhmscj,t, (3)
where αhmscj,t ≥ 0 is the proportion of total units bought in the category in period t the
household allocated to product j in store s.
Within a time period such as a quarter, purchases of a given product in a given store can
occur at different prices. By exploiting temporary price reductions, bundling or quantity
discounts, a household may pay less than average for a given product in a given store in a
given time period. Define
δhmscj,t = rhmscj,t − rmscj,t, (4)
where rmscj,t is the average price paid for product i in store j in the period in question. We
can now write a household’s category price as follows.
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phcm,t =
∑
j
∑
s
αhmscj,t(rmscj,t + δhmscj,t) (5)
This average price can be decomposed as follows.
phcm,t =
∑
j
∑
s
αhmscj,t(rmscj,t + δmscj,t)
= 12
∑
j
αhmcj,trmcj,t +
1
2
∑
s
αhmsc,trmsc,t +
∑
j
∑
s
αij(rmscj,t −
rmcj,t + rmsc,t
2 )
+
∑
j
∑
s
αhmscj,tδhmscj,t, (6)
where αhmcj,t =
∑
s αhmscj,t is the volume share of product j in period t (summed across
stores), αhmsc,t =
∑
j αhmscj,t is the volume share of store s in period t (summed across
products), and rhmcj,t and rhmsc,t are the average prices in period t, market m and category
c of product j and store s, respectively.
The first two terms of the last expression in (6) are weighted averages of the price levels
of stores and products, where the weights are the volume shares the household allocates
to each store and product. The third term accounts for the fact that some product–store
combinations may be cheaper (or more expensive) than expected, based on the general
price level of the store and the product. The fourth term accounts for the fact that not
all purchases of a given product in a given store in a given time period take place at the
same price. Equation (6) illustrates that a household can reduce its average price by buying
products that in general are cheap (the first term), by buying at stores that in general
are cheap (the second term), by choosing product–store combinations that, relative to the
general price level of the store and the product, are cheap (the third term), and finally, by
exploiting temporary price reductions and other special offers such as bundling or quantity
discounts (the fourth term).
We are interested in the cyclicality of prices. Therefore, let us now consider the change
in the average price from one period to the next. Note that we can write the category price
paid by the household in period t as follows.
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phcm,t =
∑
j
∑
s
αhmscj,t(rmscj,t + δhmscj,t) (7)
=
∑
j
∑
s
(αhmscj,t−1 + ∆αhmscj,t)(rmscj,t−1 + ∆rmscj,t) +
∑
j
∑
s
αhmscj,tδhmscj,t,
where ∆αhmscj,t = αhmscj,t − αhmscj,t−1 and ∆rmscj,t = rmscj,t − rmscj,t−1. Subtracting phc,t−1
from (7) gives us the change in the category price as follows.
phcm,t − phcm,t−1 =
∑
j
∑
s
(αhmscj,t−1 + ∆αhmscj,t)(rmscj,t−1 + ∆rmscj,t) +
∑
j
∑
s
αhmscj,tδhmscj,t
−
∑
j
∑
s
αhmscj,t−1(rmscj,t−1 + δhmscj,t−1)
=
∑
j
∑
s
αhmscj,t−1∆rmscj,t +
∑
j
∑
s
∆αhmscj,trmscj,t−1 +
∑
j
∑
s
∆αhmscj,t∆rmscj,t
+
∑
j
∑
s
(αhmscj,tδhmscj,t − αhmscj,t−1δhmscj,t−1) (8)
The first term in the last expression, ∑j
∑
s αhmscj,t−1∆rmscj,t, is the change in the av-
erage category price that would result purely from changes in product–store prices (if the
household did not reallocate consumption). The second term, ∑j
∑
s ∆αhmscj,trmscj,t−1, is the
change in the category price that would result purely from changes in volume shares (if prices
were unchanged). The third term, ∑j
∑
s ∆αhmscj,t∆rmscj,t, captures the interaction between
price changes and volume changes. If the household reallocates toward products that have
become relatively cheaper this term will be negative. The last term, ∑j
∑
s(αhmscj,tδhmscj,t −
αhmscj,t−1δhmscj,t−1), captures changes in the households’ willingness and ability to take ad-
vantage of temporary price changes and other special offers.
To obtain the decomposition that we will take to the data, we write the change in the
average price as follows.
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phcm,t − phcm,t−1 =
∆Laspeyre︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j
∑
s
αhmscj,t−1∆rmscj,t (9)
+
∆P roducts︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
2
∑
j
∆αhmcj,trmcj,t−1 +
∆Stores︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
2
∑
s
∆αhmsc,trmsc,t−1
+
∆Shopping︷ ︸︸ ︷
∑
j
∑
s
∆αhmscj,t(rmscj,t−1 −
rmcj,t−1 + rmsc,t−1
2 ) +
∆Interaction︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j
∑
s
∆αhmscj,t∆rmscj,t
+
∆Discounts︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j
∑
s
(αhmscj,tδhmscj,t − αhmscj,t−1δhmscj,t−1)
The average price a household pays for products in a given category may decrease because
the prices of the products it buys decrease (∆Laspeyre), because the household substitutes
toward products and stores that in general are cheaper (∆Products and ∆Stores), and because
the household’s shopping intensity has increased (the last three terms in (9)). ∆Shopping
captures changes in the household’s propensity to choose combinations of products and
stores that cost less than their individual product and store shares would indicate. ∆Interaction
tells us something about the household’s willingness to take advantage of changing relative
prices by substituting toward products that have become relatively cheaper, while ∆Discounts
captures changes in the changes in the household’s willingness and ability to take advantage
of temporary price changes and other special offers.
6 The cyclicality of grocery prices
Our main empirical specification is as follows
Yhcm,t = θhcm + βURhm,t + λt + εhcm,t, (10)
where h, c,m, and t index households, categories, markets, and time period, respectively.
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Yhcm,t is the variable of interest, URhm,t is the unemployment rate in the home municipality
of the household, θhcm denotes fixed effects at the household-category level, and λt denotes
time fixed effects.
First differencing (10) gives us the following equation
Yhcm,t − Yhcm,t−1 = β(URhm,t − URhm,t−1) + (λt − λt−1) + (εhcm,t − εhcm,t−1). (11)
OLS estimation of (11) with the change in household-level category price, phcm,t − phcm,t−1,
on the left-hand side gives us an estimate of the cyclicality of average category prices. Fur-
thermore, by estimating (11) with each of the terms on the right-hand side of (9) as the
dependent variable, we can decompose the cyclicality of the prices into the different compo-
nents described in the previous section.
To calculate phcm,t, we use the average prices a household paid for each product–store
combination in category c in period t. The average prices are calculated as the number of
units bought divided by sales expenditure, including any discounts. We use quarters as time
periods. When calculating the terms on the right hand side of (9), we need a measure of the
general price of product j in store s in quarter t. Our measure is the (unweighted) average of
the weekly product–store prices in the quarter, where the weekly price is sales value divided
by the total number of units sold. When calculated in this way, the product–store prices
will only to a limited extent be affected by household side responses. If we had calculated
the quarterly price by dividing the total sales amount by the total number of units sold,
the price would be responsive to the households’ willingness and ability to concentrate their
purchases of the product to the weeks where the price is relatively low.14
We now turn to the terms of the decomposition, and discuss to what extent each term
captures household-side or store-side responses.15
14There are two ways the household still could affect the average price as we define it here. First, the
average price would be reduced if the households exploit price variation at the product–store level within
weeks, by concentrating their purchases in days where the price is relatively low. However, because the
umbrella chain’s sales campaigns tend to follow a weekly pattern, we believe that any such effects are
limited. Second, households could reduce this average price by increasing their propensity to take advantage
of special offers that are always available, such as quantity discounts. It should be noted, however, that the
largest chain associated with the umbrella chain has an explicit policy of not offering quantity discounts, so
we believe that this channel is of limited importance.
15In order to decompose the change in the category price according to (9), we need to know the (average)
price in period t of all product–store combinations bought by the customer in period t − 1, and likewise the
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∆Laspeyre is calculated holding product–store shares fixed. As we argue above, the quar-
terly product–store price should not be much affected by household behavior, therefore, we
view ∆Laspeyre as measuring store-side responses to the business cycle. The variable will
pick up price reductions stemming both from reductions in the regular price and increases
in campaign activity at the store level. As ∆Stores and ∆Shopping are calculated holding
prices fixed, they are unaffected by any cyclical pricing strategies at the store level. These
two variables are therefore driven entirely by household-side responses. ∆Products is also
calculated holding prices fixed, but could to some extent be affected by store behavior, if
for example, stores reacted to changing economic conditions through assortment and shelf
space adjustments. We still believe that this variable is best viewed primarily as measuring
household-side responses. ∆Interaction measures the household’s willingness and ability to
reallocate consumption toward products that have become relatively cheaper. This variable
is therefore entirely a measure of household-side response.
Finally, ∆Discounts measures the change in the household’s ability to take advantage of
temporary price reductions, and thereby pay a lower price for product j in store s than
the average price for the product in the store. Note that any cyclical variation in this
variable will reflect an increase in the households’ tendency to concentrate their purchases
in weeks where the product is available at a relatively low price, e.g., by taking advantage of
temporary sales campaigns. Increased propensity of households in local markets experiencing
an economic downturn to take account of special offers that are available throughout the
time period, such as quantity discounts, would not affect the variable because this would
have the effect of reducing the average price. It should be noted that while it is natural to
view this variable as primarily capturing a household-side response, cyclical variation in the
households’ willingness to exploit sales campaigns may be amplified by store-side responses,
because, e.g., more frequent sales campaigns may make it easier for the households to reduce
the price they pay for a given product in a given store (compared with the average price of
the product in the store).
Table (6) reports our main empirical results. The first column of Table 6 is our preferred
(average) price in period t−1 of all product–store combinations bought by the customer in period t. Average
prices at the product–store level are calculated using the store level data set with weekly sales and quantity
information. We will therefore have a measure of the average product–store price in a given quarter, as long
as the product was sold in the given store in the given time period, even if the product was not bought by
any of the households in our transaction-level data set.
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specification. We see that the category prices indeed are countercyclical: a five percentage
point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a decrease in the category price of about
0.008,16 Given that the (within-panel) standard deviation of the category price is about 0.21
this may seem like a relatively small effect. One should however keep in mind that while not
all consumers in a given local market are (equally) affected by an economic downturn, the
effect estimated in Table 6 is an average effects over all households. Among the households
directly affected by an economic downturn, e.g., the ones becoming unemployed, the effect
is likely to be greater.
Turning to the decomposition, we observe that these sum to the total effect and that all
coefficients are negative. The component with the largest contribution to the decrease in
the category price is ∆Discounts, which accounts for about 57 percent of the total effect. This
indicates that customers are more willing and able to take advantage of temporary price
reductions when local unemployment increases. The second most substantial component,
∆Laspeyre is statistically significant at the five percent level. This component accounts for
about 12 percent of the decrease in the category price. As discussed above, we interpret
∆Laspeyre as capturing store-side responses, and the negative sign of the coefficient indicates
that stores do in fact respond to an economic downturn by reducing their prices. The
parameter for ∆Stores, which measures a household-side effect, is statistically significant at
the one percent level, and represents about 12 percent of the total effect.
These findings are well aligned with the results reported in Table 3 and Table 5. In Table
3, we found that the share of expenditures involving sales increased when the unemployment
rose. This is reflected directly in the negative sign of ∆Discounts, and also potentially in the
negative sign of ∆Laspeyre, because this variable reflects both reductions in ordinary prices
and price reductions due to more frequent or more substantial sales campaigns. The negative
sign of ∆Stores reflects the finding reported in Table 3 that households shift their trade from
high-price stores to low-price stores when economic conditions worsen. Table 5 established
that the price levels of the stores were cyclical, when average prices were calculated as
quarterly expenditure divided by quarterly volume. This finding is reflected in the negative
signs of ∆Laspeyre and ∆Discounts. The negative sign and magnitude of ∆Discounts indicates
16We choose to estimate Equation 10 by first differences rather than by fixed effects because this allows
us to decompose the cyclicality of the average price. Estimating the model with fixed effects on the same
samples as in Table 6 gives us nearly indistinguishable estimates of the main effect of unemployment on the
category price.
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Table 6: Cyclicality of category prices
Category price Category price Category price Category price
Unemployment rate −0.14262*** −0.16083*** −0.16673*** −0.17479***
(0.04038) (0.04235) (0.03941) (0.04136)
Decomposition
∆Laspeyre −0.01819** −0.01872** −0.01440* −0.01489*
(0.00772) (0.00755) (0.00811) (0.00793)
∆Products −0.00198 −0.00158 −0.01054 −0.00582
(0.01685) (0.01624) (0.01766) (0.01704)
∆Stores −0.01753*** −0.01340*** −0.02061*** −0.01520***
(0.00542) (0.00417) (0.00571) (0.00440)
∆Shopping −0.01338 −0.01966 −0.02480 −0.02730
(0.01809) (0.01740) (0.01896) (0.01826)
∆Interaction −0.00956 −0.00331 −0.00984 −0.00313
(0.00715) (0.00676) (0.00751) (0.00709)
∆Discounts −0.08199*** −0.11006*** −0.08064*** −0.10845***
(0.02031) (0.02044) (0.02125) (0.02139)
Observations 8,303,161 8,432,761 7,271,425 7,397,597
Panels 1,640,337 1,611,499 1,257,110 1,235,174
Households 87,300 87,165 54,211 54,206
Household set Full Full Restricted Restricted
Product set Full Restricted Full Restricted
Market span Labor market Labor market Labor market Labor market
Notes: The standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the household-level. Panels is the
number of distinct household category combinations. The restricted household set only includes cus-
tomers who were active in at least half of the months in the sample period. The restricted product set
is derived as follows: we rank the products in each category (in descending order) by total expendi-
ture in the entire sample period, and keep all products until the cumulative expenditure share reaches
0.95. Market is defined by labor market regions.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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that the reduction in store prices to a large degree reflects that the households are more
willing and able to concentrate their purchases of a given product in weeks where the price
is relatively low. However, the negative sign of ∆Laspeyre indicates that part of the cyclicality
of the store prices are also driven by the stores themselves, through reductions in ordinary
prices or through increased campaign activity.
While both household and store responses to business cycles have been studied in the
literature, our detailed data and our new decomposition allows us to clearly disentangle
and quantify the two responses. In sum, our results show a clear result: grocery prices are
countercyclical. When unemployment increases, prices are reduced. When we decompose
this cyclicality, we find that the aggregate effect is driven by both household-side and store-
side responses, and that most of the cyclicality is driven by changes in the households’
propensity to take advantage of sales campaigns.
To investigate the robustness of our results, we estimate several alternative specifications.
First, households that buy most of their groceries from other chains may be a less reliable
source of variation in category prices, because the category price calculated using transactions
from the umbrella chain we have data from may differ substantially from the household’s true
average category price. In Column 3 and Column 4 of Table 6, we only include households
that were active in at least half of the months in the sample period. This removes from
the estimation sample households that only sporadically visited the umbrella chain’s stores.
Second, products that are infrequently bought may not be a reliable source of variation in
prices because the weekly (and quarterly) prices at the store level may be based on few
transactions and therefore be a noisy measure of the price at which the product is available
in the store in the given period. In Column 2 and Column 4 of Table 6, we therefore exclude
the least frequently bought products in each category when calculating and decomposing
the average category prices. More specifically, we rank the products in each category (in
descending order) by total expenditure in the entire sample period, and keep all products
until the cumulative expenditure share reaches 0.95.
Comparing the results in Columns 2–4 with Column 1, we see that the results are qual-
itatively and quantitatively similar. The overall effects is similar, although the magnitude
is slightly larger in the alternative specifications than in the Column 1. ∆Discounts has the
largest contribution in all specifications. ∆Laspeyre and ∆Stores still stands out among the
other components, although ∆Laspeyre is only borderline statistically significant in the spec-
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ifications with the restricted household set.
Finally, we have re-estimated each model reported in Table 6 after dropping extreme
observations. Specifically, when constructing the household-level average prices we drop
transactions where the log-difference between the average quarterly price at the household-
product-store level and the category-level average (across all products, stores, households
and time periods) exceed two. This is to ensure that our results are not driven by a small
number of transactions with extremely low (or high) prices. As can be seen from Table 7 in
Appendix A, the results are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported
in Table 6.
7 Conclusion
We utilize two data sets on household- and store-level grocery prices and sales to uncover
how consumers’ shopping behavior was affected by local economic downturns following the
large drop in oil prices in 2014. The reduction in oil prices affected the Norwegian labor
market very differently across regions, increasing local unemployment rates substantially in
some areas.
We start by presenting reduced form evidence suggesting that both households and stores
reacted to the economic downturn. Store prices are reduced when unemployment increases,
and consumers react by reallocating expenditure toward cheaper products (more private
label products, more bulk items) and stores.
We then develop a novel decomposition of changes in average category prices at the
household-level. The decomposition captures changes in the prices charged by the stores
(holding the choices of the households unchanged), changes in the store shares and product
shares (holding prices charged by the stores unchanged), and changes in the households’
shopping intensity. This decomposition allows us to incorporate household and store re-
sponses within the same framework, and thus measure also their relative contributions. We
find that most of the cyclicality in prices are determined by household responses, but more
than ten percent of the cyclicality in the average price is determined by stores’ regional re-
sponses to the economic downturn. The single most important factor, accounting for more
than half of the total effect, is the households’ willingness to take advantage of temporary
price reductions.
122
The results are consisitent with findings in the literature and indicate that knowledge
of households’ shopping behavior and the effect on prices can play a crucial role in under-
standing how shocks are transmitted in the economy (as in e.g, Jaimovich et al. [2019] and
Kaplan and Menzio [2016]). The findings in the current paper are relevant for several im-
portant issues, such as how to measure consumption expenditures, and how local consumer
responses affect the measurement of the aggregated real interest rate in an economy. Finally,
the understanding of the scope for consumers to respond to economic shocks has implications
for the measurement of consumption inequality and purchasing power in an economy.
It is important to note that while not all consumers in a given local market are (equally)
affected by an economic downturn, the effects estimated in our paper are average effects
over all households. An interesting venue for future research would be to combine detailed
household-level data on shopping behavior with household-level data on employment status.
This would allow a more direct measurement of the ways becoming unemployed affects
shopping behavior.
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Appendix A Alternative specification
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Table 7: Cyclicality of category prices – extreme values dropped
Category price Category price Category price Category price
Unemployment rate −0.13847*** −0.15163*** −0.16427*** −0.16765***
(0.03964) (0.04155) (0.03882) (0.04074)
Decomposition
∆Laspeyre −0.01899** −0.01990*** −0.01533* −0.01620**
(0.00768) (0.00751) (0.00807) (0.00789)
∆Products −0.00358 −0.00315 −0.00920 −0.00427
(0.01651) (0.01593) (0.01728) (0.01670)
∆Stores −0.01461*** −0.01074** −0.01688*** −0.01242***
(0.00530) (0.00441) (0.00559) (0.00465)
∆Shopping −0.01526 −0.02203 −0.02401 −0.02660
(0.01763) (0.01704) (0.01845) (0.01786)
∆Interaction −0.01055 −0.00394 −0.01047 −0.00365
(0.00709) (0.00670) (0.00744) (0.00702)
∆Discounts −0.07549*** −0.10452*** −0.07573*** −0.10450***
(0.02021) (0.02034) (0.02116) (0.02130)
Observations 8,378,469 8,501,788 7,339,874 7,460,478
Panels 1,644,486 1,615,344 1,259,854 1,237,755
Households 87,307 87,172 54,211 54,206
Household set Full Full Restricted Restricted
Product set Full Restricted Full Restricted
Market span Labor market Labor market Labor market Labor market
Notes: The standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the household-level. Panels is the
number of distinct household category combinations. The restricted household set only includes cus-
tomers who were active in at least half of the months in the sample period. The restricted product set
is derived as follows: we rank the products in each category (in descending order) by total expenditure
in the entire sample period, and keep all products until the cumulative expenditure share reaches 0.95.
Market is defined by labor market regions. We drop observations where the log-difference between
the average quarterly price price at the household-product-store level and the category-level average
(across all products, stores, households and time periods) exceeds two.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix B Theoretical Framework
To organize thinking about the transmission mechanism from local economic conditions to
shopping behavior, we present the model from Aguiar and Hurst [2007] and Nevo and Wong
[2019] used for the study of life-time prices and shopping behavior over the business cycle
respectively. The underlying assumption is that business cycle variation in the opportunity
cost of time induces households to spend more time looking for lower prices, and that unem-
ployment induces substitution in the consumption bundle. These mechanisms are captured
in the comparative statics of s and Q with respect to C and µ below.
Within a period the household minimizes the cost of reaching a consumption level, C, at
a given cost of time, µ. To reach the desired level of consumption the household exerts effort,
h, to enhance inputs purchased in the market, Q, in order to produce the final consumption
good. Furthermore, the household can exert effort, s, to search for lower prices, p(s,N). We
assume that the marginal gross return to search is always positive and declining in search
effort, i.e., ∂p(s,N)/∂s < 0 and ∂2p(s,N)/∂s2 > 0. As in Aguiar and Hurst [2007] and
Nevo and Wong [2019] the price vector can be described by aspects other than price, these
are captured in N. Among the properties are the product itself, Q. We assume that the
conditions for an interior maximum are satisfied. This implies that η is a positive Lagrange
multiplier measuring the marginal cost of consumption. The described problem results in
the following optimization problem and first-order conditions
minimize
Q,h,s
p(s,N)Q+ µ (h+ s)
subject to f(Q, h) = C
−∂p
∂s
Q = µ (12)
∂f
∂h
η = µ (13)
p(s,N) + ∂p
∂Q
Q = ∂f
∂Q
η (14)
The optimal allocation of time is described by the agent equating the marginal returns to
shopping and household production to the opportunity cost of time, µ. In the following I
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assume that ∂p/∂Q = 0. Dividing equation 13 by equation 14 gives the familiar result that
the inputs to production are chosen such that their marginal rate of transformation equals
their relative price.
∂f/∂h
∂f/∂Q
= µ
p(s) (15)
Business Cycle: Comparative Statics with respect to µ and C
µ
If the opportunity cost of time decreases, we would expect the household to spend more time
to produce the same level of consumption. However, whether both time in home production
and search effort increase is not obvious. For prices to decrease when the opportunity cost
of time decreases, time and market goods must be sufficiently “unsubstitutable” in home
production. To see why, assume that the household does not change its search effort such
that the price of market goods p(s) is unchanged. By equation 15, the household increases
the use of time relative to market goods in production. This will come about as an increase
in h and a decrease in Q. When the purchased quantity of market goods falls, the marginal
benefits of search decline. However, there is a direct effect of the opportunity cost of time
on search effort which will tend to increase the effort spent looking for lower prices. Hence,
the substitutability of time and market goods in home production versus the elasticity of the
price with respect to search effort is crucial in determining the effect of changed opportunity
cost of time on prices paid by households.
C
Assume that the desired level of final consumption falls. Holding time spent searching for
low prices constant, this reduces the time needed in home production and the amount of
goods purchased in the market. This in turn reduces the returns to search for low prices
and we would expect to see a decline in search effort and higher prices. A higher price of
market goods will lead to substitution toward time in home production, further reducing the
incentives to search for low prices.
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Sources of Business Cycle Variation in µ and C
We consider variation in household income and available time to be the main sources of
variation in the opportunity cost of time and consumption over the business cycle. Here we
consider how changes in current and future employment prospects might affect the within-
period opportunity cost of time and desired final consumption. We first consider the case
when labor supply is along the intensive margin and then along the extensive margin. In
both cases we abstract from potential search effort in the labor market as a consequence of
being unemployed.
To understand the potential sources of business cycle variation in the opportunity cost
of time and consumption, we embed the home production model of Aguiar and Hurst [2007]
and Nevo and Wong [2019] in an intertemporal setting as follows. Assume that the household
derives utility from final consumption and leisure and can save in a bond. If the employment
is along the extensive margin, hours worked and income are given by nt = n̄It, yt = ȳIt,
where It = 1 and It = 0 if unemployed. If employment is along the extensive margin, the
household chooses hours optimally given a wage rate wt and labor income wtnt. This results
in the following maximization problem
max
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, lt) (16)
s.t. p (st) qt + bt = Rbt−1 + yt (λt) (17)
ct = f (ht, qt) (κt) (18)
lt = 1 − nt − st − ht
The variables q, p, s and h have the same interpretation as previously. bt is the amount saved
in period t, yt is labor income, and nt is the share of the time endowment devoted to market
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work. The problem has the following first-order conditions
bt : λt = Rβλt+1 (19)
ct :
∂u
∂ct
= κt (20)
nt :
∂u
∂lt
= wtλt (21)
qt :
[
p (st) +
∂p
∂qt
qt
]
λt =
∂f
∂qt
κt (22)
st : −
∂p
∂st
qtλt =
∂u
∂lt
(23)
ht :
∂f
∂ht
κt =
∂u
∂lt
(24)
Define ηt ≡ κt/λt and µt ≡ ∂u/∂ltλt such that equations 22, 23, and 24 can be rewritten as
p (st) +
∂p
∂qt
qt =
∂f
∂qt
ηt
− ∂p
∂st
qt = µt
∂f
∂ht
ηt = µt
Conditional on a value of ct and µt these equations along with equation 18 make up a system
of four equations in four unknowns (qt, ht, st, ηt), mirroring the first-order conditions of the
cost minimization problem. Intuitively, maximizing life-time utility implies minimizing costs
within periods. The intertemporal problem allows us to consider how employment status
and real wages affect the within-period consumption level and opportunity cost of time.
When labor supply is along the intensive margin, the opportunity cost of time is equal
to the real wage. That is, µ moves one-for-one with the real wage in each period. Based
on the comparative statics above, we would predict lower real wages, ceteris paribus, lead
to greater search effort and lower transaction prices for the affected households. Depending
on how strong the effect of temporary real wage changes are on labor supply, and there-
fore life-time income, the effect on transaction prices might be undone through effects on
desired consumption. A decline in desired consumption reduces purchases of market goods
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and therefore reduces the marginal benefit of looking for lower prices. For this channel to
dominate, the decline in income would have to be long-lasting and/or uninsured.
For households that determine labor supply on the extensive margin, the opportunity
cost of time is given by the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and market goods.
That is, the ratio of marginal utility of leisure to the marginal utility of market income.
Assume that a household is employed and expects to be employed at the same salary for
the foreseeable future. The household then becomes unemployed. Becoming unemployed
increases time available, allowing for more leisure. Holding the marginal utility of market
income/wealth constant and assuming leisure increases, the marginal utility of leisure falls
and the opportunity cost of home production/search falls. In addition, job loss will tend to
decrease life-time income, which in turn will increase the marginal utility of market income
and lead to a further decline in the opportunity cost of time. As before, the decline in
consumption of market goods will reduce the returns to search in product markets and the
effect on transaction prices might be ambiguous.
To conclude, the two models have similar predictions regarding business cycle fluctuations
in final consumption, but they differ in how the opportunity cost of time is determined.
This might be clearer if we consider the response to an anticipated future reduction in real
wages or expected transition to unemployment. When labor supply is determined along
the intensive margin, there is no change in the opportunity cost of time in response to the
news of lower future wages as today’s opportunity cost is equal to the current real wage.
We would therefore expect to see an increase in transaction prices as final consumption is
reduced. In contrast, a household that supplies labor along the extensive margin will reduce
final consumption and experience a fall in the opportunity cost of time.
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Appendix C Product categories
The table lists the categories included in the analysis. The Total column reports the expen-
diture share of the category in the transaction-level data set (including all categories), while
Included column reports the expenditure share of the category in the data set used for the
main analyses.
Table 8: Product categories
Product category Total Cum. total Included Cum. included
Beer 0.0477 0.0477 0.1472 0.1472
Soft drinks 0.0351 0.0828 0.1083 0.2555
White cheese, semi-hard 0.0221 0.1049 0.0681 0.3236
Milk, low-fat 0.0192 0.1240 0.0592 0.3828
Beef, minced 0.0137 0.1378 0.0424 0.4252
Ham 0.0132 0.1510 0.0408 0.4661
Eggs 0.0117 0.1627 0.0361 0.5022
Coffee, ground 0.0103 0.1730 0.0316 0.5338
Pizza, frozen 0.0099 0.1828 0.0304 0.5643
Chocolate, bars 0.0095 0.1923 0.0293 0.5936
Bread, whole grain 0.0090 0.2013 0.0278 0.6214
Chicken, raw fillets 0.0089 0.2102 0.0275 0.6488
Orange juice 0.0086 0.2188 0.0265 0.6754
Potato chips 0.0085 0.2273 0.0263 0.7016
Beef, steaks 0.0080 0.2354 0.0248 0.7264
Sausages 0.0065 0.2419 0.0201 0.7465
Toilet tissue 0.0058 0.2477 0.0178 0.7643
Fish, fresh 0.0057 0.2534 0.0176 0.7819
Bread, semi whole-grain 0.0053 0.2586 0.0163 0.7982
Sour cream 0.0052 0.2638 0.0160 0.8142
Milk, full 0.0043 0.2682 0.0134 0.8276
Chocolate, snack bars 0.0041 0.2723 0.0126 0.8402
Continued on next page
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Table 8 – continued from previous page
Product category Total Cum. total Included Cum. included
Yoghurt, fruit 0.0039 0.2762 0.0121 0.8523
Butter 0.0031 0.2793 0.0096 0.8619
Mackerel, tinned 0.0030 0.2822 0.0092 0.8711
Milk, skimmed 0.0029 0.2852 0.0091 0.8801
Toothpaste 0.0027 0.2879 0.0085 0.8886
Fish, frozen salmon and trout 0.0026 0.2906 0.0081 0.8967
Carbonated water, flavoured 0.0024 0.2930 0.0074 0.9041
Tortillas 0.0024 0.2953 0.0073 0.9114
Diapers 0.0023 0.2976 0.0071 0.9186
Pork, steaks 0.0022 0.2998 0.0068 0.9253
Fish, frozen whitefish 0.0019 0.3017 0.0057 0.9311
Coffee, instant 0.0018 0.3034 0.0054 0.9365
Dishwasher detergent, tablets 0.0017 0.3052 0.0053 0.9418
Shampoo 0.0017 0.3068 0.0051 0.9470
Laundry detergent, liquid 0.0016 0.3084 0.0049 0.9518
Breakfast cereals 0.0015 0.3099 0.0046 0.9565
Beer, alcohol free 0.0015 0.3114 0.0046 0.9611
Carbonated water, not flavoured 0.0015 0.3129 0.0046 0.9657
Laundry detergent, powder 0.0015 0.3144 0.0045 0.9702
Ketchup 0.0013 0.3156 0.0039 0.9741
Müsli 0.0012 0.3168 0.0037 0.9778
Salsa 0.0011 0.3179 0.0034 0.9812
Dishwasher detergent, powder 0.0011 0.3190 0.0033 0.9845
Tomatoes, tinned 0.0009 0.3199 0.0029 0.9874
Still water, not flavoured 0.0008 0.3208 0.0026 0.9900
Sanitary napkins 0.0008 0.3216 0.0026 0.9926
Pantyliners 0.0008 0.3224 0.0026 0.9951
Spaghetti 0.0007 0.3232 0.0022 0.9973
Still water, flavoured 0.0006 0.3237 0.0018 0.9991
Continued on next page
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Table 8 – continued from previous page
Product category Total Cum. total Included Cum. included
Laundry detergent, tablets 0.0003 0.3240 0.0009 1.0000
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Appendix D Business cycle measures
Table 9: County-level unemployment
County Month Unemployment
Akershus 2013m1 2.3
Aust-Agder 2013m1 3.5
Buskerud 2013m1 2.5
Finnmark 2013m1 3.7
Hedmark 2013m1 2.9
Hordaland 2013m1 2.1
Møre og Romsdal 2013m1 2.1
Nord-Trøndelag 2013m1 2.5
Nordland 2013m1 3.1
Oppland 2013m1 2.6
Oslo 2013m1 3.4
Østfold 2013m1 3.6
Rogaland 2013m1 1.8
Sogn og Fjordane 2013m1 2.0
Sør-Trøndelag 2013m1 2.5
Telemark 2013m1 3.6
Troms 2013m1 2.3
Vest-Agder 2013m1 3.1
Vestfold 2013m1 3.2
Akershus 2016m1 2.7
Aust-Agder 2016m1 4.7
Buskerud 2016m1 3.1
Finnmark 2016m1 3.8
Hedmark 2016m1 2.6
Hordaland 2016m1 3.5
Møre og Romsdal 2016m1 3.3
Continued on next page
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Table 9 – continued from previous page
County Month Unemployment
Nord-Trøndelag 2016m1 2.9
Nordland 2016m1 2.9
Oppland 2016m1 2.4
Oslo 2016m1 3.6
Østfold 2016m1 3.6
Rogaland 2016m1 4.8
Sogn og Fjordane 2016m1 2.4
Sør-Trøndelag 2016m1 3.0
Telemark 2016m1 4.0
Troms 2016m1 2.3
Vest-Agder 2016m1 4.1
Vestfold 2016m1 3.3
Akershus 2018m6 1.8
Aust-Agder 2018m6 2.5
Buskerud 2018m6 2.3
Finnmark 2018m6 2.7
Hedmark 2018m6 1.7
Hordaland 2018m6 2.5
Møre og Romsdal 2018m6 2.2
Nordland 2018m6 1.7
Oppland 2018m6 1.4
Oslo 2018m6 2.4
Østfold 2018m6 2.6
Rogaland 2018m6 2.6
Sogn og Fjordane 2018m6 1.3
Telemark 2018m6 2.4
Troms 2018m6 1.5
Trøndelag 2018m6 1.9
Vest-Agder 2018m6 2.4
Continued on next page
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Table 9 – continued from previous page
County Month Unemployment
Vestfold 2018m6 2.7
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Table 10: Municipality-level unemployment in Rogaland
Municipality Month Unemployment
Bjerkreim 2013m1 0.7
Bokn 2013m1 1.4
Eigersund 2013m1 1.5
Finnøy 2013m1 0.7
Forsand 2013m1 2.5
Gjesdal 2013m1 1.8
Hå 2013m1 1.8
Haugesund 2013m1 2.8
Hjelmeland 2013m1 0.7
Karmøy 2013m1 2.3
Klepp 2013m1 1.5
Kvitsøy 2013m1 1.9
Lund 2013m1 1.7
Randaberg 2013m1 1.1
Rennesøy 2013m1 1.0
Sandnes 2013m1 1.9
Sauda 2013m1 1.7
Sokndal 2013m1 1.2
Sola 2013m1 1.5
Stavanger 2013m1 1.6
Strand 2013m1 1.8
Suldal 2013m1 1.6
Time 2013m1 1.7
Tysvær 2013m1 1.6
Utsira 2013m1 0.8
Vindafjord 2013m1 1.7
Bjerkreim 2016m1 3.1
Bokn 2016m1 3.1
Continued on next page
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Table 10 – continued from previous page
Municipality Month Unemployment
Eigersund 2016m1 5.2
Finnøy 2016m1 2.1
Forsand 2016m1 3.3
Gjesdal 2016m1 4.8
Hå 2016m1 3.2
Haugesund 2016m1 6.2
Hjelmeland 2016m1 3.0
Karmøy 2016m1 4.9
Klepp 2016m1 4.5
Kvitsøy 2016m1 2.1
Lund 2016m1 9.3
Randaberg 2016m1 4.4
Rennesøy 2016m1 3.4
Sandnes 2016m1 5.6
Sauda 2016m1 2.7
Sokndal 2016m1 4.3
Sola 2016m1 5.1
Stavanger 2016m1 5.0
Strand 2016m1 4.9
Suldal 2016m1 0.9
Time 2016m1 4.0
Tysvær 2016m1 2.7
Utsira 2016m1 NA
Vindafjord 2016m1 2.6
Bjerkreim 2018m6 1.2
Bokn 2018m6 1.4
Eigersund 2018m6 2.8
Finnøy 2018m6 1.4
Forsand 2018m6 2.3
Continued on next page
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Table 10 – continued from previous page
Municipality Month Unemployment
Gjesdal 2018m6 2.6
Hå 2018m6 2.1
Haugesund 2018m6 2.8
Hjelmeland 2018m6 1.3
Karmøy 2018m6 2.3
Klepp 2018m6 2.2
Kvitsøy 2018m6 1.4
Lund 2018m6 1.0
Randaberg 2018m6 2.3
Rennesøy 2018m6 2.5
Sandnes 2018m6 3.0
Sauda 2018m6 1.4
Sokndal 2018m6 1.4
Sola 2018m6 3.0
Stavanger 2018m6 2.9
Strand 2018m6 2.4
Suldal 2018m6 0.7
Time 2018m6 2.2
Tysvær 2018m6 1.5
Utsira 2018m6 NA
Vindafjord 2018m6 2.8
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Table 11: Additonal business cycle measures
Municipality Year Disposable income Gross product Wage cost
Akershus 2013 536000 224537 143125
Aust-Agder 2013 462000 33750 22398
Buskerud 2013 465000 94282 62130
Finnmark 2013 454000 26063 17659
Hedmark 2013 430000 59093 38156
Hordaland 2013 488000 226218 141186
Møre og Romsdal 2013 480000 108996 65959
Nord-Trøndelag 2013 462000 41824 27878
Nordland 2013 452000 83443 52057
Oppland 2013 436000 56313 36562
Oslo 2013 410000 459605 273353
Østfold 2013 442000 81475 54222
Rogaland 2013 532000 226278 150557
Sogn og Fjordane 2013 486000 40746 25338
Sør-Trøndelag 2013 463000 123555 79044
Telemark 2013 442000 55764 35318
Troms 2013 457000 59616 38158
Vest-Agder 2013 468000 68798 43063
Vestfold 2013 455000 74917 50452
Akershus 2016 573000 255988 165857
Aust-Agder 2016 489000 37728 24074
Buskerud 2016 500000 105219 68259
Finnmark 2016 493000 31874 18995
Hedmark 2016 463000 68471 43283
Hordaland 2016 517000 244246 149038
Møre og Romsdal 2016 509000 113118 70447
Nord-Trøndelag 2016 497000 48397 30307
Nordland 2016 485000 98737 57447
Continued on next page
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Table 11 – continued from previous page
Municipality Year Disposable income Gross product Wage cost
Oppland 2016 472000 65780 41868
Oslo 2016 446000 516690 308924
Østfold 2016 477000 93495 60838
Rogaland 2016 547000 231403 158615
Sogn og Fjordane 2016 516000 48187 28429
Sør-Trøndelag 2016 500000 143387 88442
Telemark 2016 473000 62445 38737
Troms 2016 493000 71758 44217
Vest-Agder 2016 495000 71959 45866
Vestfold 2016 489000 86107 56465
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